社会民主主义对抗共产主义(Social Democracy versus Communism)

5. The Communist International

5,共产国际

Wherein do the Russian people differ from other peoples of our capitalist civilization? First of all, of course, in their economic and political backwardness. As a result of this backwardness any Socialist party in present-day Russia would be unavoidably driven to the methods of utopianism and dictatorship if it were placed in power by the force of extraordinary circumstances, without support of the majority of the population, and if its own illusions impelled it to undertake the immediate task of building Socialism. Therein lies the explanation of the Bolshevik methods in Russia. The experiments of the utopian Socialists in Western Europe a hundred years ago were likewise impelled by the insufficient development of the working class in their countries. The methods of both the old utopians and the Bolsheviks are not mere accidents, but derive their logic from immature conditions. But this explanation offers just as little proof now as it did in the time of the utopians that these methods can lead to the desired aim. To prove the wisdom of the Bolshevik methods one would have to prove first that the Russian workers possess some peculiar inherent socialist powers which the workers of Western Europe lack. So far the existence of such powers has not been established.

1,俄国人民和其他在我们的资本主义文明下的人民有什么不同呢?首先,当然是,他们的经济和政治上的落后。作为落后的结果,任何社会主义政党如果他们在特殊情况下,在没有多数人民支持的情况下获得权力,如果他们自己的幻想是立刻完成建设社会主义的任务,都会在今天的俄国无法避免的趋向于乌托邦和独裁。这就是对布尔什维克在俄国的模式的解释。一百年前西欧的乌托邦社会主义者的实验同样受到了在他们国家没有有效发展的工人阶级们的推动。老乌托邦主义者的模式和布尔什维克的模式的重叠并不是巧合,而是来源于他们在不成熟状态下产生的逻辑。但是这一解释几乎没有在现在提供证据证明这些手段能够实现目标,同样在乌托邦主义者所在的时期也没有提供证据证明能够实现目标。为了证明布尔什维克模式的智慧之处,一个人需要首先证明俄国工人们表现出了一些奇特的内在的社会主义力量,而这种力量是西欧工人们缺少的。迄今为止这种力量还没能被证明存在。

This in fact was the view held by Lenin himself as late as 1918. He believed that the revolution in Russia would be the signal for a social revolution in Western capitalist countries, and that only the establishment of a Socialist order in these countries could furnish the direction and the means for Socialist construction in Russia. Lenin undertook this construction in the hope of a world revolution which, according to his belief, was to break out immediately.

2,事实上,这是列宁自己在1918年晚期的时候持有的观点。他相信在俄国的革命会成为在西方资本主义国家发生的社会革命的信号,只有这些国家中建立的社会主义秩序才能提供给俄国社会主义建设的方向。列宁承诺这一建设是世界革命的希望,而根据他的信念,世界革命会立即爆发。

In this he was deceived. Instead of the world revolution came civil war in Russia. This war helped to some extent in the establishment of a militarized state economy. This, indeed, is the result of every war, even in capitalist countries, if the war is of long duration and demands great sacrifices. But this compulsory economy can by no means be regarded as a higher, socialist economy. It is only a temporary measure necessitated by an extreme emergency.

3,他撒谎了。与世界革命相反的是,俄国爆发了内战。这场战争帮助扩展了军事化国家经济的建立。这是任何一场战争中的结果,甚至在资本主义国家中也是如此,如果战争持续时间很长然后要求巨大的牺牲。但是这种义务经济和社会主义经济一点关系也没有。这只是一种在极端紧急的情况下必要的临时措施。

When the civil war in Russia subsided and all the hopes for a world revolution vanished, doubts began to arise in the minds of the Bolshevist rulers as to whether “military communism” would last long. Lacking a basis in the initiative and discipline of the working class, this new regime could be maintained only with the aid of a bureaucratic apparatus, as unwieldy as it was inefficient, and by means of military discipline in the factories and brutal terrorism practiced by an all-powerful political police throughout the state. “Military communism” resulted in a constant fall of production and brought the country to an ever-growing economic decline.

4,当俄国的内战平息和所有世界革命的希望都消失时,对布尔什维克的“军事共产主义”还能持续多久的怀疑开始增长。缺乏工人阶级的能动性和纪律性基础,这一新政权只能通过官僚机器的协助维持,官僚机器巨大而低效,同时工厂里的军事纪律和握有大权的政治警察的暴力恐怖主义在国家中到处都是。“军事共产主义”导致了生产率的普遍降低,带给这个国家不断恶化的经济衰退。

This was soon recognized by the majority of the Bolsheviks themselves. Lenin created a breach in this Communism by making some concession to private economy (NEP, 1921), and that gave the country a short breathing spell. Lenin himself called it a respite. And, in fact, Russia under “military Communism” was gasping for breath.

5,很快布尔什维克的主流意识到了这点。列宁在这一共产主义中通过对私有经济进行部分让步创造了一个裂口(NEP,1921),这给了这个国家短暂的喘息。列宁自己叫这个为喘息。事实上,俄国在“军事共产主义”下痛苦的喘息着。

Before the war Lenin did not find in the Socialist International the favorable conditions for the promotion of his party dictatorship in Russia. To avoid being isolated he was compelled to accept democracy in the International, not only platonically but in fact. However distasteful he found some decisions of the congresses of the International, he confined himself to criticism, which was his right, but did not venture to defy them.

6,在战争之前列宁发现社会主义国际对他在俄国推行党内独裁并不欢迎。为了避免被鼓励,他被迫接受了社会主义国际中的民主,不仅在嘴上而且在实际上都接受了。然而他发现一些社会国际议会的决定令人反感,他限制自己去批判,这是他的权利,但他没有冒险去违抗它们。

This situation changed after the World War had temporarily halted the functioning of the International. In 1915, a group representing some elements of the International met in Zimmerwald, Switzerland. These were not entirely of the same opinions however. Some wanted to revive the old International, while others proposed the creation of a new, Third International, from which all Socialist parties which did not accept the demands of the founders of the new International were to be excluded. The Bolsheviks, commanded by Lenin, were to form the nucleus of the new body. From the outset, therefore, their object was not to rebuild but to split the International.

7,在世界大战后,社会主义国际的运作被暂时中止了,从而改变了局势。在1915年,一个代表了社会国际中部分元素的组织在瑞士的Zimmerwald会面。然而他们在观点上并不完全一致。一些人希望复活旧的社会主义国际,而另一些人主张创建一个新的第三国际,而任何不承认新国际的建立者的命令的社会主义政党将会被驱逐出去。布尔什维克在列宁的命令下组成核心。从起点来看,因此,他们的目标不是重建国际,而是分裂国际。

The war had hardly come to an end when they undertook to form the new, Third International, in opposition to the old one, which in the meanwhile (1919 had again begun to function. The grandiose experiment undertaken by the Bolsheviks could not help influencing the Socialist parties of the Western countries. These parties, until then united, now split. A part of them enthusiastically joined the Bolsheviks and began to apply their methods in Western Europe and America. This led to the rise of the Communist parties. The majority remained faithful to the old Socialist principles and rejected the Communist methods under all circumstances. As between these two currents there soon appeared a third one. The latter rejects the Bolshevik methods for its own country but believes that these methods axe justified in Russia. Contrary to the democratic structure of the First and Second Internationals, the Third or Communist International, also known as the Comintern, was rigidly dictatorial. It established its permanent seat in Moscow and became merely the tool of the Russian government, which thus obtained a large number of agents abroad, some of them sincere and enthusiastic supporters and others well paid agents, but all of them blind instruments of the Moscow centre without any will of their own.

8,当他们承诺建立一个新的第三国际以反对旧的那个时,战争几乎结束了,同时社会主义国际开始运转(1919)。布尔什维克承诺的雄伟实验无法影响到西方国家的社会主义政党。这些政党直到现在还是联合的,但现在开始分裂了。部分人热情的加入了布尔什维克,然后开始在西欧和美国接受他们的模式。这导致了共产党的崛起。主流保留了对旧的社会主义原则的忠诚,在所有情况下都拒绝了共产党模式。在这两者之间出现了第三种。后者在自己的国家内拒绝了布尔什维克模式,但相信这些模式适合俄国。与第一国际和第二国际的民主架构相反的是,第三或共产党国际,也被称作共产国际,是严格独裁的。它建立时给了莫斯科永久席位,并成为了俄国政府的工具,维持了大批海外间谍,其中一些是真诚和热情的支持者,另一些是雇佣间谍,但是所有人都是莫斯科中心的盲目的工具,没有任何自己的意志。

The times seemed to favor the Soviet rulers. They expected a world revolution which they, the world’s most successful revolutionists, would lead. The dictatorship over Russia was to be extended to a world dictatorship.

9,看起来这一切满足了苏维埃统治者们。他们期待着世界革命,而他们作为世界上最成功的革命者们将会领导革命。俄国的独裁会被扩展为世界的独裁。

But the calculations upon which they based their plans for world domination proved erroneous. Their dictatorship fitted the peculiar conditions then prevailing in Russia but was abhorrent to the peoples of Western civilization. Moreover, even in Russia the Communist dictatorship could assert itself only because of the abnormal conditions which ensued upon the military collapse of 1917.

10,但是他们基于主宰世界的计划的算盘被证明是错误的。他们的独裁适配了俄国广泛存在的特别局势,但是对于西方文明的人民来说是非常可恶的。然而,甚至在俄国共产党的独裁只是因为1917年的军队崩溃之后接踵而至的不正常的局势才树立的。

Only those who never understood the nature of the modern state could have expected a revolution in every belligerent country at the end of the war. Revolutions occurred only in defeated military monarchies. But in these, too, the Communists failed to win. No highly developed working class will accept dictatorship, however proletarian its colors, as instrument of emancipation.

11,只有那些从来没有理解过现代国家的本质的人才会期待在战争结束时每个交战国都会爆发革命。革命只在被击败的军事王国中发生了。不过在这些国家中,共产主义者们也失败了。然而没有哪个高度发展的工人阶级会接受以无产阶级的名义粉饰的,作为解放的工具的独裁。

The idea of a Communist world revolution met with a quite different fate than the Communist dictatorship in Russia. The latter was victorious and has been able to maintain itself unbroken to this day. The former suffered complete failure. But the efforts to put the idea of a Communist world revolution into effect did not pass without trace.

12,关于共产主义世界革命的理念相对于俄国的共产主义独裁来说具有不同的命运。后者成功了,并维持至今(备注:这本书是考茨基在上世纪三十年代时写的)。而前者则完全失败了。但是将共产主义世界革命这一理念变成现实的努力并没有停止。

The Socialist observer outside who failed to look beneath the surface was impressed by the spectacle of the Soviet Republic. Such an observer did not understand that everything that was purely progressive in the new state was merely the execution of that which the other Socialist parties of Russia had already pioneered and prepared. All this they would have carried out through the Constituent Assembly with its overwhelming Socialist majority, under much more favorable conditions, with the enthusiastic participation of the population, and in a manner much more rational than the Bolsheviks have been able to do in the midst of civil war, which they themselves had provoked, with its consequent enormous destruction of productive forces and extensive paralysis of the activity of the people.

13,在外界进行观察的社会主义者没能看到表象下的真相,他们被苏维埃共和国的表象鼓舞了。这样一个观察者并不理解所有那些在新政权内发生的真正进步的一切只是在执行俄国其他社会主义政党已经首创和准备的。所有这些都会由制宪议会的压倒性的社会主义多数实现,在更好的环境下,在热情的人民的参与下,在比布尔什维克在内战中所用的更理性的方式下实现,而内战是他们自己招惹的,后果是巨大的生产力破坏和人民活动的广泛的瘫痪。

The superficial Socialist observer, his wish being father to his thought, likewise failed to understand that under democratic forms the revolution would have led to a speedy rise of the intellectual and economic powers of the people, whereas under the dictatorship even the hopeful beginnings for the development of the masses laid down in decades of struggle under Czarism were shattered. What impressed the superficial observer was the fact that for the first time in history a socialist party had come into power in a state, the largest in Europe.

14,这些浅薄的社会主义观察者,他们的愿望产生了他们的思想,同样没能明白在民主的基础上革命将会导向人民在知识和经济力量上的快速发展,在独裁之下甚至大众在沙俄时期的长期的斗争中的希望的开端也被粉碎了。鼓舞了那些浅薄的观察者的是历史上第一次一个社会主义政党在欧洲最大的国家中夺取了政权这一事实。

For this reason there was at first wide sympathy for Communist Russia in the circles of Western European Socialism. Bolshevism had become strong through dictatorship in the party. It had succeeded in achieving dictatorship in the state. Now it would be satisfied with nothing less than dictatorship over the world proletariat. All those outside of Russia who would not bow to such dictatorship were denounced as enemies, even though they may have looked upon the Communist police dictatorship as quite all right for the Russian proletariat. This failed to satisfy the Moscow dictators. They called upon all Socialists to recognize the wisdom and desirability of this dictatorship for the entire world.

15,由于这一原因,一开始在西欧社会主义的圈子内广泛存在着对共产俄国的同情。布尔什维克通过在政党中的独裁变得强大。他们成功的在国家中实现了独裁。现在他们不会满足于任何事,除了独裁世界上所有无产阶级外。所有那些在俄国之外的不肯对这样的独裁低头的人都会被宣告为敌人,即使他们也许将共产警察独裁看作对俄国无产阶级所做的正确的事。这无法满足莫斯科的独裁者们。他们呼吁所有社会主义者们认识到他们的智慧和独裁整个世界的渴望。

Many refused to go along with Bolshevism to any such point. The Bolsheviks insisted, however, that it was the duty of every worker, and particularly of every Marxist, to submit to their dictatorship. Those who declined to do so were branded as “class enemies, counter-revolutionists, miserable traitors, more dangerous and corrupting than direct class enemies.”

16,很多人拒绝和布尔什维克合作。然而,布尔什维克坚持这是每个工人的责任,特别是要求每个马克思主义者服从他们的独裁。那些拒绝这么做的人被刻上“阶级敌人,反革命,悲惨的叛徒,比直接的阶级敌人更危险和腐化”之类的标签。

The Bolsheviks looked upon the bourgeois parties only as enemies with whom it was possible to negotiate under certain conditions and to conclude an armistice. On the other hand, they regarded the Socialists as cowardly deserters or rascally mutineers, fit to be hung.

17,布尔什维克只把资产阶级政党看做敌人,但它们本可能在特定条件下进行协商从而停战。另一方面,他们把社会主义者们当成懦弱的逃兵或肆意叛变者,应当被绞死。

In this manner the Communists succeeded in weakening very materially the forces of labor in all countries, at a time when the old regimes had collapsed in many states, although no world revolution was to be expected, and when the working class throughout Europe had attained a position of higher significance. By considering their dictatorship more important than the unity of the working class, the Communists split the Socialists parties outside of Russia after the war as they had split the Socialists parties inside Russia before the war. They aggravated this division of the forces of labor by extending the schism into the ranks of the trade unions.

18,在这种方式下共产主义者们成功的在所有国家削弱了劳工的力量,在旧政权在很多国家崩溃的时候,虽然没有世界革命可期待,但当时整个欧洲的工人阶级们获得了更高的地位。认为他们的独裁比团结工人阶级更为重要,共产主义者们在战争结束后分裂了俄国之外的社会主义政党,就像他们在战争爆发前分裂了俄国内的社会主义政党一样。他们通过扩展工会内部的分裂使得工人力量的分裂程度加重了。

The Communist parties which arose outside of Russia as a result of this policy were forbidden to have any views of their own but were obliged to follow blindly the orders of the centre in Moscow. This centre was always very badly informed as to conditions abroad, its mercenary tools and informers reporting the situation not as it really was but as the dictator in Russia wished it to be. Every despot in history was always thus misled by his servile tools. As a consequence, the Communists abroad were frequently drawn into senseless adventures, which brought them severe and often annihilating defeat and which, in turn, were very detrimental in their prolonged repercussions upon the workers of the countries in question.

19,俄国之外的共产党作为这一政策的结果,被禁止拥有任何他们自己的观点,被命令盲目遵从莫斯科中心的命令。这一中心总是对外国的情况了解不足,它们的雇佣工具和间谍并不报告真实情况,而是报告俄国的独裁者希望的情形。历史上美国暴君总是被他的服务工具所误导。后果是,外国的共产主义者们频繁的陷入无意义的冒险中,带来了严重的和经常造成全军覆没的失败,这对于他们在这些国家的工人中间的持续影响是非常有害的。

The ultimate expression of this criminal policy was the fact that whenever a Socialist party found itself engaged in a bitter struggle with the reactionary bourgeois enemy, the Communists not only failed to support the Socialists but stabbed them in the back, thus giving aid and comfort to reaction. Weakening of the forces of labor and strengthening of the enemy was the consequence of the policy of the Communist International. The Communists devoted all their energies to the destruction of the Social Democratic parties, the free trade unions and the cooperatives. This had led, in turn, to the weakening of the revolution and of the labor movement as a whole, and to the triumph of the counter-revolution in all countries where circumstances have favored the rise of dictators operating on the principles governing the dictator in the Kremlin, the principles under which we are asked to reject “all moral and intellectual restraint.” This was neither mere accident nor occasional mistake but the inevitable result of the policy of dictatorship in the party, in the state, in the International begun by Lenin three decades ago, and which had become the foundation stone of his sect.

20,这一有罪的政策的终极表达是造成了这样一个事实,无论什么时候一个社会主义政党发现它们正在与反应过来的资产阶级敌人们艰苦作战,共产主义者们不仅没成功支持他们,而且还在他们的背后捅刀,而不是给予帮助和安慰。削弱了劳工们的力量,增强了敌人的力量,这是共产国际的政策的后果。共产主义者们将他们所有的能量都拿来破坏社会民主政党,自由的独立工会和合作组织了。这导致了革命的削弱和整体工人运动的削弱,和所有那些现状对遵从克里姆林的独裁者的统治原则的独裁者的崛起有利的国家中反革命力量的胜利,这一原则是摆脱“所有道德和知识上的锁链”。这不是巧合,也不是偶然的错误,而是政党内的,国家内的,国际内的独裁政策的必然结果,这被列宁于三十年前开始,并成为了他的教派的基石。

https://www.marxists.org/archive/kautsky/1930s/demvscom/ch05.htm