A Brief History of the American Left(美国左派简明历史)

by Maurice Isserman

“Promising indeed,” Eugene Debs wrote in September l900, “is the outlook for Socialism in the United States. The very contemplation of the prospect is a wellspring of inspiration.” Debs, a gifted and militant leader of America’s railroad workers, seemed to have been granted a prophetic gift. When he ran for President in 1900 as the candidate of the newly unified socialist movement, he attracted a mere one hundred thousand votes. As the Socialist Party’s standard-bearer twelve years later, he won nearly a million votes, some 6 percent of the total. In some states, such as Oklahoma, Washington, and California, the Socialist share of the vote climbed into the double digits. Over the same twelve-year period, the Socialist Party expanded its membership from 10,000 to nearly 120,000. Twelve hundred of these Socialists were elected to public office across the United States, including mayors from Flint, Butte, and Berkeley.

“真的很有希望,”Eugene Debs在1900年9月写道,“这是美国社会主义的前景。对前景的深思熟虑是灵感的源泉。” Debs是美国铁路工人的天才和激进的领导者,似乎已经被当作预言的礼物。1900年,当他作为新统一的社会主义运动的候选人竞选总统时,他获得了十万票。 十二年后作为社会主义党的旗手,他赢得了近百万张选票,占人口总数的6%。在一些州,如俄克拉荷马州,华盛顿州和加利福尼亚州,社会党的投票份额攀升至两位数。 在同一个十二年期间,社会主义党成员从10,000人扩大到近12万人。这些社会党人中有1200人当选为美国公职人员,其中包括Flint, Butte,和Berkeley的市长。

Socialists were influential in the leadership of some major American Federation of Labor (AFL) unions, as well as in independent unions such as the Amalgamated Clothing Workers. Socialist and non-Socialist radicals in the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) pioneered in the organization of unions among immigrant workers in mass production industries in cities like Lawrence and Patterson, and among migrant workers in the lumber camps and mining towns of the far west. While the Socialist Party was not immune to the racism endemic in turn of-the-century America, Socialists were among the founders of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). The ideas of the Socialist movement attracted a growing following on college campuses, in church groups, and in the settlement house and women’s movements. The key to the Socialist Party’s success in the 1910s was unity in diversity. Its members disagreed with each other on some issues (whether, for example, to put their main emphasis on electoral or union organizing), but for a while the common goal of democratic socialism seemed more important than tactical or ideological differences.

社会主义党人在一些主要的美国劳工联合会(AFL)工会以及诸如合并服装工人等独立工会的领导中具有影响力。世界工业工人(IWW)的社会主义党人和非社会主义党人激进分子在Lawrence 和Patterson等城市的大规模生产行业的移民工人组织中,以及遥远西部的木材营地和矿业城镇的移民工人中成为了工会的先驱。虽然社会主义党在本世纪之交对种族主义流行病没有免疫,但社会主义党人是全国有色人种协进会(NAACP)的创始人之一。社会主义运动的思想吸引了在大学校园,教会团体,定居点和妇女运动中吸引了越来越多的人跟随。社会主义党在1910s取得成功的关键是保有多样性的统一。其成员在某些问题上不一致(例如,是否主要进行选举工作或组织工会),但有一段时间,民主社会主义的共同目标似乎比战术或意识形态差异更重要。

In the long run, Debs’s optimism proved misplaced. The year 1912 was the high-water mark of Socialist strength. The party fell on hard times with the coming of the First World War. Pre-existing internal tensions were exacerbated by debates over the party’s attitude towards American involvement in the war, followed by debates over whether (or how best) to support the Russian Revolution. Official repression of antiwar dissent led to the imprisonment of Debs and dozens of other Socialist leaders, while Socialist legislators were expelled from public office and the Socialist press was banned from the mails. As a Communist Party on the Russian model split from the Socialist Party, and the IWW went into a sharp decline, the radical movement in general slipped into the doldrums in the 1920s.

长久来看,Debs的乐观情绪被证明是错误的。 1912年是社会主义党力量的高潮。 但随着第一次世界大战的到来,该党陷入了艰难时期。 关于党对美国参与战争的态度的辩论加剧了先前存在的内部紧张局势,随后就是否(或如何最好地)支持俄国革命进行了辩论。 官方镇压反战异议导致了Debs和其他数十名社会主义党领导者被监禁,而社会主义立法者被驱逐出公职,社会主义出版物被禁止进入邮寄系统。作为俄罗斯模式的共产党从社会党分裂出来,IWW急剧下滑,激进的运动在1920s陷入了低迷状态。

With the onset of the Great Depression in 1929, however, faith in American capitalism went into a tail-spin, and the fortunes of the radical movement revived. Despite the deep divisions that beset the left, radicals from a number of different groups — Socialists, Communists, and Trotskyists among them — played a central role in the struggles of the unemployed to win adequate relief in the early 1930s, and in the vast expansion of industrial unionism through the organization of the new Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO) in the later 1930s. Socialists helped to organize Detroit autoworkers and southern sharecroppers; Communists were influential in drives to organize the auto, steel, electrical, and longshore industries, among others.

然而,随着1929年大萧条的开始,对美国资本主义的信仰陷入了尾声,而激进运动的未来又复活了。尽管深刻分歧困扰着左派,来自不同群体的激进分子—社会主义党人,共产党人和他们中的托洛茨基主义者—在失业者的斗争中发挥了核心作用,在1930s初期赢得了足够的救济,并在1930s后期组建新的工业组织大会(CIO),工业工会主义得到了广泛的扩张。社会主义党人帮助底特律汽车工人和南部佃农组织起来; 共产党人在推动组织汽车,钢铁,电力和沿海产业等方面具有影响力。

While neither Socialists nor Communists were able to replicate the electoral successes of the Debsian era, the Socialists were able to attract a million votes for Norman Thomas, their Presidential candidate in 1932. Running in the Democratic primary, the Socialist novelist Upton Sinclair captured the Democratic gubernatorial nomination in California in 1934. And during the “Popular Front” era of the later 1930s, when Communists sought to build a broad-based American movement not so explicitly tied to the Soviet model, the Communists developed a considerable political base and measure of influence within the Democratic Party in such states as Washington, Minnesota, and California, and in the American Labor Party in New York. The Thirties did not usher in “the Revolution,” contrary to the expectations of many at the start of the decade. Nevertheless, much had changed for the better in American politics in the space of a few years. While Franklin Roosevelt’s administration was never the hotbed of radicalism it was portrayed as in right-wing propaganda, it is certainly true that radicals helped play midwife at the birth of the liberal-labor “New Deal coalition” that would shape the contours of Democratic Party politics over the next three decades.

虽然社会主义党人和共产党人者都无法复制Debs的时代的选举成功,但社会主义党人在1932年能够为他们的总统候选人Norman Thomas吸引到一百万张选票。参加了民主党初选,社会主义党人小说家Upton Sinclair在1934年在加利福尼亚州的州长提名中获得了民主党官员的支持。在20世纪30年代后期的“人民阵线”时代,当共产党人试图建立一个与苏联模式没有明确联系的基础广泛的美国运动时,共产党人在华盛顿,明尼苏达州和加利福尼亚州以及纽约的美国工党内发展出了相当大的政治基础和标准,以及在民主党内的影响。三十年代没有迎来“革命”,这与年初时许多人的期望相反。尽管如此,在几年的时间里,美国政治的变化已经有了很大的改变。虽然富兰克林罗斯福的政府从来不是右翼宣传中描绘的激进主义的温床,但自由派劳动者的“新政联盟”诞生时,激进分子帮助扮演助产士,这将在未来三十年内塑造民主党的轮廓。

Radicals were not, however, in a position to take independent advantage of the new political possibilities opening before them. The Socialist Party finished the decade once again in disarray, wounded by an internal factional battle with Trotskyists (with whom they shared little beyond a hatred of Stalinism), and divided over the question of whether they should abandon their long-standing refusal to back Democratic Party candidates. The Communist Party, though nominally more “revolutionary” than the Socialists, had proven tactically more flexible, and its tacit alliance with Roosevelt had helped it to grow to perhaps as many as 75,000 members by 1938 (with another 20,000 in the Young Communist League). After a bruising few years when its international guide, Stalin, was allied with Hitler, the American Communist Party seemed to emerge triumphant during the years of the “Grand Alliance,” when the United States and the Soviet Union were allied against fascism and it was possible to be both “patriotic” and “pro-Soviet.” But with the onset of the Cold War in 1945, radicalism of any sort was again suspect, and the Communists came under particularly ferocious attack.

然而,激进主义者并没有能够独立地利用他们面前开启的新政治可能性。社会主义党再一次陷入混乱,在与托洛茨基主义者的内部派系争斗中(他们除了在对斯大林主义的仇恨之外并没有共享更多相同之处)受到伤害,并且在是否应该放弃长期拒绝的态度并回去支持民主党候选人的问题上出现了分歧。共产党虽然名义上比社会主义党人更具“革命性”,但在战术上已经被证明更具灵活性,与罗斯福的默契联盟帮助它在1938年成长为可能多达75,000名成员(在青年共产主义联盟中又有2万名成员) 。在他们的国际导师斯大林与希特勒结盟几年之后,美国共产党似乎在“大联盟”期间取得胜利,当时美国和苏联结盟反对法西斯主义,并将是“爱国的”和“亲苏的”变得可能同时成立。但随着1945年冷战的开始,任何形式的激进主义再次受到怀疑,而共产党人受到了特别凶猛的攻击。

By the mid-1950s, dozens of Communist Party leaders had been imprisoned under the Smith Act, while thousands of rank and file Communists were harassed by the FBI, dragged before Congressional investigating committees, denied passports, and in many instances fired from their jobs. Several of the most unscrupulous men in postwar American political life, including Joseph McCarthy and Richard Nixon, built their careers on the shrewd manipulation of anticommunist hysteria. In the end, the Communist Party was able to survive McCarthyism. What finally led to its demise as the most important force on the left was its own internal disagreements, brought to a head in 1956 by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s denunciation of his now safely-dead predecessor Stalin. This “de-Stalinization crisis” led many American Communists to question not only their previous unquestioning support of Soviet policies, but also the undemocratic nature of Soviet-style socialism and the authoritarian nature of their own movement. Most of these dissenters left the party after 1956.

到1950s中期,数十名共产党领导人根据史密斯法案被监禁,而数千名共产党员受到联邦调查局(FBI)的骚扰,被国会调查委员会拖走,被拒绝护照,并在许多情况下被解雇。战后美国政治生活中一些最肆无忌惮的人,包括约瑟夫麦卡锡和理查德尼克松,在精明的操纵反共的歇斯底里的过程中建立了自己的事业。最后,共产党成功在麦卡锡主义中生存下来。最终导致它作为左派中最重要力量的消亡的是它自己的内部分歧,这是在1956年由苏联领导人赫鲁晓夫谴责他现在安全死去的前任斯大林引起的。这场“去斯大林化危机”导致许多美国共产党人质疑他们以前对苏联政策不加质疑的支持,也质疑苏联式社会主义的不民主性质以及他们自己的运动的独裁性质。这些持不同政见者大多数在1956年后离开了党。

Even as the Communist Party disintegrated in the mid-1950s, a new wave of radical activism began to take shape. This time, however, it would not be the traditional socialist parties of the left that would lead the way, nor would the organization of the industrial working class be the main concern of the new radicals. Starting with the Montgomery bus boycott of 1955-56, led by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and accelerating with the sit-in movement launched by black students in Greensboro and a dozen other southern cities in 1960, movements emerged that were destined to change the U.S. political landscape. White students, inspired by the example of their black counterparts in the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), were drawn into civil rights protests, and from there into a wide range of movements for peace, university reform, and social change. Many joined a new campus group, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), which became the main organizational vehicle for what was beginning to be called the “new left”.

即使共产党在1950s中期解体,一股新的激进主义浪潮也开始形成。然而,这一次,左派的传统社会主义政党不会引领潮流,工业工人阶级的组织也不会成为新激进分子的主要关注点。从1955-1956年的蒙哥马利公共汽车抵制开始,由马丁·路德金博士领导,并在1960年由格林斯博罗和其他十几个南方城市的黑人学生发起的静坐运动加速,出现了注定会改变美国的政治格局的运动。受到学生非暴力协调委员会(SNCC)的黑人同行的鼓舞,白人学生被吸引到民权抗议活动中,并从那里进入广泛的和平,大学改革和社会变革运动。许多人加入了一个新的校园小组,民主社会学生(SDS),成为开始被称为“新左派”的主要组织工具。

A series of developments in mid-decade — including John F. Kennedy’s assassination, the murder of civil rights activists in the South, and the mounting escalation of the Vietnam war — spurred the growth of the new left, while tarnishing the optimism of the early 1960s. Over the years in which the war in Vietnam raged on, a loose coalition of radical activists developed the broadest and most diverse antiwar movement in American history. It was, to be sure, a turbulent and in many ways a tragic era. Some student protesters, in despair over bringing the war to an end (and sometimes egged on by government agents), turned to selfdefeating violent street confrontations and even to bombings. But it should also be remembered that, by the end of the 1960s, antiwar sentiment had spread from elite Ivy League universities to working-class community colleges and high schools, and that groups like the Vietnam Veterans Against the War were playing an increasingly prominent role in antiwar demonstrations. The general cultural and political ferment of the decade also gave rise to a revived feminist movement and a new gay liberation movement.

在这一个十年中期的一系列事态发展—包括约翰·肯尼迪被暗杀,南方民权活动人士被谋杀,以及越南战争的不断升级—刺激了新左翼的增长,同时玷污了新左派在1960s初期的乐观情绪。在越南战争非常激烈的岁月里,松散的激进分子联盟在美国历史上发展出了最广泛,最多样化的反战运动。可以肯定的是,这是一个动荡的时代,在很多方面都是一个悲惨的时代。一些学生抗议者,绝望地结束了战斗(有时候被政府特工怂恿),转向自我击败的街头对抗,甚至是爆炸。但我们也应该记住,到1960s末期,反战情绪已经从精英们的常春藤盟校扩展到工人阶级的社区学院和高中,像越战老兵这样的团体在反战示威中正在扮演越来越重要的角色。这十年的大众文化和政治骚动也促成了复兴的女权主义运动和新的同性恋解放运动。

At the end of the 1960s the left again faltered. If the old left Socialists and Communists had been too wedded to the “New Deal coalition” of urban ethnics and industrial workers to respond adequately to the new black, youth, and women’s insurgencies, nevertheless those new constituencies alone could not build a stable base for a mass new left. Martin Luther King’s assassination in 1968 hastened the demise of the civil rights movement, while SNCC and SDS collapsed from sectarian excesses. The antiwar movement held on into the early 1970s but, by the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1973, had lost most of its momentum. And not only was the left collapsing, but this time the New Deal coalition itself — the mass base for American liberalism — was showing signs of increasing instability, as Richard Nixon’s victories in 1968 and 1972 indicated. This liberal weakness became progressively clearer as Nixon’s fall in the Watergate scandal led, not to a revival of the New Deal coalition, but to a long-term revival of radical conservatism in the Republican Party under Ronald Reagan.

在1960s末期,左派再次摇摇欲坠。如果旧左派社会主义党人和共产党人过于坚持城市伦理学和产业工人的“新政联盟”,对新的黑人,青年和妇女的反抗没能作出充分的反应,那么仅靠这些新选民也无法为一个新的大众左派建立一个稳定的基础。马丁路德金于1968年被暗杀,这加速了民权运动的消亡,而SNCC和SDS因派系过激而崩溃。反战运动一直持续到1970s初期,但是,1973年签署的“巴黎和平协定”使得反战运动失去了大部分的势头。不仅左派崩溃了,而且这次新政联盟本身——美国自由主义的群众基础——显示出不稳定性增加的迹象,正如理查德尼克松在1968年和1972年的胜利所表明的那样。随着尼克松在水门事件丑闻中的垮台,新政联盟并没有复兴,以及罗纳德里根统治下共和党的激进保守主义的长期复兴,这种自由主义的弱点变得越来越清晰。

From the beginning of this long period of deepening conservatism in the early 1970s, several groups continued to uphold the traditions of the American left. Two in particular sought to recreate the broad and tolerant spirit of the Debsian Socialist Party, while absorbing also the new lessons, causes, and constituencies over which the left had stumbled in the intervening decades. The Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee (DSOC) had been founded by Michael Harrington out of some fragments of the old Socialist Party. DSOC continued to operate, in the old Socialist or Communist manner, as the left-wing of the New Deal coalition, clearly now not as a separate political party but as an explicitly socialist force within the Democratic Party and the labor movement. It met with some success in attracting young activists disenchanted with the Democratic Party’s drift and seeking ways to galvanize the ailing party coalition. DSOC also drew to its banner a number of well-known public figures, such as Machinists’ Union leader William Winpisinger, feminist Gloria Steinem, gay rights activist Harry Britt, actor Ed Asner, and California Congressman Ron Dellums, the first avowed socialist in Congress since World War Two.

从1970s初这一长期深化保守主义周期的开始,几个团体继续坚持美国左派的传统。特别是其中两个组织试图重建Debs的社会主义党的广泛和宽容精神,同时也吸收了左派在几十年间偶然发现的新的教训,事业和选区。民主社会主义组织委员会(DSOC)由Michael Harrington从旧社会主义党的一些碎片中建立起来。DSOC继续以旧社会主义党或共产党的方式作为新政联盟的左翼运作,显然现在不是一个单独的政党,而是民主党和工人运动中明确的社会主义力量。它在吸引年轻活动者方面取得了一些成功,这些活动者们对民主党的漂移感到不满,并寻求激励陷入困境的政党联盟。DSOC还展示了不少知名公众人物成员,如机械师联盟领导人William Winpisinger,女权主义者Gloria Steinem,同性恋权利活动家Harry Britt,演员Ed Asner以及加州国会议员Ron Dellums,他是国会上自二战以来第一位公开宣称自己的社会主义者。

The New American Movement (NAM) emerged at about the same time, more from the new left than from the old, though it counted in its number some former Communists who had left their party after 1956. NAM, true to these new left origins, was more skeptical about the long-term future of the New Deal coalition, and accordingly devoted its energies more than did DSOC to the new movements of the 1960s, especially feminism, gay and lesbian liberation, and local community organizing.

新美国运动(NAM)大约在同一时间出现,更多来自新左派而不是旧左派,尽管它算入了1956年以后离开他们党的一些前共产党人的数量。NAM,对于这些新左派来说是真实的, 他们对新政联盟的长期未来持更加怀疑的态度,因此比DSOC在1960年代的新运动中投入更多,特别是在女权主义,同性恋解放和当地社区组织中。

But neither NAM nor DSOC saw their heritages and organizing areas as mutually exclusive, and by the early 1980s — especially considering the weakness of the American left — came to see themselves as complementary, completing a formal merger in 1983. The merged organization, Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), for the first time since the First World War brought together the various splinters of left opinion in America: former Socialists and Communists, former old leftists and new leftists, and many who had never been leftists at all. The decades of disunion had taken their toll. The hundreds of thousands of Debs’s day had dwindled to mere thousands. But a new beginning now seems possible in the 1990s As the old Cold War polarities break down, DSA has an opportunity to demonstrate that the history of the American left had reached a turning-point, not an end.

但是,NAM和DSOC都没有看到他们的遗产和组织区域是相互排斥的,到1980s初期—特别是考虑到美国左派的弱点—开始认为他们自己是互补的,并在1983年完成了正式合并。合并后的组织, 美国的民主社会主义者(DSA),自第一次世界大战以来第一次将美国左派观点的各种碎片汇集在一起:前社会主义党人和共产党人,以前的旧左派和新左派,以及许多从未成为左派的人。几十年的分裂造成了损失。Debs时期的几十万人现在已经减少到数千人。但是,在20世纪90年代,现在似乎有了一个新的开始。随着旧的冷战两极的瓦解,DSA有机会证明美国左派的历史已经到了一个转折点,而不是结束。

https://www.dsausa.org/a_brief_history_of_the_american_left

Democracy and Care Unbound: On Feminism’s Abiding Political Value(没有限制的民主与保障:女权主义不变的政治价值观)

By Michele L. Rossi

Today, most of us are only too painfully aware of leftists’ worldwide difficulty in winning and exercising power. Capital’s enhanced global mobility, legal challenges by undemocratic transnational bodies like the World Trade Organization, and the explosion of service jobs that offer little chance for wage and revenue growth sabotage states’ tools for safeguarding their people, firms, and environment. Governments starve for funds to implement the policies we socialists love, and our forebears fought bitter struggles to achieve: universal programs that prioritize human needs for food, shelter, health care, education; and regulations that protect humans and the planet and allow people a life outside of work.

今天,我们大多数人都非常痛苦地意识到左派们在世界范围内赢得和行使权力的困难。 资本增强的全球流动性,世界贸易组织(WTO)等不民主的跨国机构制造的法律挑战,以及几乎不提供工资和收入增长机会的服务工作激增,破坏了政府保护其人民,企业和环境的工具。 政府切断了实施我们社会主义者所热爱的政策需要的资金来源,而我们的祖先则为实现这一目标而进行了艰苦的斗争:普遍的计划,这些计划优先考虑人类对食物,住所,医疗保障,教育的需求; 和保护人类和地球的规定,让人们能够在工作之外生活。

Given the dire circumstances, it is heartening to see that over the last ten years segments of the US left and labor movements have grown savvier in identifying the dynamics behind these recent assaults on freedom and wellbeing, and more vocal in decrying them. While the labor movement’s leaders have not exactly dusted off Das Kapital, some have stepped up efforts to make union members, and wage earners and voters more broadly, aware of the extent of their losses. Labor and its supporters have publicized declines in wages, pensions, health care benefits, safety regulations, and environmental protections, and fingered global capital as the culprit. Indeed, the US labor movement deserves special praise for adopting an internationalist rather than protectionist stance and stepping up its commitment to grassroots electoral mobilization. (Direct action is fun, but eventually all but the most hardcore anarchist activists realize demonstrations are no substitute for goals and a strategy with regard to the state. It still takes the hard work of coalition-building and boring old electoral politics to deliver the changes progressives want.)

鉴于这些可怕的情况,令人振奋的是,在过去十年中,美国左翼和劳工运动的各个部分在确认最近这些对自由和福祉的攻击背后的动力方面变得更加精明,并且在谴责它们时更加直言不讳。虽然劳工运动的领导人并没有完全摒弃资本论,但有些人已经加紧努力使工会成员,打工仔们和选民们更广泛地了解他们的损失程度。劳工组织及其支持者们已经揭示了工资,养老金,医疗福利,安全法规和环境保护方面的下降,并将全球资本作为罪魁祸首。实际上,美国的工人运动应该特别赞扬的是其采取国际主义而不是保护主义的立场,并加强其对基层选举动员的承诺。 (直接行动很有趣,但最终除了最硬核的无政府主义活动家之外,所有人都认为示威活动无法替代政府的目标和策略。它仍然需要联合建设的艰苦工作和无聊的旧选举政治才能实现进步人士所希望的变革。)

What worries me, however, is a tendency on the left to assume that pointing to shrinking paychecks is sufficient to win elections. It is not. Identifying threats to working people’s economic security can help to sway their votes, but anyone who has watched the Right’s political successes knows that people get more fired up by a profound sense of loss, anger, and panic over what is happening to them outside of work. Of course the two are related – the market has grown so powerful that it now corrodes areas of life supposedly immune to its logic – but in the US, the Right has been especially clever at keeping this connection out of the mind of voters. People do not readily pin their deteriorating quality of life off the job – fatigue, fear, crime, lack of time to spend with family and friends, and frenzied consumption as the chief means to express affection and bond with others – on global capitalism fueling greater inequality. (A columnist in my hometown newspaper blamed an increase in rudeness and stress and a decrease in volunteering for Little League, the PTA, and church bazaars, on Americans’ watching too much TV!)

然而,令我担心的是,左派倾向于认为指出减少的薪水足以赢得选举。并非如此。识别对劳动者的经济安全构成的威胁可能有助于影响他们的选票,但任何看过右翼政治成功的人都知道,人们会因为工作之外发生的事情而感到极度失落,愤怒和恐慌而更加激动起来 。当然这两者是相关的 – 市场已经变得如此强大,以至于它现在腐蚀了被认为对其逻辑影响免疫的生活领域 – 但在美国,右派特别聪明地将这种联系放在选民的思维之外。人们不会轻易的将他们日益恶化的生活质量,由工作导致的—疲劳,恐惧,犯罪,没有时间与家人和朋友共度,疯狂消费作为表达情感和与他人联系的主要手段— 全球资本主义推动了更大的不平等。(我家乡报纸上的一位专栏作家指责,在美国人看太多电视的情况下,小联盟,PTA和教堂集市中的粗鲁和压力增加,而志愿服务减少了!)

And the left is hardly doing its best to help people make this connection. Confused and hampered by their own unexamined nostalgia for a way of life associated with traditional, authoritarian “family values” as much as economic security (think Mom in the kitchen baking pies as the kids come home from school), many on the left are tongue tied. We are uncomfortable or clumsy applying democratic and egalitarian principles to resolve conflicts in intimate life, so we prefer to remain silent on such questions, and cede the ground to the Right. Small wonder, then, that many working people follow the Right’s  lead and blame working women, poor mothers, people of color, and queers for our society’s decay.

左派很难尽力帮助人们建立这种联系。 由于他们对传统的,独裁的“家庭价值观”以及和经济安全相关的生活方式的未经检验的怀旧感到迷惑和困扰(认为当孩子们从学校回家时妈妈在厨房烤饼),左派中的许多人都闭嘴了。 我们对在解决亲密生活中的冲突时采用民主和平等主义原则感到不舒服或笨拙,因此我们宁愿对这些问题保持沉默,并将阵地送给了右派。因此,不奇怪的是,许多工人都跟随右派的领导,并责怪职业女性,贫穷的母亲,有色人种和同性恋者为我们的社会衰败负责。

The Right will continue to trounce the left in public debate and elections if we think we can ignore the “social” or “moral” issues of intimate life and stick to economic analysis, where we feel confident. On the contrary, for the left to win on economic issues we must tackle moral issues. And to do that successfully we need to take advantage of insights from decades of feminist thought and organizing. To that end, I offer the following crash course in feminist analysis.

如果我们认为我们可以忽视亲密生活中的“社会”或“道德”问题并坚持经济分析,而经济分析是我们对自己感到自信的地方,那么右派将继续在公开辩论和选举中击败左派。 相反,要让左派在经济问题上取胜,我们必须解决道德问题。 为了成功地做到这一点,我们需要利用几十年来女权主义思想和组织的见解。 为此,我在女权主义分析中提供以下速成课程。

Socialists have long decried how humans’ dazzling ability to create things from the world’s resources leads to misery – when those who perform this work lack control over the product, production process, or profits, and the abundance they create by laboring together goes to someone else. In the case of industrial societies, that someone else is the capitalist, who uses profit to further diminish those who must work for a living, by making any one person’s labor power less necessary, and turning fellow laborers into hostile rivals for a shrinking number of jobs and smaller rewards. Under such desperate conditions – sing along with me now – men only feel human off the job, while eating, drinking, and, uh, procreating.

长期以来,社会主义者一直在谴责人类从世界资源中创造财富的炫目能力如何导致痛苦—当执行这项工作的人缺乏对产品,生产过程或利润的控制权时,他们通过共同努力创造的丰富财富会到其他人手中。 就工业社会而言,其他人就是资本家,利用利润来进一步减少那些必须通过工作谋生的人,使任何一个人的劳动力变得更不必要,并将同业工人变成敌对的竞争对手,因为工作数量和奖励都减少了。在如此绝望的条件下—现在和我一起唱歌—在工作之外,男人只会在吃饭,喝酒,和生育的时候感到像人。

If in the past some parts of the US left and labor movement were indifferent to this tune, today they are not. What has been less commonly absorbed – yet is vital for the left to improve its skill at handling “moral” questions – are the insights sparked by feminists, who drew attention to an array of oppressions in addition to economic ones. Socialist feminists in particular revealed how women are exploited, alienated, and coerced not only as wage laborers, but also in the very processes that permit men to enjoy eating, drinking and procreating. These efforts paved the way for later waves of feminists to examine how gender, race, and geography inflect nation building and economic exploitation.

如果在过去美国的一些地方左派和劳工运动对这种曲调漠不关心,那么今天它们就不是如此。对于左派来说,对提高其处理“道德”问题的技巧至关重要的是—这是女权主义者引发的见解,他们注意到了除了经济问题之外的一系列压迫。特别是社会女权主义者揭示了女性如何被剥削,疏远和胁迫,不仅作为劳动者,而且也在允许男性享受饮食和生育的过程中。这些努力为后来的女权主义者浪潮铺平了道路,研究性别,种族和地理如何影响国家建设和经济剥削。

Most significantly, feminists of all stripes insisted that what goes on in private, personal, “emotional” life is as deeply political as what happens in the “rational” public sphere of economic production and formal government. Thanks in part to their research and activism, we better comprehend how they all intertwine – with one another, and with unequal, gendered divisions of labor and power. Distinctions between “public” and “private,” “work,” “family,” and “government” have been exposed as unstable and contestable; they vary according to place and time. Furthermore, within any society only certain groups recognize and practice, let alone benefit from, them. In fact, the US left and labor movement built and consolidated their gains upon such separations, to the detriment of women and ultimately their own movements. Today’s dilemmas can be traced to yesterday’s betrayals; the contemporary left’s difficulty in beating the Right on moral and economic issues stems from unfinished revolutions.

最重要的是,各种女权主义者坚持认为,在私人的,个人的,“情感的”生活中发生的一切与在经济生产和正式政府的“理性”公共领域中发生的一样是深深的政治化的。部分由于他们的研究和行动,我们更好地理解它们如何交织在一起—彼此之间,以及劳动和权力的不平等的性别的分裂。“公共”和“私人”,“工作”,“家庭”和“政府”之间的区别被暴露为不稳定的和争议的;它们根据地点和时间而有所不同。此外,在任何社会中,如果只有某些群体认可和实践,其他人就不可能从中受益。事实上,美国的左派和劳工运动在这种分裂的基础上建立并巩固了它们的利益,损害了女性的利益并最终损害了他们自己的运动。今天的困境可以追溯到昨天的背叛;当代左派在道德和经济问题上击败右派的困难源于未完成的革命。

To be specific, in Europe and the US, as production of material goods increasingly moved out of the home, and liberal democracy spread, both men and women were forced off the land, out of the home, and into desperate wage labor in order to survive. Yet as Heidi Hartmann noted decades ago, in many cases male trade unionists found retaining control over women, especially their sexuality, care giving and domestic labor, more compelling than advancing working class interests as a whole. They often opposed women’s struggles for the vote. And rather than organize female workers to prevent them from becoming cheap competition, many trade unions pursued agreements with capitalists that specified a family wage for male workers and hiring policies and practices that excluded women.

具体而言,在欧洲和美国,随着物质产品的生产逐渐走出家园,和自由民主的扩张,男人和女都被迫离开土地,离开家园,进入绝望的工资劳动,这是为了生存。 然而正如Heidi Hartmann几十年前所指出的那样,在许多情况下,男性工会会员发现保留对女性的控制权,特别是她们的性生活,照顾和家务劳动,比提升整个工人阶级的利益更具吸引力。他们经常反对女性争取投票权的斗争。而不是组织女工来阻止她们成为廉价竞争者,许多工会与资本家们达成协议,为男性工人规定了家庭工资,并采用了排斥女性的政策和做法。

Establishing the family wage as the standard payment for male workers was an advance; it allowed some working class people to increase their level of consumption and to begin to adhere to a middle class ideal of separate spheres, public and private, for men and women, respectively. Now some working class men, too, could forego care giving and domestic responsibilities entirely, and devote their energies to participating in the contentious public world of wage labor and politics. Meanwhile, some working class women could withdraw from wage labor and confine their concerns to the private: caring for home and children, and replenishing husbands and sons when they returned from the fray.

确定家庭工资作为标准支付对男性工人来说是一项进步; 它允许一些工人阶级的人提升他们的消费水平,并开始坚持分别为男性和女性提供分别在公立和私立的独立领域的中产阶级理想。现在,一些工人阶级男人也可以完全放弃照顾责任和家庭责任,并投入精力参与有争议的公共雇佣劳动和公共政治世界。与此同时,一些工人阶级的妇女可以退出工资劳动,并将他们的担忧局限于私人领域:照顾家庭和孩子,并在他们从战斗中返回时补给丈夫和儿子。

But left and labor movement aficionados often miss the down sides to this victory, particularly in the United States. As compliance with the notion of separate spheres for men and women moved down the class ladder, many women found themselves worse off. Women’s working for wages lost respectability.

但左派和劳工运动爱好者经常会错过这场胜利,特别是在美国。 由于遵守男女独立领域的概念走下了阶梯,许多女性发现自己情况更糟。 女性的工作失去了尊重。

Union hostility and employer discrimination closed down the possibility of wage labor offering viable alternatives to women’s trading limitless affection, sex, childcare, and domestic labor for men’s  economic support. Any woman not attached to an upper class man or an employed member of the male labor aristocracy – unmarried women, divorcees, widows, and women of color, especially African American women – had to hustle between public and private, between low wage labor and domestic duties, and expose themselves to extreme exploitation in both. The New Deal and subsequent welfare state expansion offered these women little relief (which recent welfare reform – the switch from AFDC to TANF – snatched away).

工会的敌意和雇主的歧视关闭了工资劳动的可能性,为男性的经济支持提供了可行的替代方案,使女性交易无限的感情,性,儿童照料和家务劳动。任何不依赖上层阶级男性或男性工人贵族雇员的女性—未婚女性,离婚者,寡妇和有色女性,特别是非裔美国女性 – 不得不在公共和私人之间,低工资劳动力和家庭责任之间徘徊,并在两者中暴露自己,被极度剥削。 新政和随后的福利国家扩张为这些女性提供了一点救济(最近的福利改革 – 从AFDC转向TANF – 将这点救济抢走了)。

Meanwhile, other kinds of problems festered among those who enjoyed enough distance from economic hardship to maintain a male breadwinner/female caregiver division of labor. Feminist thinkers like Nancy Chodorow and Jessica Benjamin pointed out that the two parent nuclear family in which the woman is responsible for raising young children – and by extension, any domestic arrangement with a rigid separation of male and female activity, and where caring for young children is primarily women’s work – predisposes human relationships to confusion and strife. At a most basic, personal level, such childcare arrangements incline boys to grow up to see the world in terms of difference and separation and to prove their masculinity by denying emotion, interdependence, and nurturance. Simultaneously, they encourage girls to grow up to see the world in terms of similarity and connection, to be uncomfortable with independence, and to learn to anticipate and respond to others’ wishes and needs more than their own. From the start, male-female interactions are set up to be dysfunctional.

与此同时,在与因为经济困难而保持男性养家者/女性照顾者分工之间有着足够距离的人中,还存在着其他类型的问题。Nancy Chodorow和Jessica Benjamin这类女权主义思想家指出,这个女性负责养育幼儿的两个家长的核心家庭 —以及任何严格分离男女活动的家庭安排,以及照顾幼儿主要是女性的工作的地方—使人与人之间的关系变得混乱和充满纷争。在最基本的个人层面,这种儿童保育安排倾向于让男孩成长为以差异和分离的方式看世界,并通过否认情感,相互依赖和养育来证明自己的男性气质。同时,他们鼓励女孩成长为在相似性和联系方面看世界,对独立感到不舒服,并学会更多地预测和回应他人的愿望和需求而不是自己的。从一开始,男女之间的相互依赖被设置为功能失调的。

Women’s movements caught fire because they promised to address the power inequality, coercion, waste of talent, and mutilation of selves required for women and men to fit into and maintain rigid, distinct, recognizably heterosexual roles within separate spheres. It is a pity that, for a variety of reasons scholars are still trying to untangle, radical political movements of all kinds died down or disappeared before they could (or would) digest the analyses or fight for the kinds of changes socialist feminists and their successors advocated. The boldest feminists sought to redistribute power and resources democratically across structural (public, economic, institutional) as well as personal (private) arenas.

女性的运动火了,因为她们承诺解决权力不平等,胁迫,浪费人才和自残,以及女性和男性在不同的领域内融入并保持僵化,独特,可识别的异性恋角色这些问题。遗憾的是,由于种种原因,学者仍在试图解开,各种激进的政治运动在他们能够(或将会)消化分析或为社会女权主义者及其继承者的变化而战之前死亡或消失的原因。 最有胆量的女权主义者试图在结构(公共,经济,制度)以及个人(私人)领域民主地重新分配权力和资源。

Instead, the liberal wing of the feminist movement that survived and became feminism’s dominant political voice avoided such radical reconfigurations. Liberal feminists made it easier for certain women to choose to move into the public arena, but on capitalist terms. They struggled to remove barriers to equality in the marketplace, allowing middle class white women increased access to education and professions, and to contraception and abortion. These advances should not be derided, simply kept in perspective. Freed to concentrate on more profitable endeavors, elite women could join many men in keeping distance from the labor that cares for frail bodies and cleans up messes – usually by hiring a more economically vulnerable woman to do it.

相反,女权主义运动中的自由派幸存并成为女权主义的主导政治声音,避免了这种激进的重组。 自由女权主义者使某些女性更容易选择进入公共领域,但是是以资本主义的方式。 她们努力消除市场上的平等障碍,允许中产阶级白人女性更多地获得教育和职业机会,以及避孕和堕胎的权利。我们不应该嘲笑这些进步,只是保持审视。由于能够专注于更有利可图的努力,精英女性可以与许多男性一起保持与劳动之间的距离,这些劳动关心脆弱的身体并清理混乱—通常是雇用一个经济上更为脆弱的女性来做这件事。

By contrast, many working class, poor women and women of color had long been in the labor market, and at low wages. If not, they were soon pulled into it. Global economic restructuring according to capitalist imperatives meant the family wage for their male counterparts vanished during the 1980s. No one rushed to assist these women with meeting their unpaid caregiving obligations. In the US, a liberal women’s movement and an embattled labor movement were painfully slow to recognize these women and acknowledge their problems: a need for quality child care, assistance in caring for aging parents, access to health care independent of wage labor, revaluation of wages for jobs where women predominate, a shorter work week for men and women, and a need for men to take on more caring labor at home.

相反的是,许多工人阶级,贫困妇女和有色人种女性长期以来一直在劳动力市场上工作,而且工资很低。 如果没有,他们很快就被拉进去。 根据资本主义要求进行的全球经济结构调整意味着,从1980s开始,男性同行的家庭工资已经消失了。没有人急于帮助这些妇女履行其没有薪水的照顾义务。在美国,自由主义女性运动和陷入困境的劳工运动对于识别这些女性并承认她们的问题行动得令人痛苦的缓慢:需要优质的儿童福利,帮助照顾年迈父母,获得独立于雇佣劳动的医疗保障,重新评估女性占主导地位的工作的工资,缩短男女工作周,男性需要承担更多的家庭照料劳动。

Today, we all feel the consequences from feminism and labor’s unfinished revolutions. The advent of separate spheres for men and women, facilitated in industrialized nations by working class men selling out working class women for a family wage, preserved a non-market logic – an ethic of care, a kind of morality – by assigning it to women to exercise in private. Nurturing was saved, but it was also thereby contained, made scarce and essentially banished from the public realm. Public institutions such as the state could be excused from providing care; any that attempted it were vulnerable to attack for overstepping their bounds and delivering inferior results.

今天,我们都感受到了女权主义和劳工革命未完成的后果。 男女分离的领域的出现,在工业化国家由工人阶级男性出卖工人阶级女性以获得家庭工资,通过将其在私有领域分配给女性,保留了非市场逻辑—一种关怀原则,一种道德。照料得到了拯救,但也因此被遏制,变得稀缺,基本上被排除在公共领域之外。 政府等公共机构可以免于提供照料;任何试图超越其界限并产生劣势结果的人都很容易受到攻击。

Indeed, as society accepted self interest, competition, and ruthless individualism everywhere, and in everyone, else, women in the home became a sort of “nurture preserve.” Minor concessions to liberal feminism aside, women provided the emotional grease and (unpaid and invisible) caring labor to keep everything running, especially “the market.” And now, largely thanks to global capitalism, this nurture preserve is fast disappearing everywhere, leading to widespread panic over women’s “carelessness.”

事实上,随着社会接受了自我利益,竞争和无情的个人主义,对每个人来说,家庭中的女性变成了一种“培育保存”。除了自由女权主义的轻微让步,女性提供了情感润滑剂和(无偿和 无形的劳动),以保持一切的运行,特别是“市场”的运行。现在,这在很大程度上要归功于全球资本主义,这种培育保存在各地迅速消失,导致对女性“粗心大意”的普遍恐慌。

In advanced industrial societies, almost everyone suffers from what sociologist Arlie Hochschild identifies as the “care deficit.” Men and women move through their days drained and hostile from pursuing (increasingly hard to get) wage labor, with diminishing financial returns. Short on resources, time and energy to replenish ourselves and our loved ones, we can hardly bother with the unpaid labor of caring for anything, or anyone, else. Those who can afford it contract out, satisfying their and their dependents need for nurturance through the market. The rest of us do without.

在先进的工业社会中,几乎每个人都患有社会学家Arlie Hochschild所认为的“缺乏照料”。男性和女性在他们的日子里变得枯竭和相互敌视,这是由于追求(越来越难以获得)的工资劳动,和金融收益递减。缺乏资源,时间和精力来补给我们自己和我们所爱的人,我们几乎不会为照顾任何事或任何人所需的无偿劳动而烦恼。 能够负担得起的人将这些外包出去,通过市场满足他们和依赖他们的人对养育的需要。 我们其余的人都没有。

The Right seizes on this wretched situation and frames it as a moral crisis. And it is. But what is being violated are values that recognize and support caring labor – values that ought to be claimed as part of the left’s democratic, feminist, and egalitarian impulses, in defiance of the Right’s desire for rigid order, hierarchy, and brutal defense of (male) privilege. Moreover, we on the left can reveal how this “moral” crisis has structural (i.e., political and economic) components. We need to deliver the message loud and clear: the culprits behind our discontent are global capitalism and sexism. Our society’s crisis is not due to a lack of personal responsibility or “family values” among those who want an independent, adequate income, democracy, and respect in all relationships: women, lone mothers, wage earners, the poor, people of color, and queers.

右派们抓住了这种悲惨的局面,然后将其看成道德危机。它是的。但正在被侵犯的是承认和支持照料劳动的价值观—这些价值观应该被视为左派的民主,女权主义和平等主义冲动的一部分,无视右派渴望严苛秩序,等级制度和对( 男性)特权的野蛮防御。此外,我们左派们可以揭示这种“道德”危机如何具有结构性(例如政治和经济)成分。我们需要大声和明确地传达信息:导致我们的不满的罪魁祸首是全球资本主义和性别歧视。我们社会的危机不是由于在所有关系中希望获得独立,充足的收入,民主和尊重的人缺乏个人责任感或“家庭价值观”:女性,单身母亲,工人阶级,穷人,有色人种, 和同性恋者。

At the moment, the left may not command the state, but we do have the power to promote an honest, accurate, pro-labor and pro-feminist discussion of our society’s shortage and devaluation of nurturance in all spheres. That is a first step toward winning elections and ultimately enhancing democracy and the quality of life: by creating and financing public goods like universal health care, child care and elder care; and by reassessing the value of the caring jobs women, especially women of color, are paid so little to do, expanding workers’ rights to organize, insisting men share in nurturing labor, and reducing the length of the work week. Otherwise, if we on the left fail to make use of our democratic moral resources, the Right will see to it that the market is the only thing that is “free.”

目前,左派可能不会指挥政府,但我们确实有能力促进一个诚实,准确,亲劳动者和亲女权主义的讨论,讨论我们社会在所有领域的照料的短缺和贬值。这是赢得选举并最终增强民主和生活质量的第一步:通过创造和资助诸如全民医疗保障,儿童福利和老年人护理等公共产品; 通过重新评估女性照料工作的价值,特别是有色人种的妇女,得到的工资很少,扩大工人组织的权利,坚持男人共同承担养育劳动,减少工作周的长度。否则,如果我们左派未能利用我们的民主的道德资源,那么右派将会认为市场是唯一“自由”的东西。

https://www.dsausa.org/democracy_and_care_unbound

对资本主义哈巴狗的种种狗屁的反驳

我和资本主义哈巴狗们对战也有些时日了,然后我发现,这些哈巴狗嘴里根本没有新东西,无论是铅笔纳粹社之流也好,还是我曾经的朋友也好,他们都只会重复一些最早可以追溯到马克思时代的纳粹狗屁而已。因此,我决定专门写一篇集中反驳这些狗屁的文章,说实在,我很好奇这些复读机中到底有多少是拿钱的五毛狗,呵呵。

狗屁1:资本主义没有剥削压迫,工人和老板们是自愿交易。

反驳:自愿交易?既然是自愿交易,滚去解释一下老板的利润来源?滚去解释一下为什么老板们要强迫工人加班?要通过狗屁奋斗文化和狗屁军训洗脑工人?要虐待工人?拒绝提供劳动保护?工人不工作就要喝西北风去,算个屁的自愿?

 

狗屁2:老板们的利润来自企业家精神,而企业家精神是创新和冒险。

反驳:创新和冒险?呵呵,这世界上绝大部分独裁公司有个屁的创新能力?绝大部分创新都跟你亲爱的老板们狗屁关系都没有,而老板们不过是无耻的侵吞了工人的创新成果!至于冒险,你们亲爱的老板们一遇到经营问题,就无耻的通过降薪裁员把风险转嫁给工人,还要求政府救市,好意思吗?而且冒险就可以极权独裁剥削压迫了?按照这种强盗逻辑,金三胖子也冒险独裁朝鲜人民(冒着被内斗做掉和被人民推翻的风险),所以独裁没问题了?

 

狗屁3:老板们提供了资金,就有权占有利润。

反驳:资金?先不说第一桶金大都不干净(来自官商勾结,欺诈,继承的比比皆是),就算第一桶金是干净的,老板们就有权剥削掠夺了?那么按照这种狗屁逻辑,中共当年为了夺取中国政权也付出了很多(资金,努力和生命),那么中共也有权独裁了?恶心的强盗逻辑罢了。极权独裁就是极权独裁,无论如何粉饰,极权独裁都是应该被推翻的!

 

狗屁4:老板们的管理也是劳动。

反驳:所谓的管理,不过是剥削压榨洗脑罢了,如果这都能是劳动,那么这世界上所有独裁政权对人民的剥削压迫都是劳动了,你干脆说劫匪抢劫也是劳动好了。

 

狗屁5:社会主义者的主张破坏了神圣的自由市场,扭曲了供求关系,一定会制造灾难。

反驳:自由市场?对啊,老板们自由的胡作非为,自由的剥削掠夺官商勾结的市场吗,这种“自由”和人的自由有个狗屁关系?至于供求,呵呵,“神圣的”供求关系本身就是可以被操纵洗脑的,而且也一直被老板们操纵洗脑,例如通过消费主义洗脑(钻戒神话,网红食品之类)制造虚假需求,例如老板们每年宁可丢掉几亿吨食物也不肯把食物低价或免费提供给穷人和员工,就是为了操纵供应以实现利润你最大化!这种老板们胡作非为奴役员工坑骗消费者的自由市场,社会主义者当然不会要啦!

 

狗屁6:独立工会搞罢工只会制造失业。

反驳:恰恰相反,失业本身就是你亲爱的资本主义为了压低工资和控制工人而故意制造出来的,资本主义的逐利本性决定了老板们必然会用最少的工人压榨出最大程度的剩余价值出来,而独立工会通过罢工等抗争手段,强迫老板们减少剥削,那么老板们就不得不选择雇佣更多工人,从而降低失业率,呵呵。

 

狗屁7:独立工会搞罢工提升经营成本,造成创业公司倒闭。

反驳:呵呵,把创业公司倒闭的原因赖到工人头上?按照这种狗屁逻辑,是不是允许创业公司直接使用奴隶最好啊?告诉你,创业公司的死亡率极高的原因是你亲爱的大企业们对创业公司的资本攻击,小小的创业公司在大企业的资本攻击下当然很容易就会死,大公司的存在已经是个既成事实了,你们幻想的“没有大公司的高度竞争的市场”根本不存在,也不会存在,因为竞争必然会有结果,而竞争的结果就是垄断!而老板们被迫减少剥削,结果是大公司剥削出的剩余价值的减少程度多过小公司(因为大公司工人更多,剥削的剩余价值也更多,而在单个人能剥削出的剩余价值减少的情况下,大公司减少的自然比小公司多),大公司和小公司(特别是创业公司)之间的相对实力差距反而缩小了,所以,弄死创业公司的是你们!

 

狗屁8:私企效率高,国企效率低。

反驳:“国企效率低”,这里所谓的“国企”实际上都是些国了一半的,也就是只有所有权国有化,但经营权还在政府官僚手中,政府官僚独裁专制,又不需要担心倒闭,效率自然低,有什么奇怪?而社会主义者主张经济民主,工人们民主的经营企业,创造财富越多自身收入也越多,怎么可能没有工作动力?效率怎么可能不高?西班牙蒙德拉贡合作社在资本主义的围堵下,其表现都好过99%的独裁公司(99%的独裁公司都会在成立之后的五年内倒闭),《after capitalism》中更指出多项研究都表明工人对企业决策的参与能有效提升效率。至于中国的“国企”,更是纯粹的党官僚私企,打的恰恰是私企的脸,呵呵。

至于私企效率高,谁的效率?这效率背后是什么?私企剥削压榨血汗的效率是够高的,但这效率的代价呢?代价是大批人被饿死冻死病死穷死,知识和AI自动化技术被老板们无耻的垄断,环境被污染,生态被破坏,民主被政治游说侵蚀,这一切都是你们这些资本主义哈巴狗不肯提的!

 

狗屁9:知识产权保护原作者。

反驳:纯属狗屁,知识产权根本不保护原作者,而是保护那些无耻的侵吞了原作者成果的老板们,例如制药,研发很多都是大学等公共机构以及小公司的科技工人做的,但他们的成果却被老板们霸占,老板们以知识产权的名义垄断抬价,屠杀穷人,但他们却一分利润都得不到!而学术论文也是如此,论文作者不仅一分钱都拿不到,还要交高额版面费,而那些无耻的出版商们把论文据为己有,高价垄断,使得广大穷人包括穷学生们根本看不起论文!更别说现有知识产权法律把知识产权延伸到作者死后50年,甚至一百年,作者早就死了,还保护个屁?利润给作者烧冥币吗?

 

狗屁10:资本主义下人人平等,社会主义通往奴役之路。

反驳:告诉我华尔街的金融寡头们和非洲西海岸的童工们如何平等吧,呵呵。至于“社会主义通往奴役之路”,呵呵,社会主义的核心是政治民主+经济民主,如何通往奴役之路?哦,我知道你想说苏联和中国,对不起,苏联和中国以及抄袭它们的东欧越南古巴之流都是如假包换的国家资本主义,特点是党官僚以国家的名义独裁垄断生产资料,成为全国人民的老板,这和社会主义狗屁关系都没有,但是它们是你们亲爱的资本主义兄弟,你们怎么不认呢?

 

狗屁11:政治民主是资本主义铸造的。

反驳:资本主义下只有少数剥削阶级才有投票权,1831年英国拥有投票权的人只有3.1%,这算个屁的民主国家?而主张普选权的,恰恰是社会主义,当年马克思就主张工人们争取普选权!资本主义恰恰是和民主不兼容的,因为老板们为了自己的利益总是会试图游说政府腐蚀民主,法西斯主义才是和资本主义最搭配的。

 

狗屁12:资本主义捍卫言论自由。

反驳:当年那些反社会主义者法我就不说了,呵呵,我也不说麦卡锡时代和冷战时期美国政府对社会主义几十年的抹黑,现在的资本主义故意在主流媒体上封杀社会主义者,逼得社会主义者自己建网站,还经常派黑客攻击社会主义者的网站,骚扰网站维护者,雇佣大批五毛狗抹黑社会主义,把军队里的革命社会主义者赶出去,把贴反大银行标语的示威者判刑13年,这就是你们的”言论自由“,对吧?

 

狗屁13:高福利养懒人。

反驳:滚去看北欧国家,根本没有养懒人,顺便说一句,所谓的”高福利“不过是一个稻草人而已,要么实现福利国家,捍卫所有人的人权,要么没有实现福利国家,有些人的人权没被捍卫,根本没有所谓的”高福利“或”低福利“,再说了,如果穷人的人权得到捍卫就会”养懒人“,那么你们亲爱的政客和财团老板们,这些不劳而获的剥削阶级们,怎么没有懒死呢?贪欲是基本人性,没人会嫌钱多,只会嫌钱少,白痴。

 

狗屁14:穷人穷是因为他们自己不努力。

反驳:傻逼以为穷人和他一样有他的资源运气和条件吗?既然如此,把你这傻逼纳粹扒光了扔去南极演示一下如何努力,怎样?穷人穷当然是因为你亲爱的资本主义的剥削压迫了,没有其他原因。

 

狗屁15:小政府才能民主,大政府必然奴役。

反驳:所谓的小政府大政府不过是恶心的伪概念而已,古代专制帝国政府无论规模还是负责范围,都比现代民主政府要小得多,但专制就是专制,人民对政府的控制程度(对决策的参与程度)才是关键,社会主义者主张的政府是尽可能实现参与式民主的强民主政府,怎么可能走向奴役?而资本主义哈巴狗呢,只在社会主义者要求政府捍卫人民的人权时,才嚷嚷狗屁小政府,至于政府增加军费扩张监控四处镇压践踏公民自由时,他们屁都不会放一个。

 

狗屁16:民主有导致多数暴政的危险。

反驳:多数暴政?多数人压迫少数人,贼赃够分吗?只有少数人压迫多数人贼赃才够分,所以这世界上所有极权独裁都是少数人的暴政。

 

狗屁17:资本主义下的自由市场是公平竞争的。

反驳:还是那句话,非洲西海岸童工和华尔街金融寡头如何公平竞争?机会公平?呵呵,所谓机会公平纯属自打脸,没有起点公平谈何机会公平?而要实现起点公平,就必须消除剥削压迫,然后也就没必要提机会公平了。

 

狗屁18:商人之间的竞争有利于消费者。

反驳:事实上很多时候竞争都不是什么好东西,例如为了降低成本提升竞争力,制作假货,毒食品,地沟油,派五毛狗相互抹黑,挖空心思坑骗消费者,游说政府腐蚀民主,而在资本主义之下,这些烂事是根本无法被有效消除的,因为独裁公司能做的小动作太多了,只有在经济民主之下,公司经营公开透明,这些烂事才能被消除。

 

狗屁19:纳粹是社会主义。

反驳:按照这种逻辑,朝鲜也是民主国家,白痴。事实是纳粹党上台之后就禁止罢工和组建独立工会,并和私企们勾结得相当开心,例如法本克虏伯大众这些,呵呵。

 

狗屁20:资本主义主张平权。

反驳:纯属放屁,最早主张平权的是社会主义者,1898年倍倍尔最早主张同性恋平权,1917年十月革命之后列宁和托洛茨基取消了沙俄时代压迫同性恋者的法律,此后LGBTQ平权逐渐成为了社会主义者的标配;而最早主张女权的是乌托邦社会主义者傅立叶,后来恩格斯也明确支持女权,反对私有制父权压迫,逐渐支持女权也成为了社会主义者的标配,而资本主义所基于的私有制,恰恰是人类不平等的根源。此外,最早反对种族主义和国族主义的还是社会主义者,马克思当年就说了,全世界无产者,联合起来!国家不过是阶级统治的工具而已!

 

狗屁21:社会主义者主张取消私有制,是要抢走个人拥有的财产。

反驳:马克思在《资本论》中很明确的区分了私有财产和个人财产,个人拥有的生活资料是个人财产,而老板们独裁占有的生产资料和资本才是私有财产,社会主义者主张取消私有制,是要实现经济民主,终结老板们的独裁占有,关个人财产屁事?

 

狗屁22:社会主义(或共产主义)造成了1亿人的死亡。

反驳:前面说过了,造成一亿人死亡的是苏联和中国的国家资本主义,除了自称”社会主义“之外,这两个极权以及学习他们的其他国家和社会主义狗屁关系都没有,社会主义的核心是政治民主+经济民主,苏联和中国有其中任何一个吗?没有!

 

狗屁23:社会主义违反人性。

反驳:资本主义从中世纪末期才开始出现,从18世纪开始才成为世界主流,原来在这之前的人类都不是人类啊,呵呵。而且,什么是人性?人的行为很大程度上是后天社会环境塑造的结果,资本主义这种要靠谎言和暴力去维护的制度,凭什么说是”符合人性“的?

 

狗屁24:财富不来自劳动,而来自交易(或来自主观感受)

反驳:财富不来自劳动?好啊,那么所有人回家睡觉去吧,然后请资本主义哈巴狗们滚去演示一下如何靠交易路边的石头增加财富,或者如何把路边的石头想象成黄金,呵呵。

 

狗屁25:社会主义是一种宗教。

反驳:社会主义是一种自由的思想集合,以反压迫为核心,社会主义者们一直都在向集合中添加新的思想,同时也一直在相互辩论批判,当年马克思和恩格斯就参与了和蒲鲁东布朗基巴枯宁之间的辩论。倒是资本主义所依赖的以奥地利芝加哥学派为核心的新自由主义,从头到尾都是无法解释事实的鬼扯,连资本主义周期性经济危机的原因都说不出来,这才是宗教。

 

狗屁26:社会主义就是平均主义。

反驳:社会主义从来不是什么平均主义,社会主义者主张的是一个没有剥削压迫的,自由人的联合体!

 

狗屁27:既然社会主义者这么不满,为什么自己不建立一家良心公司?

反驳:因为你亲爱的资本主义是逆淘汰的,良心公司基本活不下来,就算运气好活下来了,也无法做大。话说,你那么反对独裁专制,为什么不自己滚去体制内混到高层呢?

 

狗屁28:给有钱人减税有利经济。

反驳:呵呵,有钱人的钱本身就来自于剥削压迫,他们连减少剥削都不肯,怎么可能主动分给工人呢?如果有利可图,那么他们借钱也会投资;如果无利可图,那么怎么给他们减税都没屁用,而且给富人减税就是给穷人加税,结果只能使穷人更穷!先富不会带动后富,只会想尽办法把后富踢出去!

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

天价新药根本不是药企研发的!吸血资本不值得同情

(写在前面:新药不是药企研发的,游戏创意也不是游戏公司老板想出来的,老板们不过是无耻的盗窃了别人的劳动成果,然后拿来垄断剥削掠夺而已。)

导语:在本文中,我们将回答这样几个问题:苦X的研发工作到底是谁在做?制药公司真的在创新么?美国药价为何这么贵?面对嚣张的制药公司,病人采取了什么行动?

身体健康,是人类维持自身生存的最基本追求。

我们记得电影《我不是药神》中,老吕开始来到印度神油店的卑微。我们记得老奶奶抓着曹斌的手,说谁家还没个病人。我们记得小饭店门口一排排病友代表胆怯又充满渴求的眼神。

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图片来源:百度百科

与之形成鲜明对比的,是最近许多人因为某药企某药物临床试验失败、公司股价大跌而心疼、泪目,然后感慨“冒险家值得暴利”,看得土逗尴尬症都犯了。

病人渴望廉价有效的药,而制药公司却说,药的天价是为了补贴创新研发的高昂成本,病友们理应为此付费。事实真的是这样么?制药公司的帐,到底是怎么算的?

本文将借用天价药之国——美国的例子,来算一算这笔帐,一窥制药业背后的秘密。看看那些救命钱,都花到哪里去了。

苦X的研发是谁做的?钱是谁出的?

制药公司不断吹嘘自己的研发成本如何的高,但他们的宣传实在言过其实。实际上,大部分赚大钱的制药公司是在临床阶段才从院校、小研发公司或政府手中接手研发的。也就是说,最耗费时间、精力与金钱的基础研究与前临床阶段工作,往往不是制药公司完成的。

既然药企没有投入创新,那是谁在做研发呢?

在美国,几乎所有的药物创新研究都是被国家卫生研究所资助的,并且都是在大学、小型生物科技公司或者是国家卫生研究所内部研发的。实际上,制药公司以“研发成本”作为哄抬药价的理由,同时却不断向公共部门及小公司廉价“购买服务”,赚取超额利润。

《我不是药神》中格列宁,亦即现实中用于治疗慢粒白血病(CML)格列卫(Gleevec),就是一个典型案例。这个药品虽然是诺华公司将分子申请了专利并推向市场,但药物最艰难的基础研究和前临床阶段,却是由国家卫生研究所资助的大学研究人员用几十年的时间完成的。

1960年,宾夕法尼亚大学的Peter Nowell博士和费城福克斯蔡斯癌症中心的David Hungerford博士报道发现了CML患者骨髓细胞中有异常短的染色体,它被命名为“费城染色体”。

1973年,芝加哥大学利用新的DNA染色技术发现了费城染色体的形成机理,即染色体易位移位现象,这种现象被证明在其他形式的癌症中也起到关键作用。

在20世纪80年代,当时是美国国家癌症研究院(NCI)的科学家发现易位导致两种基因融合,产生了一种新基因。1986年,加州大学洛杉矶分校研究者发现,这种融合基因导致身体产生一种异常活跃的酶,如果这种高活性的酶可以被抑制,CML将是控可治愈的。

基于前人的研究,以色列和诺华公司的化学家准备合成一种能够抑制这种酶的活动的分子。诺华公司1994年将一些抑制剂申请了专利,并将它们加入到未来可能有用的备选药物中去。但当时诺华公司的管理层压根儿没想到这些抑制剂对治疗慢性骨髓性白血病有什么作用。

后来,NCI资助的研究人员——俄勒冈健康与科学大学的布莱恩.J.德鲁克(Brian J. Druker)博士通过与几个NCI赞助支持的癌症中心合作,最终让治疗CML的特效药格列卫面世,给原本只能等死的CML患者带来了重生的希望。

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发明了格列卫的布莱恩.J.德鲁克(Brian J. Druker)博士。图片来源:新浪博客

而在艰苦的研发岁月中,专利权的最终获得者诺华公司对格列卫的临床研究并没有表现出什么热情。直到1999年,德鲁克在美国血液学家的一次全国会议上报告了他在这方面的研究结果。消息迅速传开,诺华公司才决定扩大临床实验的规模。两年之内,实验就完成了,FDA批准了该药物。

在格列卫研发的过程中,国家财政的投入可谓巨大,而诺华公司为格列卫花费的大部分研发成本,是在该药物已经被科学证据证实有效之后才投入的。如今,格列卫已经是诺华的门面产品,截止目前,该药品已经给诺华带来了超过526亿美元的销售收入。

美国的相关制度为这样的操作提供了保障。由于《贝赫一多尔法案》的实施,美国大型制药公司从1980年开始依赖财政资助的研究。该法案允许将国家卫生研究所资助的研究成果申请专利,并且可以授权某个制药公司专营而收取专利权使用费。

从那以后,许多药物在它们被授权之前就已经完全开发好了,制药公司只需坐享其成。《健康事务》杂志早年间曾发表的一项研究指出,1998年,临床药物的专利申请中所引用的科学论文只有15%来自制药业,而54%自学术研究中心,13%来自政府机构,剩下的来自其他公众机构和非盈利组织。

毫无疑问,财政资助的医药研究而非制药公司进行的研究,才是创新药物的最主要来源。试问,将公共资源造就的科学成果拿来为私有资本换取超额利润,真的合适吗?

制药公司真的在创新么?

一个全新药品的研发的确是一个困难而漫长的过程,可以分为基础研究阶段,临床前阶段和临床阶段。

基础研究阶段是对基础病理和身体状况的研究,是整个研发过程中耗时最长,也最为困难的阶段。

临床前的阶段主要是确定药物的候选方案,并通过动物实验和细胞培养分析其特性。这个阶段成本最高,只有千分之一的备选药物会最终进入临床阶段,大量的实验资金都花在了不可避免的“无用功”上。

临床阶段则是在美国食品和药物管理局(简称FDA)监管下的人体测试,通过这个阶段,大约会筛选五分之一的药物进入市场。

但很多人不知道,绝大多数的制药公司推出新药,实际上并没有经历这样严格困难的研发过程。在美国,一年七八十种新药的研发,绝大多数是对旧的畅销药的改造模仿性创新药,真正的新药根本接不上趟。2002年,FDA批准的78种新药中,只有7种是对旧药有所改进的。剩下的71种新药仅仅是旧药的改造,并且与已上市的旧药相比,疗效不会更好。

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为了延长Prozac(百忧解)的专利寿命,避免因市场垄断权到期而带来的天价损失,礼来公司“开发”了Sarafem——相同的药物、相同的剂量,只是颜色从绿色(上图左)变成了淡粉色和淡紫色(上图右),并宣称该药用于“经前焦虑失调症”,这就是为了推广药物而“制造疾病”的生动案例。

而作为审核机构的FDA默许了这样的操作。2014年1月,耶鲁大学医学院领衔一个调研报告在《美国医学协会杂志》揭露,2005~2012年间FDA批准的约188个新药中,超过一半试验将药物仅仅是与安慰剂进行比较;只有接近1/3的试验是将新药与另一种药物对照。

即是说,制药公司只需要向FDA证明新药是“有效的”,而不用证明这些新药比市面上同类药物更加有效、或者至少同样有效,就能通过审批。但在现实生活中,患者并想知道的是哪种药比别的药好,而不是用药是否比不用药好。

但对于追求利润最大化的药企来说,从旧药身上榨取更多利润,相比于费劲心思寻找创新药物要轻松又廉价得多。而FDA深受利益集团裹挟,成为药企的守夜人,它让药企免受那些短兵相接的创新度对比测验,以促使药品快速进入市场。

研发成本没那么高,药价为何还这么贵?

如上所述,药企的开发成本其实有限,但他们还为卖药的高成本叫苦,它们到底把钱花到哪里去了呢?

答案是:销售、管理、广告宣传推广。对这些公司而言,“销售和管理费用”就是一个巨大的黑箱,其中可能包括了该行业所宣称的“教育费用”、广告和促销费用、律师费用、以及管理人员的工资等。

首先,药企高管的收入是肉眼可见的高。美国制药业界讯息平台FiercePharma公布的2016年全球药企CEO薪酬排行榜显示,排名第一的是迈兰主席Robert Coury,其薪酬总计达9700万美元,其中包括163万美元的年薪、148万美元期权、95万美元奖金、2000万美元的绩效激励奖金,和5000万美元的股票奖励。虽然迈兰公司在2016年表现不佳,巨额股票奖励也让投资人对Coury很不爽,但人家就是能想尽办法把钱塞进自己腰包。

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2016年全球药企CEO薪酬排行榜前列(图片来源:FiercePharma)

另外还有各种肉眼可见花式广告和营销,比如药企销售代表去医生的办公室发放药物的免费试用品,给医生送个人礼物,全方位赞助医学会议,聘请明星来为药品代言,在超级碗比赛、电视台、医药杂志上投放广告,甚至直接干预学术论文的发表,把科学研究也当成推广营销。

据《华盛顿邮报》报道,在每10家美国制药企业中,就有9家企业的市场营销费用要高于其研发费用。在2016、2017这两个财年内,诺华、赛诺菲、辉瑞三家药企在销售方面的支出均就超过了当年收入的1/4。光是2017财年,辉瑞在“销售、信息和行政费用”和赛诺菲在“销售和一般费用”几乎都是各自研发投入的两倍。

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2012年7月,美国FDA发布的司法部新闻稿中透露葛兰素史克公司因不当推广药物,被美国政府罚款30亿美元。

至今,美国仍然没有像其他国家那样实行药价管制的措施,而是把定价权充分交给药企,也给药企肆意哄抬药价提供了巨大空间。这背后,却是药企的各种暗地操作。

“医药是一种资本密集和技术密集型高壁垒产业,很多药企都是财团,而其背后多与政治人物有着复杂的关系。”中国国际经济交流中心经济研究部副研究员刘向东曾说。

1999年,时任共和党全国委员会主席吉姆·尼科尔森(Jim Nicholson)写给百时美施贵宝公司的CEO查尔斯·海姆保德(Charles Heimbold)的信遭曝光。前者在信中表示:“如果希望我们继续通过有利于你们行业的法律的话,我们就必须保持顺畅的沟通。”后者则识趣地在2000年的竞选中为共和党提供了超过20万美元的资金,并且要求百时美施贵宝公司的其他管理者及其家属每人为乔治·布什捐赠1000美元。最后该公司总计为共和党提供了200万美元的资金。

药企也不吝于撒钱收买FDA医学专家。日前,美国头号自然科学期刊《Science》披露,从2008年到2014年,在FDA的107位参与新药审批的医生中,66人在药物审批后均获得药企的“赞助”(包括差旅费、咨询费和研究补贴等)。收入最高的17名专家一共收到2600万美元的“赞助”。而在16位FDA医学审核员中,有11位事后辞职去了自己批准过产品的药企。药企甚至会直接干预FDA的官员任命(必须是亲资本的人选)和业务开展(比如新药上市审批超快,旧药退市却爆慢)。

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2018年7月《Science》杂志封面,可以说非常一针见血了

制药资本在疏通关系上下足了血本,美国国会和政府以更利好的制度环境回馈制药业资产阶级。比如,美国政府禁止除制造商以外任何人从其他国家进口处方药,降低FDA批准新药上市的标准,甚至授权由制药业赞助的私营公司来决定医保是否应当为处方药标签之外的用途付费。

结果就是美国的药价一直居高不下,药企们躺着数钱。2001年,财富500强中的十家美国制药公司的净收益率,遥遥领先于名单上其他行业的美国公司,销售利润率达18.5%。即便2002年,美国宏观经济持续下滑,当年财富500强名单中的十家制药公司的利润总和(359亿美元),比其他所有490家企业的利润总和(337亿美元)还要多。在2017年福布斯全球2000强中,药企老大辉瑞的利润率约为41%,而我们熟悉的苹果公司接近22%,中石化是2%。

自由市场一点也不自由,有钱真的可以为所欲为。而千万普通病人却沦为了官商勾结屠刀下的替罪羔羊。

药价居高不下,人民拒绝就范!

2018年初,美国各大制药巨头再次迎来涨价潮。与每年10%的速度上涨的药价形成鲜明对比的,却是无医保人数的不断增加。仅2017年,这一群体的人数就新增了320万。在美国,如何支付那些动辄数百美元的保命药物费用,成为美国病人、无医保者以及老年人的难题。

越来越多人需要面对面包与药物二选一的困境,“受害者”们开始进行各种形式的反抗。

那些想要活下去的美国病人像电影《我不是药神》里的患者一样,不得不私自从国外购入标价更低的药物。从1990年代开始,许多美国人组团专程去往加拿大购买廉价药品。在那里,药价因受当地政府管控而远低于美国。2003年的数据显示,美国人从加拿大购药的总金额达11亿美元。

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因为美国药价昂贵而组团到加拿大买药的美国老人。图片来源:网络

今天,通过网购、药店代购从邻国获得廉价处方药的美国人仍然不少。讽刺的是,这些药物多数产自美国及欧洲的制药公司,由FDA批准上市,但因为两国的药价差,美国病人们不得不费尽周折,冒着犯法的危险将药物再次购买回国。

久而久之,深受天价药之苦的美国民众也形成了一股反对高价药的社会力量。一些专门反对高价药的团体不断通过诉讼的方式来抵制药企的种种罪行,处方药获得权诉讼组织(Prescription Access Litigation Project)就是其中一个,这个由几十个消费者团体的联合体对很多家制药公司提起了诉讼,因为先灵葆雅公司在抗过敏药开瑞坦的推广中没有说明该药物通常只有50%的疗效,“处方药获得权诉讼自制”曾领导几个消费者联盟控告该公司误导消费者的行为。

在民众越来越多地识破制药公司的种种恶行之后,针对这些药企的诉讼也越来越多,案由包括给医生回扣、推广药物未经批准的用途、向公共医疗补助计划递交虚假的价格信息以及销毁与调查有关的文件等等。

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民众抗议天价丙肝药。图片来源:财新网

另外,人民的利益诉求与一些州政府达成了共识。由于高昂的药价不断考验着一些州政府的医保支出能力,许多地方因此面临预算紧张问题。于是,地方政府也做出了努力。比如2003年的7月始,斯普林菲尔德市市长迈克尔·奥巴诺曾集合了800名市府雇员自愿组成一个团体,从加拿大购入处方药,为个人与政府省下了不少钱。

一些立法者也不甘沉默。2018年初,在处方药价格飙升的情况下,美国一些州提议从加拿大批量进口药品。比如佛蒙特州立法者正在考虑立法建立一个机构,从加拿大批量购买流行的处方药,然后分发给该州的药店。犹他州,俄克拉荷马州和西弗吉尼亚州提出了类似措施。

当然,极力想咬住美国市场这块肥肉的制药企业们不会坐视不理。美国的制药商认为这些来自个体、民间团体以及地方官员的反抗将威胁到他们最大、利润最高的美国市场,因而不断通过游说议员否决此类的提案。此前,2006年,医疗保险关于处方药的福利计划实施,它明文禁止政府在买药的时候与制药公司谈判价格。该法案通过之后,制药业的股票猛涨。

不得不承认,暴利的制药企业已经成了一个强大的既得利益集团。从上个世纪80年代发展至今,放任自由的市场经济将药品的定价权交给了追逐高利润市场的药企,政府在其中的作用早已被逐渐边缘化;保险公司、经销商、医生、药剂师、医院、病人等利益攸关方的关系愈发令人眼花缭乱,美国制药公司和经销商结成了利益共同体,而保险公司和药店成了合作伙伴。

但同时,资本操控导致的用药危机正在催生新的生产方式。2018年1月中旬,在非专利药价格上浮及库存短缺的双重夹击下,美国多家大型非盈利医院集团宣布计划自建药厂,生产廉价通用药,走起了自产自销的“0票制”。 这一计划将由山间医疗集团、阿森松集团、三位一体医疗集团和SSM医疗集团以及美国退伍军人医疗管理局医疗体系支持。这5家机构覆盖超450家医院,占据美国医院总数的10%。预计新成立的非盈利制药企业将为医院每年节省上亿美元。可以想见这样的尝试困难重重,但这种公益性的医药生产方式仍然值得期待。

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图片来源:图行天下

医药自由市场养肥了药企,却让这个国家最为弱势的普通百姓吞下苦果。让救命药从产权、生产到销售的各个环节都摆脱唯利是图的属性,回归到它救死扶伤、治病救人的公共性,才是杜绝制药业人血馒头的根本办法。

参考文献:

1、北京商报:《药价难降 “美国病人难优先”空口无凭》,2018年5月

2、猎才医药网:《史上销售额超500亿美元的20个药,每一个都能让你富可敌国》,2018年4月

3、科学网:《美国NIH七年1000亿美元的经费对新药研发的贡献有多大?》,2018年2月

4、每日经济新闻:《吃不起!天价药到底怎么来的?两大主因揭秘》,2018年7月

5、玛西亚·安吉尔:《制药业的真相》,2006年4月

6、医药经济报:《FDA的新药审批标准被责疑》,2014年3月

7、科技日报:《推出调查报告:FDA新药评审中暗藏利益勾连》,2018年7月

8、The Guardians:States consider bringing prescription drugs from Canada to US as costs soar, Mar 2018

9、世界新闻报:《为了省钱 美国人不远千里跑到加拿大买药》,2003年

http://wemedia.ifeng.com/68755339/wemedia.shtml

到底谁才是巨婴?

有个词在墙内很火:巨婴。来源于书籍《巨婴国》,后来这书还被禁了:心理学书籍《巨婴国》被禁引发热议

这本书号称分析中国人的心理,实际上分析的是中国的中上层的心理,因为广大穷人很明显是就算想当巨婴也没那当巨婴的条件。书中对巨婴是这样描述的:据媒体报道,《巨婴国》指,多数成年人在心理上还是婴儿,所以是“巨婴”。这些成年的巨婴在生命中的大部分时间都在“找妈妈”,或怀有不切实际的皇帝梦或皇太后梦,以为自己拥有无上的权力,要全世界都绕着自己转。“譬如中国式家长、工作单位中的一把手”,催生了控制狂、被迫害妄想、无助感、不安全感等普遍存在的心理问题。作者认为,中国式的家庭关系是“共生(彼此是一体)绞杀”的关系,充满怨气。

简单来说,巨婴的特点是依赖,不肯自己承担责任,什么事都想要他人解决。

但,是不是觉得很奇怪呢?不肯自己承担责任,什么事都想要他人解决,可以说是个懒人了,但除了那些纯粹的剥削者(老板,官僚),大部分所谓的中产阶级(或者说精神老板们)不是一直都很勤奋努力吗(至少他们自己是这么认为并且一直如此自我贴金的)?共匪假话屁话连篇,但“中国人民勤劳勇敢自强不息”这句还真没说错。那么为什么两种冲突的属性会出现在同一批人身上?

关键在于如何定义“勤奋努力”。共匪的定义很明显是乖乖当奴隶,天天干到死,然后没有一句怨言。当然,那些老板们也是如此定义的。

但如果你说:我想要努力自己决策,我想要努力帮助别人,我想要努力推翻独裁,我想要努力推翻资本主义,那么那些剥削者和他们的走狗们绝对不干了。

所以就出现以下自打脸场景:左派们要求福利制度,铅笔社纳粹们马上嚷嚷“养懒人”,但政府拿穷人的钱大笔给“国企”(本质上是党官僚私企)救市,他们屁都不会放一个;社会主义者们主张福利国家,资本主义哈巴狗马上嚷嚷“依赖政府”,但政府拿穷人的钱发给老板,他们也是屁都不会放一个;极右纳粹们指责“穷人穷困是穷人自己不努力”,但社会主义者指责政府收钱不办事时,他们又跑来嚷嚷“要体谅政府的难处”,呸,你们体谅穷人的难处了吗?

所以,巨婴实际上说的是奴性:不肯自己承担责任——不肯自己决策,什么事都要他人解决——什么事都幻想救世主来搞定,不肯自己付出。这类巨婴在墙内的精神老板中很多,在墙外也很多,特别是各种脑残粉,川粉郭粉姨粉之类,几乎都是此类巨婴。

有人会感到奇怪:那么为什么这些人反对福利制度呢?他们既然什么事都幻想救世主来搞定,那他们应该欢迎福利制度啊?

首先,准确来说,这些人反对的不是福利制度本身,如果政府给他们提供福利,你觉得他们会主动拒收吗?他们高兴还来不及呢(关于这一点,有个极其恶劣的例子:极右纳粹川粉陈光诚对救他的希拉里没有一句好话,还和纽约大学闹翻,而他和纽约大学闹翻的原因是什么呢?纽约大学则发出严正之声明,表示当初原本就设定一年访问期,在此一年中,校方提供奖学金、公寓、办公室、翻译人员和一名助理﹐并安排讨论中国人权的公共活动。纽约大学发言人约翰·贝克曼(John Beckman)更发言说明,纽约大学上学期初向陈光诚表示不可能无限期地提供帮助。表示早在2012年10月,校方就发出书面声明,表示其住所将于2013年6月到期。 贝克曼说,最初的计划就是提供陈光诚和家人一年的帮助,让他们得以在美国“适应和过渡”。来源孔傑榮稱陳光誠不該反咬恩人陈光诚称迫于压力将离开纽约大学。这纳粹支持对穷人开火的唐纳德希特勒,但自己却因为纽约大学不肯继续用教授待遇供养他而和纽约大学闹翻,无耻。话说嚷嚷狗屁“福利国家通往奴役之路”的哈耶克也抗议过芝加哥大学的退休金太低,呵呵,双重标准玩得真好。)。他们真正反对的是,他们看不起的穷人得到福利制度的帮助,看不起他们眼里的“低等人”和他们平起平坐。以美国的白纳粹们为例,罗斯福新政的时候给他们发福利,他们屁意见都没有,后来民权运动之后,福利制度延伸到黑人身上,他们才开始不干,转而支持芝加哥哈巴狗们:盜竊團伙與真心納粹:從詹森原理看美國保守主義與另類右派

除此之外,纳粹党当年也是靠福利承诺上台的,当然上台之后这些承诺就直接当屁放了,可笑的是一堆傻逼纳粹因此嚷嚷纳粹是“社会主义”,呵呵。

然后,把社会主义等同于主张福利国家,这是一个很常见的误解。社会主义者当然主张福利国家,但主张福利国家的不一定是社会主义者,凯恩斯主义者也主张福利国家,极右纳粹党也用福利国家设想骗取支持,就连芝加哥哈巴狗中的弗里德曼也有个UBI(全民基本收入)设想,真正完全反对福利国家的,也就是剥削阶级的走狗们(例如铅笔纳粹社和张五常之流)和自由意志主义纳粹(或者说无政府资本主义纳粹)了。

社会主义者和他们的区别在于,福利国家搭配的政治和经济制度是怎样的。或者说,福利国家建立在一个怎样的国家之上。社会主义者经常指责政府拿钱不干事,不管穷人的死活,不肯承担公共服务责任,要求政府捍卫基本人权,而资本主义哈巴狗故意抓住这一点,误导不了解社会主义的人说“社会主义者想要一个从尿片管到棺材的全能政府,这种政府会毁灭自由,导致奴役”。事实上这完全是放屁。

从尿片管到棺材的全能政府?社会主义者的确要求政府管尿片和棺材,因为这些是基本人权,尿片对应儿童福利,棺材对应养老,政府当然应该捍卫社会上的所有人的基本人权了,不然要政府干什么?但要说全能政府,呵呵,资本主义哈巴狗们喜欢的商人和官僚勾结破坏民主,大规模监控人民,不断增加军费威胁世界的政府,难道不是全能政府?

社会主义者的福利国家建立在政治民主和经济民主的基础上,所以不会有官商勾结问题,而关于政治民主,社会主义者是主张增加人民对政府决策的参与度(这是民主最关键的因素所在),主张尽可能实现参与式民主(也就是直接民主),当年马克思就很赞赏巴黎公社的参与式民主。既然人民决定政府,那么怎么可能“毁灭自由,导致奴役”呢?所谓的大政府小政府完全就是伪概念,古中国各帝国政府规模和负责范围都远小于现代民主政府,但古中国各帝国政府哪个不是极权独裁的?

而怎样的人才能建立并维持民主呢?关于这点众说纷纭,但我赞同《the no-nonsense guide of democracy》的作者Richard Swift的看法:民主意味着责任,当你享受着民主带来的自由时,你也同时承担了民主赋予你的责任,在民主社会中,你有权参与决策,同时也要承担决策造成的后果。

也就是说,要想争取民主,首先必须要摆脱巨婴状态。当然,巨婴状态本身就是从小被独裁压迫洗脑的结果,作者也说了,根源是专制制度,大到政权的专制,公司的专制,小到家庭的专制,专制制度不允许一个人参与决策,长期如此这人必然会习惯服从,习惯别人替他决策,从而成为巨婴。

所以,习惯老板替他们决策的资本主义哈巴狗们,和天天幻想救世主的极右纳粹们,才是巨婴,社会主义者从来都是愿意承担责任的:“我们能意识到我们肩上系着人类命运的一个微粒,而我们的生命不会白过。”(来源:托洛茨基在第四国际成立大会上的演辞

聊聊一个被开发者的贪欲毁灭的游戏

我曾经玩过一个游戏,准确来说是一个游戏系列的第7部,一开始这个游戏很优秀,但后来,它被开发者的贪欲彻底毁灭了。

这个游戏的名字是:闪客快打7——佣兵帝国。简单来说,这是一个2D横版过关动作游戏,使用flash制作,作者为独立游戏开发者andylaw,在此之前,作者开发了6部名为闪客快打的flash游戏,并且都是免费的(这类免费flash游戏非常多,几乎都是独立开发者和小工作室做的,国内有名的集中发布这类游戏的网站有4399和17yy和7k7k等,而国外网站有armorgames和kongrate等。而随着智能手机的流行和flash的过时,越来越多的作者转移到了移动平台和HTML5上,而不变之处在于:免费分享。实际上IT领域一直都有知识共产主义传统,最典型的例子就是自由软件运动,而在游戏界,大部分独立小游戏和mod也一直保持着共产主义传统,而游戏创意绝大部分都来自于这些独立开发者的作品。)。

但是闪客快打7不再是免费分享的作品了,而是联网内购制(道具收费)游戏。不过,虽然形式上联网,但实际上,闪客快打7是无法和一般网游一样和其他人一起联机的,本质上还是单机游戏。

看到内购制,不少玩家应该能想到问题所在了。先来看看闪客快打7的现状吧:这是一个你即使在其他游戏里面都是大神的人物都有可能无法通关的游戏,即使你有无限命,甚至充值买到最好顶级装备都会累死的游戏。因为即使是游戏里面的一个小怪,战斗力都比玩家强一万倍。而当你通关后,你又会想:我花了那么多时间在这个游戏里面为何?这个时间足够我通关其他3个网游啦?在这个游戏里面充的钱我在其他游戏里面都能独闯天下或者秒杀群雄,当上真正的土豪。可是我在这个游戏里面即使通关了之后回过来玩一遍我还是要在同一个怪那里耗上1小时。Andy,我才是真的老大,不是一辈子你的奴隶啊。因为我技术都已经比你这个要钱要命要老婆的作者强一亿倍啦!(来自闪客快打7百度百科

如果你想要花钱购买游戏里的装备,那么你需要花费几千才能买到最好的装备,但是,你买了也没用,依旧经不住杂兵一刀,所以基本上谁买谁傻逼。当然,出钱的傻逼还是有很多的。

而这游戏也不仅仅是这里糟糕。在一开始的时候,游戏还有算是不错的剧情,还有剧情动画,但到了后期,游戏地图完全没有任何剧情动画了,就是茫茫杂兵和BOSS,而任务剧情也越来越扯淡,后面对不上前面,毫无逻辑可言。

而杂兵和BOSS的设计呢?一开始还有些创新,但后期,几乎没有新的设计,最后更是恶劣到加个光环就当一个新杂兵。

更新速度呢?刚开始很快,后来,基本上没有什么实质性的更新,基本每次更新都会让游戏变得更坑钱更坑钱更坑钱。

但这游戏并不是从一开始就如此糟糕的,否则我也不会玩了。

再引用一下百度百科上的概括吧(我玩过这游戏,所以我知道百度百科上这一词条的说法是事实):2011年游戏上线至今吸引了不少的闪客快打迷的关注。当时最强的装备61属于游戏中的神装(4000K),角斗场每盘金币数最高40000。但从2012年9月开始,闪客快打7游戏大幅改版。大幅削弱了装备的防御力,减少了角斗场金币的上限(最高4000),同时大量金币装备改为RMB装备,m249等弹夹改为RMB弹夹。同时原RMB装备收费价格提高到了原先的3倍,甚至出现收费达到1000以上的极品装备。导致游戏玩家人数流失大半。

由于我之前玩过系列前6部作品,所以第7部作品刚发布时我就开始玩了,当时这游戏真的很不错,虽然作为flash游戏画质不可能有多好,但其吸引人的末日剧情,合理的难度设定(我这种技术不好的人也能不花一分钱打到最后),便宜实惠的RMB装备(当时最贵的61套装也不过40RMB),这一切都使我真正的在这游戏中得到了快乐。同时,也有其他很多玩家得到了快乐,并慷慨的主动充值作为对作者andylaw的支持。

但后来,我发现游戏突然更新了,更新之后难度大大提升,以前的神装变成了纸片,很多发现了这些的玩家不干了,联合起来抗议andylaw坑钱,结果他们得到的回复是:不改变(坑钱)andylaw就会饿死;打不过去是因为自己技术差,难度设置是合理的;andylaw不是做慈善的,商业化之后收费(坑钱)理所应当,玩家的指责毫无道理;你不满更新,你怎么自己不做一个……..

这些狗屁是不是很耳熟?不改变(坑钱)就会饿死—不由着药厂垄断专利肆意抬价屠杀穷人就会饿死;打不过去是因为自己技术差,难度设置是合理的—穷人穷困是因为自己不努力,资本主义制度本身是伟光正的;商业化之后收费(坑钱)理所应当—私有化之后收费(坑钱)理所应当;你不满更新怎么自己不做一个—你不满老板剥削怎么自己不去当老板,呵呵。

既然开发者andylaw是这种态度,那么玩家们只能选择不玩了(哼,看着自己喜爱的游戏变得面目全非却毫无办法,只能转过头去,这算是选择吗?)。但还是有不少玩家抱有希望,但后来发生的一件事,彻底毁灭了他们仅有的希望:

一个玩家为了证明不花一分钱也能打通主线,亲自花费时间精力证明了这点,当然,他用了加速器,但官方并没有禁止使用加速器。但是,官方却封禁了他的帐号,而官方的理由是:”你不花一分钱也能打通主线,这让那些花费几千的玩家怎么看?“怎么看?有这么无耻的理由吗?这玩家自己花费时间精力,免费帮你们做广告,然后你们摆出这种态度?一个破flash小游戏还好意思要求每个玩家都充几千?3A大作打折的时候不到一百就能买一份呢!

然后?然后又有大批玩家因此离开,而andylaw?他不仅没因此悔改,反而变得越来越贪婪,游戏难度越来越大,最终变成了充钱几千也打不过一个杂兵的疯狂难度。然后?然后现在这游戏几乎没人玩了,但我听说,还是有白痴在里面充钱的,呵呵。

不知资本主义哈巴狗们还能如何洗地?别告诉我玩家可以不玩,无论玩家玩还是不玩,这个游戏都彻底被毁灭了,而因为狗屁知识产权的存在,玩家想自己复刻一个新版本都不行,开发者andylaw的贪欲彻底毁灭了这游戏!

 

 

权谋:为游说华盛顿,谷歌制造了一个冠冕堂皇的傀儡?

“我会说 Engine 似乎是一个傀儡,被谷歌操纵 ……作为一种策略这很棒。 谷歌是一只大而坏的狼,我们正在资助的初创团体说这只大而坏的狼会吃掉我们 …… 这是马基雅维利主义”…

这篇报道简直如洪桐县一般,但究竟谁的话可信,证据已经全部摆出来了。你可以忽视那些被称之为“回应”的狡辩。

根据一份新报告,一个基于华盛顿的声称代表创业科技公司声音的宣传组织,实际上是谷歌的一个小傀儡。

根据该报告,创业倡导组织 Engine 在其董事会和顾问委员会中至少有七名前 Google 员工和顾问。该组织三位创始人之前都在谷歌工作过; 他们创建了谷歌最终收购的创业孵化器。过去五年来,谷歌已向 Engine 提供了未公开的资金。这两家公司分享了一家名为 S-3 Group 的游说公司,该公司曾为 Engine 和 Google 工作过。 2011年 Engine 的首次发布会让与会者通过 RSVP 转到 Google 的电子邮件地址,该地址主要是为员工保留的,与向公众提供的 Gmail 地址完全不同。

报告解释说,在众多问题上,从专利改革、到反盗版工作、还有高技术移民,到最近对“通信规范法”第230条的修改,Engine 的倡导和谷歌宣称的政策偏好都是一致的。谷歌甚至资助了一篇研究论文,该论文后来被发布

“公职人员需要意识到,这个所谓的创业倡导组织实际上是与硅谷最重要的D.C.影响力机器绑在一起的,他们的利益往往与颠覆性企业家的利益相冲突“,发布该报告的 Daniel Stevens 说。他是 Campaign for Accountability 的人。

这里面没有干净的手。Campaign for Accountability 获得的资金主要来自甲骨文,而甲骨文是谷歌的对手。

谷歌发言人表示,该公司“很乐意支持 Engine 的工作”,以代表华盛顿政策辩论中创业公司的观点。 “虽然我们经常就政策问题达成一致,但 Engine 是一个独立的组织,就像我们支持的其他组织一样,”该发言人说。

谷歌在其网站上公开了他们对 Engine 的资金支持,该发言人称:“与 Campaign for Accountability 形成鲜明对比,他们拒绝列出其企业资助者,并且一直在帮助甲骨文表达对谷歌的怨恨”……

甲骨文华盛顿办事处高级副总裁 Ken Gleuck 在上述那份报告发布后表示谷歌的指控一点根据都没有,甲骨文与该报告完全无关。 “在阅读你的故事之前,甲骨文不知道 Engine 是否存在,我们也没有任何了解或参与这份报告,”他说,“虽然我们受宠若惊,但谷歌不应该假设我们支持谷歌的每一个负面报道。如果我们整天盯着谷歌的阴暗面,我们将耗尽 20% 的工作时间。我们还能负责红色婚礼和塑料吸管吗?“

Engine 组织争辩说,它已经多次在政策方面与谷歌不同,尤其是在 2014 年的网络中立战期间,证明了它的“独立性”。根据“通信法”第二章,Engine 批准重新分类宽带; 谷歌则更加低调,其互联网协会的贸易组织拒绝支持 Title II。其他问题就与谷歌无关了,比如早期公司的资本形成。该组织执行董事 Evan Engstrom 表示:“Engine 制定的政策决策完全基于我们网络中创业公司的最佳利益和反馈,而不是我们资助者的职位。”

然而,Engine 对于科技创业社区最具存在性的威胁之一却很少表态,这一威胁就是:大公司持续收购以阻止竞争,特别是谷歌(最近的“60分钟”报告指出)。每次合并都会提升大型科技公司的主导地位,并令创新挑战者更难获得空间。那些没有被人嘲笑的人称之为“无情”和“有时不公平”; 最典型的见证如 Facebook 复制 Snapchat 的应用程序并将其分发到自己庞大的网络中。马里兰大学经济学家 John Haltiwanger 将科技初创公司13年的衰落就归咎于 Big Tech,称“大公司正在进行防御性创新。

虽然 Engine 表达了对竞争的担忧 — 特别是涉及该组织所说的受益于现有公司的规定 — 在 Engine 的顶级倡导问题没有提及合并政策,反托拉斯或垄断政治。

谷歌 和 Engine 之间的关系是 D.C. 游说社区一段时间的龙门阵主题,揭示了硅谷巨头在华盛顿发挥影响力的另一种方式

除了直接游说之外,谷歌还利用其巨大的战争资金来资助智囊团、学术研究和“草根”团体,然后这些团体再提供一些看起来很像“独立观点”的玩意儿。意见和建议恰好符合谷歌的立场。在线出版商贸易组织 Digital Content Next 的首席执行官 Jason Kint 表示,“Engine 是一个对谷歌有益的 D.C.组织的例子”。

在大型科技公司因其掌握用户信息的规模、权力和疏忽而遭受强烈抵制的时候,像 Engine 这样的小企业家联盟去领导政治游说活动是有道理的,就像华尔街利用社区银行作为盾牌以推广有利于银行的政策。“你要是说 ‘这会伤害谷歌和亚马逊’ — 这个不行,会得不到结果,如果你说‘这会伤害初创公司’,就没问题了“,21世纪福克斯和美国商会的前说客 Rick Lane 说,他最近协助活动人士在第 230 条改变中与谷歌作斗争。

Engine 与谷歌的关系可以追溯到它成立之初。 2011年12月,Business Insider 写道:“Engine Advocacy 希望让硅谷创业公司在华盛顿获得发言权,直接将这一群体与提供给 Verizon、AT&T,微软和谷歌等电信和科技巨头的大笔资金形成鲜明对比。

Business Insider 的报道重点介绍了2011年12月8日在旧金山举办的 Engine 成立派对。但是,该活动的电子邮件邀请表明了 Google 员工就在幕后。 邮件是这样的:“Derek Slater 曾经在 EFF 工作,但现在是谷歌的政策主管(也许你认识他?)他正开始追求一个新的政治倡导组织引领的大规模而令人兴奋的项目,” 这封电子邮件要求 RSVP 转到另一位 Google 员工的工作电子邮件地址。

Slater 还在 Google+ 上宣传了 Engine 的启动,写道:“如果你是一家科技创业公司,或者你以其他方式支持初创公司(例如,投资者、自由设计师),你需要加入 Engine Advocacy。”Google co- 创始人 Sergey Brin 在发布之日不久就推出 Engine 了。

Engine 回应说,Slater 不是创始人,从未在集团中担任正式角色,只是帮助实现了这一目标。但所有三位 Engine 的创始人 — Luis Arbulu,Joshua To 和 Joshua Mendelsohn — 都是谷歌的前雇员。在离开 Goog​​le 后不久,注册了域名 EngineAdvocacy.com 和当前网站 Engine.is。在新闻报道中,Mendelsohn 被称为“科技创业公司的’华盛顿游说者”

在 Engine 启动时,创始人经营着一家名为 Hattery 的创业孵化器公司; Engine 最初安放在同一个办公室里。 Engine 的政治战略家 Mike McGeary 的薪水是由 Hattery 支付的。然后,谷歌在2013年夏天收购了 Hattery,雇用了大部分员工; 倡导团体和沟通团队去了 Engine。同年返回谷歌。Engine 说,谷歌从未直接支付任何工作人员的薪水。Mendelsohn 的新公司,一家名为 Hangar 的公司,没有让他发表评论。

Engine 不是需要会费的会员制组织。根据 Campaign for Accountability 报告,“会员”最初通过“由 Google 和 Engine 传播的互联网表单”。有一个会员名单,其中包括那些在这一点上很难称自己为创业公司的公司,如谷歌,Facebook,Twitter,Netflix,优步和微软的子公司 LinkedIn。 Engine 说该列表是“旧的”,无法从其主页访问。

在公共政策页面上,Google 在其资助的数百个第三方组织中列出了 Engine。Campaign for Accountability 报告称谷歌自 2013 年以来每年都承认资助 Engine,但它从未详细说明金额。同样,虽然 Engine Advocacy,一个501(c)(4)非营利组织和 Engine 研究基金会,其501(c)(3)同伴,2013 年至 2015 年期间的资金为 440 万美元,并没有详细说明这些贡献来自何处,以及 Google 在其中的贡献量。

Engine 确实为其获得资金的其他公司注名了,包括 Apple,Facebook,T-Mobile,Sprint,Etsy 和甚至还有彭博 Bloomberg,以及 Koch Foundation 和 Knight Foundation 等各种基金会。 “我们为慈善组织和包括谷歌在内的大大小小公司提供的资金感到自豪,”Engstrom 说。但是 Engine 不会提供确切的数字或注名所有资助者。

另一位被提到资助者的是 Yelp,这是谷歌最激烈的批评者之一,该公司上周刚刚在欧盟对谷歌提起诉讼,指控其本地搜索结果存在偏见。 “我们在技术上是[Engine]的成员,但我认为我们在一段时间内不会给他们钱,”Yelp 公共政策高级副总裁 Luther Lowe 说。

前 Google 员工在 Engine 上脱颖而出。 Marvin Ammori 是 Google 的长期顾问,现任技术公司 Protocol Labs 的总法律顾问,现任 Engine 的董事会成员。 Mendelsohn 和他的妻子 Julie Samuels 还与 Derek Parham 一起坐在六人董事会上,Derek Parham 是前谷歌员工和 Songza 的顾问,Songza 是2014年出售给 Google 的公司。

Engine 知识产权高级顾问 Peter Pappas 就专利问题向谷歌提供建议他的政府关系公司 Innovation Strategies 将 Google 和 Engine 列为客户。同样,根据国会游说披露,S-3 集团是一家注册游说公司,曾为 EngineGoogle 工作过。

另一位顾问委员会成员是前 ​​Google 员工 Hunter Walk,被列出的他的经验是“收购初创公司(@Google)”。咨询委员会成员 Brad Feld 是 Foundry Group 的风险资本家,他投资 AdMeldRevolv,创业公司被谷歌收购,并与 YeswareTrada 等公司以及 Google 风险投资子公司共同投资。

Engstrom 来自 Farella Braun + Martel,这是一家知识产权律师事务所,谷歌一直是其客户。但 Engine 称,Engstrom 并不适用于谷歌作为客户的任何案例。

Engine 的显示屏甚至可以在 2012 年共和党和民主党全国代表大会上进入 Google 展位一位名叫 Michelle Brook 的艺术总监对该项目发表了一篇文章在其个人网站上,其中写道:“Engine 与谷歌合作,倡导促进创新和企业家精神的公共政策……”

上述报告引用了 Engine 和谷歌利益相关的几个问题领域。这包括在 2011 年和 2012 年(Engine 成立时)防止严格的反盗版立法的运动当谷歌面临其专利诉讼威胁时,该组织还搞了一封致国会的关于专利改革权的。该报告称,谷歌和 Engine 也有兴趣开放更多的宽带频谱并增加高技能移民的签证。

谷歌在其博客上强调了一份关于2012年高科技工作对美国经济重要性的 Engine 研究论文。第二年,Engine 发布了一份由 KU Leuven 欧洲研究人员发表的另一份报告,宣传欧盟高科技产业。在封面上,作者“感谢 Google 为此报告提供资金。”

Engstrom 否认了 Engine 和 Google 之间的直接政策调整。 “我们已经表明,在大大小小的政策辩论中,我们都不会害怕偏离强烈的捐助者立场,当我们觉得可以为创业生态系统的利益更好地服务时”,他说。

最近的一个例子是在争夺在线性交易立法(称为 SESTA)的斗争中。谷歌反对 SESTA,因为它代表了对第 230 条的第一次修改,这是一项黄金标准条款,免除网站对其用户行为的责任。支持者表示,SESTA 目标狭窄,是防止性交易在线扩散的必要条件。

谷歌在抵制 SESTA 方面赋予了大量的热情,并在背景中保持直接抵制意见。而 Engine 非常直率。Engstrom 去年十月在参议院作证反对 SESTA。Engine 组织了关于这个问题的国会信件,并建立了反对派中心。当谷歌内部游说人员 Stewart Jeffries 写信给国会工作人员反对修改第230条时,他引用了 Engstrom 的陈述。谷歌在战斗期间也在他们的博客上公开引用了 Engine。

“谷歌正在游说,但他们不想自己露面,”在 SESTA 辩论期间与活动家合作的 Rick Lane 说。 “他们推出了 CDT(民主与技术中心),EFF(电子前沿基金会),TechFreedom 和 Engine。”所有人都得到了谷歌的支持

领导反性交易法案的“I Am Jane Doe”背后的电影制片人 Mary Mazzio 说,在 SESTA 斗争期间,Engine “非常非常活跃”。Engine 强调第 230 条对小型创业公司的重要性确实引起了某些立法者的共鸣,比如 Sens.Ed Markey,D-Mass和 Ron Wyden,D-Ore。去年11月,Wyden 发表了一份声明,称 SESTA“将以创业公司为代价,支持大型科技公司,并将扼杀创新,”完全是 Engine 在此问题上的主体观点的镜像。

“我会说 Engine 似乎是一个傀儡,被谷歌操纵,”Mazzio 说。 “作为一种策略,这是很棒的。 [谷歌]是一只大而坏的狼,我们正在资助的[初创]团体说这只大而坏的狼会吃掉我们。这是马基雅维利主义。“

最终,覆盖性交易的印象被证明是 Engine 或 Google 无法克服的,而 SESTA 则被通过了法律。这一点上,事实显示了科技行业的崛起,在华盛顿不再能获得免费通行证。甚至没有共同提案的 Markey 也最终投票支持了这项法案。Wyden 是投反对票的两位参议员之一。

Engine 继续支持与Google保持一致的计划。它批评加利福尼亚州即将开启的以保护消费者隐私的投票政策,“写得不好”和“过于宽泛”。谷歌一直在反对投票措施,即使 Facebook 已经在批评中放弃了反对意见。

这份报告总结道:“谷歌对 Engine 的明显创造和支持是大企业公司如何利用其财富在华盛顿实现其目标的关键指标,这令谷歌可以躲在幕后”。

Engine 和 Google 都强调了 Campaign for Accountability 与甲骨文的关系,指的是关于谷歌在构建 Android 操作系统时是否违反了甲骨文专利的长达八年的激烈诉讼。在这一点上,高度技术性的案例似乎更像是两个硅谷竞争对手之间的激烈争斗的借口。

“由甲骨文资助的这份报告试图破坏 Engine 代表创业社区所做的工作,以推进甲骨文与谷歌之间的长期争议……”Engstrom 辩解道。

https://medium.com/@iyouport/%E6%9D%83%E8%B0%8B-%E4%B8%BA%E6%B8%B8%E8%AF%B4%E5%8D%8E%E7%9B%9B%E9%A1%BF-%E8%B0%B7%E6%AD%8C%E5%88%B6%E9%80%A0%E4%BA%86%E4%B8%80%E4%B8%AA%E5%86%A0%E5%86%95%E5%A0%82%E7%9A%87%E7%9A%84%E5%82%80%E5%84%A1-d553cd3873e2

Islam and Islamophobia(伊斯兰教和伊斯兰恐惧症)

(写在前面:社会主义者和伊斯兰恐惧症患者最大的区别是,社会主义者批评伊斯兰教愚弄人民的教义,而伊斯兰恐惧症患者只仇恨穆斯林。)

OVER THE course of 2006, the attacks on Muslims and the vilification of Islam has been relentless. When Muslims protested the cartoons that caricatured Islam published in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten in September 2005, they were denounced for not appreciating Western values of “free speech.” When a United Arab Emirates company was to take over the running of six U.S. ports from a British company in early 2006, the Democrats and Republicans whipped up a xenophobic frenzy. After Hezbollah defeated Israel in the Lebanon war, Bush referred to Hezbollah as an “Islamofascist” organization, and stated that “Islamic fascism” was the biggest threat facing the United States.1 Tony Blair talked about an “arc of extremism [in a] specifically Muslim version” stretching across the Middle East. Then the Pope suggested that Islam was violent and that “reason” was more at home in the West. British Cabinet Minister Jack Straw advised Muslim women not to wear veils because the practice had “implications of separateness” which creates “parallel communities.” And right behind him came Tony Blair himself, blithely supporting his bigoted minister.

在2006年,对穆斯林的攻击和对伊斯兰教的诽谤是凶狠的。当穆斯林抗议2005年9月在丹麦报纸Jyllands-Posten发表讽刺伊斯兰教的漫画时,他们因为不赞赏西方的“言论自由”而受到谴责。当一家阿拉伯联合酋长国公司从英国公司手中接管了六个美国港口的运作时,民主党和共和党人在2006年初掀起了一场仇外狂热。在真主党在黎巴嫩战争中击败以色列之后,布什将真主党称为“伊斯兰法西斯主义”组织,并称“伊斯兰法西斯主义”是美国面临的最大威胁.托尼布莱尔谈到了“特别是穆斯林版本的极端主义”横跨中东地区。然后,教皇认为伊斯兰教是暴力的,西方的“理性”更多。英国内阁大臣Jack Straw建议穆斯林妇女不要戴面纱,因为这种做法具有“分裂的意义”,造成“平行的社区”。而在他身后的是托尼布莱尔本人,他轻率地支持他的顽固的部长。

In his address to the nation on September 11, 2006, President Bush’s arguments revealed the perverse logic of Islamophobia today:

2006年9月11日,布什总统在全国发表的讲话中揭示了伊斯兰恐惧症的非理性逻辑:

Since the horror of 9/11, we’ve learned a great deal about the enemy. And we have learned that their goal is to build a radical Islamic empire where women are prisoners in their homes, men are beaten for missing prayer meetings, and terrorists have a safe haven to plan and launch attacks on America and other civilized nations. The war against this enemy is more than a military conflict. It is the decisive ideological struggle of the 21st century, and the calling of our generation…. This struggle has been called a clash of civilizations. In truth, it is a struggle for civilization. We are fighting to maintain the way of life enjoyed by free nations.2

“自9/11恐怖以来,我们已经对敌人有了很多了解。 我们已经了解到,他们的目标是建立一个激进的伊斯兰帝国,在这里,妇女在家中成为囚犯,男人因错过祷告会而遭到殴打,恐怖分子有安全的避风港来策划和发动对美国和其他文明国家的袭击。 对这个敌人的战争不仅仅是一场军事冲突。 这是21世纪的决定性的思想斗争,是对我们这一代人的号召…… 这场斗争被称为文明之间的冲突。 事实上,这是一场文明之间的斗争。 我们正在努力维持自由国家享有的生活方式。”

The common thread that ties together all these attacks on Islam is a polarized view of the world. On one side are the values of freedom, democracy, rationality, women’s rights, liberty, and civilization; all associated, furthermore, with Christianity. On the other side are a people who are irrational, evil, barbaric, and uncivilized; who hate freedom and democracy and want to create, according to Bush, an Islamic empire stretching from Europe to South East Asia.

将所有这些对伊斯兰教的攻击联系在一起的共同点是对世界的两极分化的视角。 一边是自由,民主,理性,妇女权利,自由和文明的价值观; 所有这些都与基督教有关。 另一边是一个非理性,邪恶,野蛮和不文明的人; 布什认为,他们讨厌自由民主,并希望创造一个从欧洲延伸到东南亚的伊斯兰帝国。

What is striking about this characterization of “the West” and “Islam,” is not only the degree of hyperbole but the fact that it finds resonance within the wider culture. Today, it has become commonplace for media pundits, not only on Fox but also on CNN, to call for the racial profiling of Arabs and Muslims. Hollywood has churned out a steady stream of films that portray Arab Muslims either as terrorists incapable of being reasoned with, or as sheiks and belly-dancers.3 Disney’s Alladin, for instance, begins with a song that describes Arab society in the most stereotypical terms and then concludes: “It’s barbaric, but hey—it’s home.” When the Pope issued a statement expressing regret over Muslim reactions to his comments, but not directly apologizing for equating Islam with violence, a poll found that two-thirds of Americans believed that the Pope had done enough to apologize to Muslims.4

对“西方”和“伊斯兰”这些特征的惊人之处不仅在于夸张的程度,而在于它在更广泛的文化中找到共鸣的事实。 今天,媒体专家,不仅是福克斯,还有美国有线电视新闻网(CNN),都呼吁对阿拉伯人和穆斯林进行种族描绘,这已经司空见惯。好莱坞制作了源源不断的电影,将阿拉伯穆斯林描绘成无法被理解的恐怖分子,或者作为酋长和肚皮舞者.3迪士尼的Alladin就是以一首用最刻板的术语描述阿拉伯社会的歌曲开头的。 然后得出结论:“这是野蛮的,但嘿 – 这是家。”当教皇发表声明对穆斯林对他的评论的反应表示遗憾,但没有直接道歉将伊斯兰教与暴力等同起来时,民意调查发现三分之二的美国人相信教皇做得向穆斯林的道歉足够了。


Significant minorities of Americans hold negative views of Islam. In a U.S.A Today/Gallup Poll conducted in late July, 39 percent of Americans admitted to feeling some prejudice against Muslims. About the same percentage favored requiring Muslims, including U.S. citizens, to carry a special ID “as a means of preventing terrorist attacks in the United States.” Nearly one in four—22 percent—said they wouldn’t want to have Muslims as their neighbors.5

显著的少数美国人对伊斯兰教持负面看法。在7月下旬举行的美国今日/盖洛普民意调查中,39%的美国人承认对穆斯林产生了一些偏见。 大约相同的百分比倾向于要求穆斯林,包括美国公民,携带一个特殊的身份证“作为防止美国恐怖袭击的手段。”近四分之一到百分之二十二的人表示他们不希望穆斯林成为他们的邻居.5

In short, Islamophobia today has wide resonance. However, these attitudes and ideas are not new, and they were not developed from scratch by the Bush or Blair administrations. Rather, Islamophobia in its current form derives from a body of knowledge known as “Orientalist” thought, which came into being in the late eighteenth century, and it is here we must turn in order to understand the roots of Islamophobia.

简而言之,今天的伊斯兰恐惧症有广泛的共鸣。 然而,这些态度和想法并不新鲜,而且布什或布莱尔政府也没有从头发明这些态度和想法。 相反,目前形式的伊斯兰恐惧症来自于被称为“东方主义”思想的知识体系,这种思想在18世纪后期出现,我们必须在这里转向才能理解伊斯兰恐惧症的根源。

Orientalist roots

东方主义的根源

As Spain, Portugal, Britain, France, and other imperial nations embarked on a mission of colonial expansion, they developed ideologies to justify conquest. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, colonizers justified the slaughter and exploitation of the Indians in the New World by arguing that the Indian “savages” were wild animals, idolaters whom God had ordained to be enslaved by Christians.6 The enslavement of Africans was similarly justified through the book of Genesis. It was argued that Africans were a cursed people (drawn from the myth of the Curse of Ham or Canaan) whose skin color had blackened to mark the curse. Thus, even after the African slaves converted to Christianity they could be retained as slaves.7

随着西班牙,葡萄牙,英国,法国和其他帝国开始殖民扩张的使命,他们发展了意识形态以合法化征服。 在十六和十七世纪,殖民者通过争辩说印度的“野蛮人”是野生动物,上帝所命定的被基督徒所奴役的偶像崇拜者来证明对新世界的印第安人的屠杀和剥削是正当的.6对非洲人的奴役同样如此,通过创世纪的书证明了这一点。 有人认为,非洲人是一个受到诅咒的人(来自汉姆或迦南诅咒的神话),他们的肤色已经变暗以标记诅咒。 因此,即使在非洲奴隶皈依基督教之后,他们也可以被当成奴隶。

The shift from religious to “scientific” justifications took place in the eighteenth century in the context of the Enlightenment and the growth of science. Ethnologists such as Carolus Linnaeus and Johann Friedrich Blumenbach divided human beings into various races with distinct characteristics. Not surprisingly, the logic that flowed from this classification was that white Europeans were superior and other “darker, colored peoples” were both “ugly” and at best “semi-civilized.”8 Racism, as an ideology to justify slavery and conquest, grew up around this time.9

从宗教到“科学”理由的转变发生在十八世纪的启蒙运动和科学的发展中。 像Carolus Linnaeus和Johann Friedrich Blumenbach这样的民族学家将人类划分为具有鲜明特征的各种种族。 毫不奇怪,从这种分类中产生的逻辑是白欧洲人优越,其他“黑暗,有色人种”都“丑陋”,充其量只是“半文明”.8种族主义作为一种为奴隶制和征服辩护的意识形态, 在这个时间增长.9

In the late nineteenth century, when the British poet Rudyard Kipling wrote “The white man’s burden” he was simply reinforcing an idea that was by then widespread. Kipling wrote of the inherent superiority of the West and their “burden” to civilize and tame the peoples of the East. Characterized as “half devil, half child,” the colonized were seen as both evil/barbaric, but also childlike and therefore in need of protection. Originally published in 1899, Kipling used the subtitle “The United States and the Philippine Islands,” as a way to urge the U.S. to take on the same responsibilities as the British.10112

在十九世纪末期,当英国诗人Rudyard Kipling写下“白人的负担”时,他只是强化了一种当时普遍存在的观念。 吉卜林写到了西方的内在优势和他们将东方人民变得文明和驯服的“负担”。 被称为“半恶魔,半孩子”的殖民者被视为邪恶/野蛮,但也是孩子般的,因此需要保护。 吉卜林最初出版于1899年,使用了副标题“美国和菲律宾群岛”作为敦促美国承担与英国同样责任的一种方式.110112

The encounter with the peoples of the Middle East and North Africa took a similar form. When Napoleon invaded Egypt in 1798 he took with him not only soldiers, but an army of scientists, botanists, biologists, architects, etc. all with the goal of producing a “scientific” survey of the country that was designed for use not by the Egyptians but by the French.11 Various imperial nations commissioned scholars to develop knowledge about what they called the “Orient” in order to better control their subjects.

与中东和北非人民的相遇也采取了类似的形式。 当拿破仑于1798年入侵埃及时,他不仅带来了士兵,还带来了科学家,植物学家,生物学家,建筑师等等,所有人的目标都是对国家进行“科学”调查,证明埃及不是被设计为供埃及人使用的,而是供法国人使用的。11各个帝国都委托学者发展他们所谓的“东方”的知识,以便更好地控制他们的臣民。

The body of Orientalist thought that emerged from this process has a few characteristic features. First, it draws on a “civilizational” view of history—the idea that civilizations come into being, prosper, and then go into decline. Such a view of history assumes that civilizations are distinct entities, which exist in isolation from each other, and which have a core set of values that drive them. Freedom, law, rationality, science, progress, intellectual curiosity, the spirit of invention, and so on, were seen as the core values of the so-called West, thus constructing the West as a unique civilization with its roots in ancient Greece. Every other civilization was then defined in relation to this notion of a superior West. Predictably, the world of Islam was characterized as despotic, static, undemocratic, and rigid.12

从这个过程中出现的东方主义思想的主体有一些特征。 首先,它借鉴了历史的“文明”观点 – 文明产生,繁荣,然后进入衰落的观念。 这种历史观假定文明是不同的实体,它们彼此孤立存在,并且具有驱动它们的核心价值观。 自由,法律,理性,科学,进步,求知欲,发明精神等被视为所谓西方的核心价值观,从而将西方建设成为一个源于古希腊的独特文明。 然后,根据这一优越的西方概念来定义其他所有文明。 可以预见的是,伊斯兰世界的特征是专制,静态,不民主和僵化的。

In addition to civilizational theories, the Orientalists drew on the theories of race discussed above that placed European Caucasians at the top of the racial hierarchy and colonized peoples close to the bottom. Maxime Rodinson describes the origin of race-based understandings of Muslims as follows:

除了文明理论之外,东方主义者还借鉴了上面讨论过的种族理论,这种理论将欧洲高加索人置于种族等级的顶端,被殖民的人接近底层 Maxime Rodinson描述了基于种族的对穆斯林的起源的理解下:

The Oriental may always have been characterized as a savage enemy, but during the Middle Ages, he was at least considered on the same level as his European counterpart…. In the nineteenth century, however, he became something quite separate, sealed off in his own specificity, yet worthy of a kind of grudging admiration. This is the origin of the homo islamicus, a notion widely accepted even today.13

东方人可能一直被认为是一个野蛮的敌人,但在中世纪,他至少被认为与他的欧洲同行相同…… 然而,在十九世纪,他变得相当分离,以自己的特殊性进行了封闭,但值得一种勉强的赞赏。 这是伊斯兰的起源,即使在今天也被广泛接受。

In sum, Orientalists argue that the West is a dynamic, complex, and ever changing society, while the Orient, and particularly the world of Islam, is static, barbaric, and despotic, and therefore in need of Western intervention to bring about progressive change.

总而言之,东方主义者认为西方是一个充满活力,复杂且不断变化的社会,而东方,特别是伊斯兰世界,是静态的,野蛮的,专制的,因此需要西方的干预才能实现进步的变革。

If these ideas served to justify French and English conquest of the Middle East and North Africa in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, they are still very much in vogue today. Books like Rafael Patai’s The Arab Mind, which was used by the U.S. military to devise the torture techniques used in Abu Ghraib and elsewhere, are a reassertion of homo islamicus. Modern-day Orientalists like Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington have argued that the conflict between the U.S. and the Middle East is a “clash of civilizations.” According to Huntington, who has done much to popularize this notion, “Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic societies.”14

如果这些想法有助于合理化法国和英国在十八和十九世纪征服中东和北非,那么它们今天仍然非常流行。 像Rafael Patai的“阿拉伯思维”这样的书,被美国军方用来设计在Abu Ghraib和其他地方使用的酷刑技术,是同质化的伊斯兰的重新确立。 像伯纳德·刘易斯和塞缪尔·亨廷顿这样的现代东方主义者认为,美国与中东之间的冲突是“文明的冲突。”亨廷顿说,他已经做了很多来推广这一观念,“西方的个人主义思想,自由主义 ,宪政,人权,平等,自由,法治,民主,自由市场,政教分离,在伊斯兰社会中经常几乎没有共鸣。“14

While these ideas remained on the margins during the 1990s, when the Clinton administration preferred the language of “humanitarian intervention” to justify U.S. imperialism, they have now assumed center stage after 9/11, with both the Republicans and Democrats equally comfortable with this rhetoric. The end result is a political climate in the U.S. where Islamophobic ideas are largely taken for granted. So much so that, as I have argued elsewhere, large sections of the Left have internalized the “clash of civilizations” thesis.15 When Lewis’s essay on the rise of Islamic “fundamentalism,” “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” was published in the Atlantic Monthly, the cover featured an angry, bearded, turbaned man. In October 2005, when the Progressive ran an article by Sasha Abramsky that internalizes the clash argument, the cover featured a bearded, turbaned man brandishing a scimitar.

虽然这些想法在1990s时仍处于边缘状态,当时克林顿政府倾向于采用“人道主义干预”的语言来证明美国帝国主义的合理性,但他们现在已经成为911事件后的中心舞台,共和党人和民主党人同样对这种言论感到满意。最终的结果是美国的政治气候,其中伊斯兰恐惧症的想法在很大程度上被视为理所当然。 正如我在其他地方所论述的那样,左派中的大部分人内部化了“文明的冲突”理论.15当刘易斯关于伊斯兰“原教旨主义”,“穆斯林愤怒的根源”的崛起的论文发表在 大西洋月刊,封面上有一个生气的,有胡须的,戴头巾的男人。 2005年10月,当进步主义者杂志发表Sasha Abramsky撰写的一篇文章进行内部化冲突论证时,封面上有一个留着胡须,戴头巾的男人挥舞着一把弯刀。

In what follows, I begin by laying out the Marxist approach to religion and then debunk five inter-related myths about Islam and the West that are in play today:

接下来,我首先阐述马克思主义的宗教分析方法,然后揭穿五个关于伊斯兰教和西方相互关联的迷思:

1. Islam is a monolithic religion;

伊斯兰教是一个单一的宗教
2. Islam is a uniquely sexist religion;

伊斯兰教是一种独特的性别歧视宗教;
3. The “Muslim mind” is incapable of rationality and science;

“穆斯林思维”无法兼容理性和科学;
4. Islam is inherently violent;

伊斯兰教本质上就是暴力的;
5. The West spreads democracy, Islam spawns terrorism.

西方传播民主,伊斯兰教产生了恐怖主义。

Marxism and religion

马克思主义和宗教

Historically, Orientalist scholars were philologists, and as philologists, they drew their conclusions about how different societies functioned simply by examining written texts. The Orientalist H.A.R. Gibb, who moved from Oxford to Harvard University in 1955, wrote about the unchanging “Arab mind” based on his readings of classical Islamic texts.16 Imagine if scholars had similarly attempted to deduce observations about contemporary Catholics based on readings of the New Testament; they would surely have been scoffed at and derided. Yet, when it comes to learning about Muslims and Arabs such research methods are seen as acceptable. Gibb, and others like him, saw no need to gather information about the reality of life in the Middle East or elsewhere before drawing conclusions. Thus, much of their writing is based on distortions of history and reality. In contrast to this, Marxists explain the dynamics of a society, and the role of religion within it, based on actual historical reality. The Marxist method of analysis, historical materialism, looks at the concrete circumstances in which human beings shape, and are shaped by, their conditions of existence.

从历史上看,东方学者是语言学家,作为语言学家,他们通过检查书面文件得出了关于不同社会如何运作的结论。东方主义者H.A.R. Gibb在1955年从牛津大学搬到了哈佛大学,根据他对古典伊斯兰教文本的阅读,写下了不变的“阿拉伯思维”。想象一下,如果学者们同样试图根据新约的读物来推断对当代天主教徒的观察,他们肯定会被嘲笑和讥讽。然而,当谈到了解穆斯林和阿拉伯人时,这种研究方法被认为是可以接受的。Gibb,和其他像他一样的人,在得出结论之前,声称在得出结论前没有必要收集有关中东或其他地方的现实生活的信息。因此,他们的大部分作品都是对历史和现实的歪曲。与此形成对比的是,马克思主义者根据实际的历史现实来解释社会的动态,以及宗教在其中的作用。马克思主义的分析方法,历史唯物主义,着眼于人类塑造和被塑造其存在条件的具体环境。

Marxists have argued that the impetus for religious thought initially emerged from human beings’ relative lack of control over nature, and later, the oppressed condition of the exploited majority. As Frederick Engels notes, “All religion…is nothing but the fantastic reflection in men’s minds of those external forces which control their daily life, a reflection in which the terrestrial forces assume the form of supernatural forces. In the beginning of history it was the forces of nature which were first so reflected and which in the course of further evolution underwent the most manifold and varied personifications among various peoples.”17

马克思主义者认为,宗教思想的推动最初源于人类对自然的相对缺乏的控制,以及后来被剥削的多数人的被压迫状态。正如弗雷德里克·恩格斯所指出的那样,“所有宗教……都只不过是人们对那些控制着他们的日常生活的外部力量的思想的奇妙反映,这种反映是地球力量被假设为超自然力量的形式。 在历史的开端,自然力量首先被反映,并且在进一步发展的过程中经历了各种人中最多样的和复杂的人格化。“17


Religion has since played a contradictory role in history. It has functioned as part of the ideological apparatus of ruling classes, and as an ideology of the oppressed. Christianity, for example, emerged as the religion of the oppressed against the exploitation of the Romans. However, once the Roman Empire accepted the religion it was transformed into its opposite; it became a bulwark of the system.18 Different denominations of Islam have followed similar trajectories, for example Shiism in Iran. Religion’s mass appeal in most cases, however, has not been as a challenge to the status quo, but as a comfort and solace for the oppressed. As the Russian revolutionary Lenin wrote,

从那以后,宗教在历史上发挥了矛盾的作用。 它既是统治阶级的思想器官的一部分,也是被压迫者的意识形态。 例如,基督教成为被压迫者反对罗马人剥削的宗教。 然而,一旦罗马帝国接受了这个宗教,它就会转变为它的对立面; 它成为了制度的堡垒.18伊斯兰教的不同教派也遵循类似的轨迹,例如伊朗的什叶派。 然而,在大多数情况下,宗教的大众吸引力并不是对现状的挑战,而是对被压迫者的安慰和慰藉。 正如俄罗斯革命者列宁所写,

Those who toil and live in want all their lives are taught by religion to be submissive and patient while here on earth, and to take comfort in the hope of a heavenly reward. But those who live by the labor of others are taught by religion to practice charity while on earth, thus offering them a very cheap way of justifying their entire existence as exploiters and selling them at a moderate price tickets to well-being in heaven.19

那些辛勤劳碌和挣扎求生的人,在地上被宗教教导为顺服和有耐心,并被获得天上的赏赐的希望而安慰。 但那些依靠别人的劳动生活的人,在宗教中被教导在地上实践慈善,从而为他们提供了一种非常便宜的方式来合理化他们作为剥削者的整个存在,并以适中的价格出售他们在天堂的幸福。

At various points, religious wars have been fought by various sects. Marxists understand these wars as being motivated not by particular religious differences, but by the class interests represented by the various factions. In his analysis of the Reformation in Germany, Engels writes:

在各个方面,各种教派都在进行宗教战争。 马克思主义者认为这些战争的动机不是出于特定的宗教差异,而是出于各教派所代表的阶级利益。 在他对德国宗教改革的分析中,恩格斯写道:

In the so-called religious wars of the Sixteenth Century, very positive material class-interests were at play, and those wars were class wars just as were the later collisions in England and France. If the class struggles of that time appear to bear religious earmarks, if the interests, requirements and demands of the various classes hid themselves behind a religious screen, it little changes the actual situation, and is to be explained by conditions of the time.20

在所谓的十六世纪宗教战争中,非常积极的物质阶级利益正在发挥作用,而那些战争就像后来的英格兰和法国之间的冲突一样。如果那个阶段的阶级斗争表现出带有宗教色彩,如果各阶级的兴趣,要求和命令隐藏在宗教屏幕背后,那么实际情况几乎没有变化,并且可以用时间条件来解释.20

He goes on to explain that all attacks against feudalism had to confront the Church, and in so doing “all revolutionary, social and political doctrines, necessarily became theological heresies.”21 But these were not theological debates in the abstract. Rather they represented the interests of the nascent bourgeois class in their struggle against the feudal monarchy, as well as the more radically inclined artisan and peasant rebels against serfdom. During the German Reformation, peasant leaders, for example, demanded the abolition of serfdom “unless it be shown from the Gospel that we are serfs.” Luther, a defender of property against the peasantry, insisted that those who died fighting rebellious peasants were “true martyrs for God.”22 During the various revolutionary wars, the bourgeoisie was animated by an explicit opposition to religious dogma. However, once in power, the bourgeoisie brought religion back as a bulwark of established order.23

他接着解释说,所有针对封建主义的攻击都必须面对教会,这样做“所有的革命,社会和政治学说,必然会成为神学异端。”21但这些并不是抽象的神学辩论。 相反,它们代表了新生资产阶级在反对封建君主制的斗争中的利益,以及更加偏向于反对农奴制的工匠和农民反抗者。 例如,在德国宗教改革期间,农民领袖要求废除农奴制“除非从福音中显示我们是农奴。”路德,一个反对农民的财产捍卫者,坚持认为那些与反抗农民战斗的人是“ 真正的上帝的烈士。“22在各种革命战争期间,资产阶级因明确反对宗教教条而变得生气勃勃。 然而,一旦掌权,资产阶级就把宗教带回了既定秩序的堡垒.23

In short, the role of religion in any society is best understood by examining the specific historical conditions that constitute that society. All the major religions of the world have undergone transformations in order to adapt to changing circumstances. In some instances, religion has played a progressive role and in others a reactionary one. In still others, it has simply adapted to new conditions in order to retain its mass appeal.

简而言之,通过研究构成该社会的具体历史条件,可以最好地理解宗教在任何社会中的作用。 世界上所有主要宗教都经历了变革,以适应不断变化的环境。 在某些情况下,宗教起着进步的作用,而在其他情况下则是反动的。 在其他情况下,它只是适应新的条件,以保持其大众吸引力。

Myth 1: Islam is a monolithic religion

迷思1:伊斯兰教是一个单一的宗教

The idea that Islam is a monolithic religion is not only false but functions as the basis for all the other myths. For it is only by denying the diversity of Islamic history and practices that one can then argue that it has certain inherent, unchanging characteristics that render it anti-democratic, violent, backward-looking, etc.

伊斯兰教是一个单一的宗教的想法不仅是错误的,而且是所有其他迷思的基础。 因为它只是否认伊斯兰教的历史和实践的多样性,然后人们可以争辩说它具有某些本质的,不变的特征,使其反民主,暴力,落后等等。

Islam is practiced in dozens of countries around the world. According to U.S. State Department figures, nearly1.5 billion people around the world are Muslims—85 percent are Sunni and 15 percent are Shiites.24 Within these two main denominations, there are many more branches.

伊斯兰教在全世界数十个国家被信奉。 根据美国国务院的数据,世界上有近15亿人是穆斯林 —其中85%是逊尼派,15%是什叶派.24在这两个主要教派中,有更多的分支派别。

There are several countries and regions which have majority Muslim populations, and they span the globe from Indonesia, to Bangladesh, to several central Asian countries, the Middle East, and North Africa. Islam looks very different in each of these regions and countries largely because as the religion spread it adopted the customs and traditions of the people of various lands. Thus, Sufi Islam practiced in Northern India is quite different from Wahabi/Salafi Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia, which is in turn different from the type of Shiism practiced in Iran. The claim that Islam is a homogenous and monolithic religion is therefore ludicrous, given the diversity of Islamic practices in nations that run the gamut from secular democracies (such as Indonesia) to dictatorships (such as Saudi Arabia).

有几个国家和地区拥有占主流的穆斯林人口,他们遍布全球,从印度尼西亚到孟加拉国,到几个中亚国家,中东和北非。 伊斯兰教在这些地区和国家中看起来大不相同,主要是因为随着宗教的传播,它采用了各种土地上人民的原本的习俗和传统。 因此,在印度北部实行的苏菲伊斯兰教与在沙特阿拉伯实行的瓦哈比/萨拉菲伊斯兰教有很大的不同,后者与伊朗的实践形式也不同。 鉴于从世俗民主国家(如印度尼西亚)到独裁国家(如沙特阿拉伯)的各个国家的伊斯兰教实践的多样性,伊斯兰教是一个同质化的和单一的宗教的说法因此是荒谬的。

Much of the current Islamophobic rhetoric seeks to demonize Arabs in particular. However, all Muslims are not Arabs, and all Arabs are not Muslims. Arabs are people who speak Arabic, share certain common cultural traditions, and claim a common Arab identity.25 Geographically, the Arab world has traditionally been divided into two parts (east and west of the river Nile): the Maghreb or the West, which includes Morocco, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan and so on, and the Mashreq or the East, which includes Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and all the countries to the east up to, but not including, Iran. Because of linguistic and cultural differences, Iranians and Turks are not considered Arabs.

目前大多数伊斯兰恐惧症的言论都试图将阿拉伯人妖魔化。 但是,不是所有穆斯林都是阿拉伯人,不是所有阿拉伯人都是穆斯林。 阿拉伯人讲阿拉伯语,分享某些共同的文化传统,并拥有共同的阿拉伯身份.25从地理上讲,阿拉伯世界传统上分为两部分(尼罗河的东部和西部):马格里布或西部, 包括摩洛哥,利比亚,阿尔及利亚,突尼斯,苏丹等,以及包括埃及,叙利亚,黎巴嫩和东部所有国家的马什雷克或东部,但不包括伊朗。 由于语言和文化差异,伊朗人和土耳其人不被视为阿拉伯人。

Like all religions, Islam has adapted. Religious texts may be more or less fixed, but the ideas and practices they are made to justify are ever-changing, based on historical transformations that are independent of religious ideology. As Chris Harman notes,

像所有宗教一样,伊斯兰教也适应了。 宗教文本可能或多或少是固定的,但基于独立于宗教意识形态的历史变革,它们合理化的理念和实践是不断变化的。 Chris Harman指出,

Islam is no different to any other religion in these respects. It arose in one context, among a trading community in the towns of 7th century Arabia, in the midst of a society still mainly organized on a tribal basis. It flourished within the succession of great empires carved out by some of those who accepted its doctrines. It persists today as the official ideology of numerous capitalist states (Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Pakistan, Iran etc), as well as the inspiration of many oppositional movements.

在这些方面,伊斯兰教与任何其他宗教都没有什么不同。 它出现在一个背景下,在7世纪阿拉伯城镇的一个贸易社区中,在一个主要以部落为基础的社会中被组织。 它在一些接受其教义的人所展示的伟大帝国的继承中蓬勃发展。 它今天仍然是许多资本主义国家(沙特阿拉伯,苏丹,巴基斯坦,伊朗等)的官方意识形态,以及许多反对派运动的灵感。

It has been able to survive in such different societies because it has been able to adapt to differing class interests. It has obtained the finance to build its mosques and employ its preachers in turn from the traders of Arabia, the bureaucrats, landowners and merchants of the great empires, and the industrialists of modern capitalism. But at the same time it has gained the allegiance of the mass of people by putting across a message offering consolation to the poor and oppressed. At every point its message has balanced between promising a degree of protection to the oppressed and providing the exploiting classes with protection against any revolutionary overthrow.26

它能够在不同的社会中生存,因为它能够适应不同阶级的利益。 它已经获得了建立其清真寺的资金,并依次从阿拉伯的贸易商,大帝国的官僚,地主和商人以及现代资本主义的工业资本家那里聘请传教士。 但与此同时,它通过传递给穷人和受压迫者安慰的信息,赢得了大众的忠诚。 在每一点上,它的信息在为受压迫者提供一定程度的保护和为剥削阶级提供保护以防止被任何革命推翻之间取得平衡.26

Myth 2: Islam is a uniquely sexist religion

迷思2:伊斯兰教是一种独特的性别歧视宗教

Islam is unique in its sexist approach to women, goes an oft-repeated argument, and therefore, Muslim women need to be rescued by white men in their pith helmets and jodhpurs. This was one of the arguments that the Bush administration used to justify its war on Afghanistan. And more recently, France passed a ban on the hijab (couched as a ban on all religious symbols in schools) and many argued that this would “liberate” Muslim women. The reality is that neither Afghan nor French Muslim women have been liberated by these actions. Today Afghan women are no better off than they were before the war.27 If anything, as the documentary Afghanistan Unveiled captures quite well, in the rural areas conditions have only deteriorated.28 The French ban represents an attack on all visible expressions of Islam, and therefore a restriction of religious rights. It does not represent a step forward for women, which would have entailed allowing women to choose whether or not to wear the hijab.29

伊斯兰教在对女性的性别歧视方面是独一无二的,这经常被反复论证,因此,穆斯林妇女需要在被拥有头盔和马裤的白人救出。 这是布什政府用来合理化其对阿富汗战争的理由之一。 最近,法国通过了对头巾的禁令(这被掩饰为对学校的所有宗教标志的禁令),许多人认为这将“解放”穆斯林女性。事实是,阿富汗和法国的穆斯林女性都没有被这些行动解放出来。 今天,阿富汗女性并没有比战前过得更好.27如果有的话,正如纪录片“阿富汗揭露”所捕获的那样,在农村地区的情况只变得更糟糕。28法国的禁令是对伊斯兰教所有可见表达的攻击, 因此限制了宗教权利。 这并不意味着女性向前迈进了一步,这将使女性能够选择是否戴头巾.29

This argument about women’s liberation has a long history. The British used a similar justification when they invaded and occupied Egypt in 1882. Lord Cromer, who oversaw the occupation, viewed Egyptian society and Islam as follows: “Islam as a social system has been a complete failure…the degradation of women in the East is a canker that begins its destructive work early in childhood, and has eaten into the whole system of Islam.”30 The solution was that Muslims “be persuaded or forced into imbibing the true spirit of Western civilization.”31 For Cromer there was no contradiction between championing women’s rights in Egypt while trying to curtail them at home. As a colonial overlord, he was simply deploying arguments that could strengthen Britain’s hold over Egypt. At home in Britain, he was against women’s rights and was a founding member and president of the Men’s League for Opposing Women’s Suffrage. Similarly, while the Bush administration trumpeted women’s liberation in Afghanistan, it has sought to further curtail women’s rights at home.

关于妇女解放的这一论点历史悠久。英国人在1882年入侵和占领埃及时使用了类似的理由进行合理化。监督占领的Lord Cromer认为埃及社会和伊斯兰教如下:“伊斯兰教作为一种社会系统已彻底失败……东方妇女的退化是一个在童年早期开始破坏性工作的溃疡病,并且已经吞噬了伊斯兰教的整个系统。“30解决方案是穆斯林”被说服或被强迫吸收西方文明的真正精神。“31对Cromer来说,在埃及支持女权,同时试图在家中减少女权之间,并不存在矛盾。作为殖民霸主,他只是在部署可以加强英国对埃及的控制的论据。在英国的家中,他反对女性的权利,并且是男子反对妇女选举联盟的创始成员和主席。同样,在布什政府大肆宣传阿富汗女性解放的同时,它还试图进一步限制女性在国内的权利。

Imperialist justifications for war and occupation have always been a sham, but one might still ask if Islam as a religion is uniquely oppressive towards women. After all, women’s rights have been severely curtailed by right-wing Islamist regimes in power, such as that in Afghanistan under the Taliban. All the world’s major religions, however, are sexist. Doesn’t the Christian creation myth tell us that Eve was created out of Adam’s rib? Women who were thought to be witches were burned at the stake, not only in Europe but in the U.S. barely three centuries ago.

帝国主义对战争和占领的合理化一直都是假的,但人们仍然可能会问伊斯兰教是否是一种对妇女具有独特压迫性的宗教。 毕竟,掌权的右翼伊斯兰政权,例如在塔利班统治下的阿富汗政权,严重压制了女性的权利。 然而,世界上所有的主要宗教都是性别歧视的。 基督徒创造神话不是告诉我们夏娃是用亚当的肋骨创造的吗? 那些被认为是女巫的女性不仅在欧洲而且在不到三个世纪前在美国被焚烧。

Women’s rights are under attack in the U.S. today. Only 13 percent of U.S. counties offer abortion services. Several states have passed laws that allow pharmacists to refuse to fill birth control prescriptions, including the “morning after” pill. At the same time as women’s right to control their bodies has been restricted, the fetus has been granted rights. The Unborn Victims of Violence Act makes it a crime to harm a fetus during an assault on a pregnant woman. These attacks on women’s rights are due in no small part to the influence of the Christian Right on U.S. politics.

今天,美国妇女的权利受到了攻击。 只有13%的美国的县提供堕胎服务。有几个州通过法律允许药剂师拒绝填写避孕药处方,包括“早晨吃药”。 在妇女控制自己身体的权利受到限制的同时,胎儿也获得了权利。 “未出生的暴力受害者法”规定,在袭击孕妇时伤害胎儿是犯罪行为。 这些对妇女权利的攻击在很大程度上归功于基督教右翼对美国政治的影响。

Recently, Nicaragua, a predominantly Catholic country, passed a ban on abortion making no exception even if the woman’s life is in danger. In short, Islam has no monopoly on misogyny. Furthermore, while predominantly Muslim countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Indonesia have elected women to the position of head of state, the “enlightened” U.S. has yet to do the same. The dominant religion in any society does not automatically shape social reality, rather religious ideology is itself shaped and reshaped by material factors.

最近,主要人口是天主教徒的国家尼加拉瓜通过了禁止堕胎的禁令,即使妇女的生命处于危险之中也不例外。 简而言之,伊斯兰教没有垄断厌女症。 此外,虽然主要人口是穆斯林的巴基斯坦,孟加拉国和印度尼西亚等国家选举出了女性国家元首,但“开明”的美国尚未做出同样的事情。 任何社会中的主导宗教都不会自动塑造社会现实,而宗教意识形态本身就是由物质因素塑造和重塑的。

There has been much debate about the role of women in Islam. The Koran, like any religious text, is contradictory and lends itself to multiple interpretations. There are passages in the Koran that grant women the same rights as men to divorce and that permit them to own and inherit property, marking a step forward for women in Arabian society at the time.32 There are, however, also passages that condone polygamy and that restrict women’s inheritance rights to only half of what men are entitled to.33

关于妇女在伊斯兰教中的角色一直存在很多争论。 与任何宗教文本一样,古兰经是矛盾的,有助于多种解释。 古兰经中有一些段落赋予妇女与男子相同的离婚权利,允许她们拥有和继承财产,这标志着当时阿拉伯社会中妇女向前迈出了一步.32但是,也有一些条款宽恕一夫多妻制。 并且将女性的继承权仅限于男性有权获得的一半.33

Scholars like Leila Ahmed and Asma Barlas have argued that Islam is not inherently misogynistic.34 They point to the egalitarian passages in the Koran that suggest equality between men and women. Barlas argues that sexist interpretations of the Koran are a product of particular societies that needed religious authority to justify sexual inequality. Ahmed states that prior to the institutionalization of Islam, women in Arab society participated in warfare and religion and had sexual autonomy. Montgomery Watt even goes so far as to argue that Arab society at the time was predominantly matrilineal.35 However, Maxime Rodinson rejects this analysis stating instead that Arabia is more appropriately described as a patrilineal society where polyandrous practices, combined with substantial social roles for women, prevailed in certain regions.36 The Prophet Muhammad’s first wife Khadija was a wealthy women who at age forty, proposed to the twenty-seven-year-old Muhammad. And while Khadija was Muhammad’s only wife at the time, she had several husbands. After her death, Muhammad practiced polygamy and married several women.

像Leila Ahmed和Asma Barlas这样的学者认为伊斯兰教本身并不是厌恶女性.34他们指出古兰经中的平等主义经文表明了男女平等。Barlas认为,对可兰经的性别歧视解释是特定社会的产物,需要宗教权威来合理化性别不平等。Ahmed说,在伊斯兰教制度化之前,阿拉伯社会中的妇女参与战争和宗教,并享有性自主权。Montgomery Watt 甚至走得更远,认为当时的阿拉伯社会主要是母系.35然而,Maxime Rodinson 拒绝接受这种分析,而是将阿拉伯更恰当地描述为一个父系社会,其中多元化的做法与女性的重大社会角色相结合在某些地区占了上风.36先知穆罕默德的第一任妻子Khadija是一位四十岁的富裕女性,向二十七岁的穆罕默德求婚。虽然Khadija当时是穆罕默德唯一的妻子,但她有几个丈夫。在她去世后,穆罕默德实行一夫多妻制并娶了几个女人。

As Islam spread, it adopted the cultural practices of various empires, including that of the neighboring Persian and the Byzantine empires. Among the Christians who populated the Middle East and the Mediterranean there were more rigid customs associated with women. In the Christian Byzantine Empire, the sexes were segregated, women were not supposed to be to be seen in public, they had to be veiled, and were given only rudimentary education. As the expanding Islamic empire incorporated these regions, it also assimilated these cultural and social practices.37 In short, the particular misogynistic practices that Islam came to adopt were largely inherited from the religious customs of the neighboring–and conquered–Christian and Jewish societies. The significant point here is that sexist attitudes towards women, far from being unique to Islam, were prevalent among Christians and Jews as well.

随着伊斯兰教的传播,它采用了各种帝国的文化习俗,包括邻国波斯帝国和拜占庭帝国的文化习俗。 在居住在中东和地中海的基督徒中,女性的习俗更加严格。 在基督教拜占庭帝国,男女被隔离,女性不应该在公共场合被看见,她们必须被蒙上,并且只接受基本的教育。 随着不断扩大的伊斯兰帝国将这些地区纳入其中,它也同化了这些文化和社会习俗.37简而言之,伊斯兰教所采用的特殊的厌恶女性主义习俗主要是从邻近和被征服的基督教和犹太社会的宗教习俗中继承而来的。 这里的重点是,对于女性的性别歧视态度,远非伊斯兰教独有,在基督徒和犹太人中也很普遍。

However, this was not the first time that the women of this region saw a further curtailment of their rights under Western influence. A similar fate had befallen Egyptian women when the Greeks conquered Egypt around 333 BC.38 In contrast to Greek society, where women led segregated lives, where their prime role was to care for children, and where the law considered a wife to be a “veritable child,” in Egyptian society women, especially upper-class women, had a high status. In the period of the New Kingdom (1570–950 BC), Egyptian women and men were considered equals under the law. Women had the right to inherit property and to own and manage it, marriage laws were egalitarian, women could move freely in society and weren’t secluded. This is not to suggest that sexism didn’t exist. It was still very much a male-dominated society, but the systematic oppression of women of the kind found in Greek society didn’t exist until Greek conquest of Egypt. In fact, the Greek philosopher Aristotle believed that the male “is by nature superior, and the female inferior, and the one rules and the other is ruled.”39 In short, the great “liberal” Western tradition is not only mired in sexism, but as the case of Egypt shows, it has even played a part in curtailing women’s rights in other societies. Moreover, it is crucial to remember that the rights that women do enjoy anywhere in the world today are the result of struggles waged by women (and men) for those rights. It took no less than a hundred years of bitter struggles for women to win the right to vote in the United States.

然而,这并不是该地区的女性第一次在西方影响下进一步削减其权利。当希腊人在公元前333年左右征服埃及时,埃及妇女遭遇了类似的命运.38与希腊社会相比,妇女过着隔离的生活,其主要作用是照顾孩子,法律认为妻子是“名副其实的孩子,“在埃及社会中,女性,特别是上流社会的女性,地位很高。在新王国时期(公元前1570年至公元前950年),根据法律,埃及妇女和男子被视为平等。妇女有权继承财产并拥有和管理财产,婚姻法是平等主义的,妇女可以在社会中自由行动,而不是被隔离。这并不是说性别歧视不存在。它仍然是一个以男性为主导的社会,但在希腊征服埃及之前,对在希腊社会中发现的那种女性的系统性压迫并不存在。事实上,希腊哲学家亚里士多德认为,男性“在本质上是优越的,而女性是劣等的,男人是统治者,女人是被统治的。”39简而言之,伟大的“自由主义”西方传统不仅陷入了性别歧视的境地。但正如埃及的情况所表明的那样,它甚至在削弱其他社会中妇女的权利方面发挥了作用。此外,至关重要的是要记住,妇女在当今世界任何地方享有的权利都是妇女(和男子)为这些权利而斗争的结果。在美国赢得投票权的女性花了不少于一百年时间苦苦斗争。

Myth 3: The “Muslim mind” is incapable of science, rational thinking, and reason

迷思3:“穆斯林思维”无法兼容科学,理性思考和理性

On September 12, 2006, when Pope Benedict XVI gave his now-infamous speech, he equated Catholicism with reason and Islam with violence and the lack of reason. Paraphrasing a fourteenth century Byzantine emperor, he stated that when a religion (like Islam) is spread through violence it goes against reason, and also against nature, for “not to act in accordance with reason is contrary to God’s nature.”40 In making this argument, the Pope joined a long line of Orientalists who have argued that reason, rationality, and science are alien to the world of Islam.

2006年9月12日,当教皇本笃十六世发表他现在已经变得臭名昭着的演讲时,他将天主教与理性等同和伊斯兰教等同于暴力和缺乏理性。 他指的是十四世纪的拜占庭皇帝,他指出,当一个宗教(如伊斯兰教)通过暴力传播时,它违背了理性,也违背了自然,因为“不按照理性行事就违背了上帝的本性。”40 在这一论点中,教皇加入了一长串的东方主义者中,他们认为理性,合理和科学对伊斯兰世界来说是陌生的。

Ernest Renan, who championed science and reason, in an essay published in 1883 titled “Islam and Science” stated: “Early Islam and the Arabs who professed it were hostile to scientific and philosophic spirit.”41 In a lecture at the Sorbonne, he said:

在1883年出版的题为“伊斯兰与科学”的文章中,支持科学和理性的Ernest Renan说:“早期的伊斯兰教和宣扬它的阿拉伯人对科学和哲学精神持敌视态度。”41在Sorbonne大学的一次演讲中,他说:

Anyone with any knowledge of current affairs can see quite clearly the actual inferiority of the Muslim countries, the decadence of the states governed by Islam, the intellectual barrenness of the races that derive their culture and education from that religion alone. All those who have traveled to the East or to Africa have been struck by the totally narrow mind of the true believer, the kind of iron band around his head that closes him off completely from science and him quite incapable of learning anything or opening his mind to any new ideas.42

任何对时事有所了解的人都可以清楚地看到穆斯林国家的实际自卑感,伊斯兰统治的国家的颓废,仅仅从这种宗教中获得文化和教育的种族的智力的贫瘠。 所有前往东方或非洲的人都被真正信徒的完全狭隘的思想所打动,他的头脑周围的铁带使他完全脱离了科学,他完全无法学习任何东西或打开他的思想,接受任何新的想法.42

Today, the so-called debate on whether Iran should be allowed to have nuclear weapons draws from these arguments. The mainstream media faithfully reproduce the line of the political elites and don’t raise the question of why it is legitimate for the U.S. to police other nations, especially when it is the only country to have ever used nuclear weapons. Iran is represented, at best, as a petulant child incapable of responsibly handling nuclear technology, and at worst, a demonic force that must be vanquished. Little time is devoted to shedding light on why Iran, as a rational political actor, might want to acquire nuclear weapons. After all, Iran is surrounded by states that possess nukes such as India, Pakistan, China, Russia, and Israel, not to mention by U.S. bases in Qatar, Iraq, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Afghanistan, which might have nuclear weapons.

今天,关于是否允许伊朗拥有核武器的所谓的辩论都来自这些论点。主流媒体忠实地再现了政治精英的界限,并没有提出为什么美国干涉其他国家是合法的问题,特别是当它是唯一曾经使用过核武器的国家时。伊朗被当成这样一个代表:最好的情况是,只是一个不适合负责处理核技术的暴力儿童,最坏的情况是,必须被征服的恶魔力量。 没有多少时间可以阐明为什么伊朗作为一个理性的政治行动者可能想要获得核武器。 毕竟,伊朗被拥有核武器的国家所包围,如印度,巴基斯坦,中国,俄罗斯和以色列,更不用说可能拥有核武器的卡塔尔,伊拉克,土耳其,乌兹别克斯坦和阿富汗的美国基地。

There are many ways to debunk this myth about Islam, science, and rationality. I will focus on the hidden history of Islam and science. The important point here is that the West would not have gone through the renaissance had it not been for the contributions made by the Muslim empires.

有很多方法可以揭穿关于伊斯兰教,科学和理性的迷思。 我将重点关注伊斯兰教和科学的被隐藏的历史。 这里重要的一点是,如果没有穆斯林帝国的贡献,西方就不会经历文艺复兴。

After the fall of Rome from the fifth to the tenth century, Europe entered the so-called Dark Ages, a period of scientific, artistic, and cultural decline. During the seventh century, Islam came onto the scene and the Muslim armies established a vast empire that stretched from Central Asia through parts of Europe, all the way to the Atlantic Ocean. The Muslim rulers of the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties (661–1258 AD) recognized the advanced development of the kingdoms and cultures they had conquered and took it upon themselves to assimilate and adopt these cultures. They established libraries and translation centers where the great works of science, medicine, and philosophy, both Eastern and Western, were collected and translated. This age of translation was followed by a period of great creativity when a new generation of Muslim thinkers and scientists built upon this knowledge and made their own contributions.

罗马衰亡之后的五世纪到十世纪,欧洲进入了所谓的黑暗时代,即科学,艺术和文化衰落的时期。 在七世纪,伊斯兰教出现了,穆斯林军队建立了一个庞大的帝国,从中亚延伸到欧洲部分地区,一直延伸到大西洋。 倭马亚和阿拔斯王朝(公元661-1258)的穆斯林统治者认识到他们征服的王国和文化的先进发展,并将其自身吸收并接受这些文化。他们建立了图书馆和翻译中心,收集和翻译了东方和西方的科学,医学和哲学的伟大著作。 当新一代穆斯林思想家和科学家建立在这些知识基础上并做出自己的贡献时,这个翻译时代之后又出现了一段伟大的创造时期。(备注:阿拉伯帝国曾经进行了持续两百年的大翻译运动,将古希腊和罗马的部分著作保留下来,后来这些著作传回欧洲,并成为文艺复兴的基础依据之一。)

The Persian scholar Ibn Sina—known in Western histories as Avicenna—laid the basis for the study of logic, science, philosophy, politics, and medicine. Ibn Rushd systematized Aristotle’s thought so as to introduce rationalism and anti-mysticism to a new audience; but he also went beyond Aristotle to promote rational thought as a virtue in itself. Ibn Rawandi wrote several books questioning the basic principles not only of Christianity and Judaism, but of Islam as well. Ibn Rawandi belonged to the Mu’tazilite sect, who went so far as to question whether the Koran was really a collection of the revelations that Muhammad received from God. They used rationalist thinking, fragments of Greek philosophy, and their own observations to develop theories to explain the physical world.43 In short, science thrived in the world of the Islamic empires.

波斯学者Ibn Sina在西方历史中称为Avicenna,为逻辑学,科学,哲学,政治和医学研究奠定了基础。 Ibn Rushd将亚里士多德的思想系统化了,以便向新的观众介绍理性主义和反神秘主义; 但他也超越了亚里士多德,将理性思想本身作为一种美德。 Ibn Rawandi写了几本书,不仅质疑了基督教和犹太教的基本原则,也质疑伊斯兰教的基本原则。 Ibn Rawandi属于Mu’tazilite教派,他甚至质疑古兰经是否真的是穆罕默德从上帝那里得到的启示的集合。 他们运用理性主义思想,希腊哲学的片段,以及他们自己的观察来发展理论以解释物质世界.43简而言之,科学在伊斯兰帝国的世界中蓬勃发展。

When Europe emerged from the Dark Ages, its renaissance in art, culture, and the sciences drew on this enduring legacy of the past, as European thinkers flocked to the great Muslim libraries to not only re-learn their own history and traditions, but also absorb the further development of these traditions by Muslim thinkers. But this history is either ignored or revised by the Orientalists who present this mythical entity known as the “West” that apparently developed in isolation from the rest of the world.

当欧洲从黑暗时代出现时,它在艺术,文化和科学方面的复兴借鉴了过去的这种持久遗产,欧洲思想家纷纷涌向伟大的穆斯林图书馆,不仅重新学习他们自己的历史和传统,而且吸收了穆斯林思想家对这些传统的进一步发展。 但这一历史要么被东方主义者所忽视或修改,他们提出这个被称为“西方”的神话实体,显然是与世界其他地方隔离开来的。

It is also significant that the Pope in denouncing Islam for lacking reason, fails to bring up the Catholic Church’s hostile opposition to the scientific revolution and to the birth of non-religious and rational ways of understanding the world. The scientific revolution (and the Enlightenment) stood in opposition to Christian dogma and was viewed as a threat by the Church. Scientists who employed reason and rationality to explain the physical world were severely punished. Giordano Bruno, who championed the Copernican system of astronomy, was imprisoned for eight years by the Roman and Venetian Inquisition for refusing to recant his beliefs. He was later burned at the stake. Galileo was similarly brought before the Inquisition and placed under house arrest for the rest of his life.

同样重要的是,教皇在缺乏理由的情况下谴责伊斯兰教,未能指出天主教会对科学革命的敌对和反对,以及非宗教的理性方式对世界的理解。 科学革命(和启蒙运动)与基督教教条相对立,被教会视为威胁。 用理性和理性来解释物质世界的科学家受到了严厉的惩罚。 支持哥白尼天文系统的佐丹奴布鲁诺因拒绝放弃他的信仰而被罗马和威尼斯的宗教裁判所监禁了八年。 他后来被烧死了。 伽利略同样被带到宗教裁判所,并在他的余生中被软禁。

The Pope’s speech is deeply rooted in Orientalist myths because he has an interest not only in presenting a particular vision of a rational and enlightened “West,” but also in obscuring Christianity’s history of violence. He thus quoted the Byzantine emperor Manuel II Paleologus, who said, “Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.”44 The great irony of our times is that the Pope, who used to be head of the Vatican office of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (formerly known as the Inquisition), can denounce the spreading of religion through violence and get away with it.

教皇的讲话深深扎根于东方主义迷思中,因为他不仅对提出理性和开明的“西方”的特定愿景感兴趣,而且还模糊了基督教的暴力史。因此,他引用了拜占庭皇帝Manuel II Paleologus,他说:“告诉我穆罕默德带来的新东西,在那里你会发现只有邪恶和不人道的东西,比如他用剑传播他所传讲的信仰。” 44我们这个时代的巨大讽刺是,曾经是梵蒂冈信仰学会(以前称为宗教裁判所)的梵蒂冈办公室主任的教皇可以谴责宗教通过暴力传播并逍遥法外。

Myth 4: Islam is an inherently violent religion

迷思4:伊斯兰教本质上就是一种暴力宗教

Today, it has become commonplace to argue that Islam is an inherently violent religion and that the growth of political Islam is the logical result of the teachings of the Koran. One of the Danish cartoons featured the Prophet Muhammad with a bomb on this turban. This is nothing if not the visual depiction of the notion that Islam is inherently violent. The term “jihad” is used repeatedly to signify a “holy war” that the East is supposedly waging against the West. Mahmood Mamdani argues against this translation, stating that the term jihad has two meanings. The first, which is the greater jihad, refers to the struggle within oneself and against one’s own weakness. The second, the lesser jihad, is about self-preservation and self-defense and is more appropriately described as a “just war” rather than a “holy war.” Mamdani shows how the “just war” has been “occasional and isolated, marking points of crisis in Islamic history.”45

今天,人们普遍认为伊斯兰教是一种本质上的暴力宗教,而政治伊斯兰教的发展是古兰经教义的导致的合乎逻辑的结果。 其中一部丹麦漫画在先知穆罕默德的头巾上画了个炸弹。 如果这不是对伊斯兰教本质上就是暴力的概念的视觉描绘,那这么做就没有任何意义。 “圣战”一词被反复用来表示东方据称正在对抗西方的“圣战”。 Mahmood Mamdani反对这一翻译,指出圣战这个词有两个含义。 第一个是更大的圣战,指的是自我内部的斗争和反对自己的弱点。 第二个,较小的圣战,是关于自我保护和自卫,更恰当地描述为“正义战争”而不是“圣战”.Mamdani表明“正义战争”是如何“偶尔和孤立的, 标志着伊斯兰历史上的危机点。“45

Yet, this is not how the history of Islam is represented by politicians and the media. Instead, Islam is portrayed as a violent and intolerant religion. Thus, Bush routinely refers to the “enemy” as “evil doers” bent on destroying the West through violence and establishing a “radical Islamic empire.” U.S. News and World Report recently featured a historical overview of Islam titled “Spreading the faith: A chronology,” that begins with the birth of Muhammad in 570 and ends with 9/11, thus drawing an unbroken line of continuity between the two events.46

然而,这不是政客和媒体代表伊斯兰历史的方式。 相反,伊斯兰教被描绘成一种暴力的和不宽容的宗教。因此,布什经常将“敌人”称为“邪恶的行为者”,他们企图通过暴力摧毁西方并建立一个“极端的伊斯兰帝国”。美国新闻与世界报最近刊登了伊斯兰教的历史概况,题为“传播信仰:一个年代表,从570年穆罕默德的出生开始到9/11结束,从而在两个事件之间画出了一条不间断的连续线.46

These claims are self-serving, and justify a level of violence in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine on the part of the United States, its allies, and Israel that far surpasses in the scale of killing and devastation anything that small bands of terrorists have inflicted in the United States, Israel, or Europe.

这些主张是用来合理化自身利益的,并合理化了美国,其盟国和以色列在阿富汗,伊拉克,黎巴嫩和巴勒斯坦的暴力程度,而这是远远超过任何小规模的恐怖分子在美国,以色列或欧洲造成的杀戮和破坏的。

I will address this myth in two parts. In this section, I will discuss Christianity’s history of brutality. In the following section, I explain why today’s Islamist movements are not the direct descendants of seventh-century Islam, but are instead the product of contemporary historical conditions.

我将分两部分讨论这个迷思。 在本节中,我将讨论基督教的残暴历史。在下一节中,我将解释为什么今天的伊斯兰运动不是七世纪伊斯兰教的直系后裔,而是当代历史条件的产物。

The claim that Islam was spread through war is indeed accurate. In the two decades after the Prophet’s death in 632 A.D., the Muslim armies defeated the two great neighboring empires, the Byzantine and Persian (Sassanid) empires, conquered large segments of their land, and set up an Islamic empire. The reason why the Muslim armies could defeat these two powerful empires is that constant warfare between the Byzantines and the Persians over the previous century had left the people war-weary. In fact, in some villages the people actually welcomed the Muslim armies. Once in power, and unlike their orthodox Christian counterparts who persecuted heretics and ruled through fear, intimidation, and terror, the Muslim invaders gave people the choice to either convert to Islam or pay a tax.

伊斯兰教通过战争传播的主张确实是准确的。 在先知于公元632年去世后的二十年中,穆斯林军队击败了两个相邻的大帝国,拜占庭和波斯(萨珊)帝国,征服了他们大部分的土地,并建立了一个伊斯兰帝国。 穆斯林军队之所以能击败这两个强大的帝国,是因为上个世纪拜占庭人和波斯人之间不断的战争让人们厌倦战争。事实上,在一些村庄,人们实际上欢迎穆斯林军队。一旦掌权,与正统的基督徒同行不同的是(基督徒迫害异教徒并通过恐惧,恐吓和恐怖来统治),穆斯林入侵者让人们可以选择皈依伊斯兰教或缴纳税款。

While the Pope and his ilk like to harp on Islam’s use of war and violence, they want us to forget Christianity’s own brutal history. Christianity had also risen to dominance through conquest and conversion, first in the Roman world and then in the neighboring areas of Europe, Armenia, Arabia, Eastern Africa and Central Asia.47 And the Crusades were yet to come. These religious wars waged by European Christians from the eleventh to the thirteenth century were driven partly by religious fervor to capture Jerusalem, and partly by the desire to loot the wealth of the region.

虽然教皇和他的同僚们喜欢指责伊斯兰教对战争和暴力的使用,但他们希望我们忘记基督教自己的残暴历史。基督教也通过征服和皈依而上升到统治地位,首先是在罗马世界,然后是在欧洲,亚美尼亚,阿拉伯,东非和中亚的邻近地区.47十字军东征尚未到来。 欧洲基督徒从十一世纪到十三世纪发动的这些宗教战争的部分原因是想要夺取耶路撒冷的宗教激情,部分原因是掠夺该地区的财富的欲望。

During the First Crusade of 1099, the crusaders went on a killing spree after taking control of Jerusalem, and murdered almost the entire population of Muslim men, women, and children. The Jews, who fought side by side with the Muslims to defend the city, were not spared either. The crusaders set fire to a synagogue where the Jews were hiding, and made sure that every single Jew burned to death.48 The same levels of brutality were seen even during the Third Crusade, when King Richard of England (Richard the Lion-Hearted) beheaded thousands of men in cold blood in full view of their armies after a battle. In contrast, after the Sultan of Egypt, Saladin, successfully retook Jerusalem from the crusaders, acts of vengeance and violence against the crusaders were forbidden, Jews were given state money to rebuild synagogues, and churches were left untouched.49 This is consistent with the way in which the Muslim empires treated Christians and Jews. During 500 years of Muslim reign in Jerusalem, from the seventh to the eleventh century, Christian churches were left largely untouched, and Jews were permitted to return and resettle in the area. This harmony was violently interrupted by the Crusades, when the Christian crusaders wreaked havoc in the region, destroyed synagogues and mosques, and killed Jews and Muslims.

在1099年的第一次十字军东征期间,十字军在控制耶路撒冷之后进行了一次杀戮狂潮,并且几乎杀死了所有穆斯林男女和儿童。与穆斯林并肩作战以保卫城市的犹太人也未能幸免。十字军焚烧了犹太人藏匿的犹太教堂,并确保每一个犹太人都被烧死.48即使在第三次十字军东征期间,当英格兰国王理查德(狮心王理查德)也做了同样程度的野蛮行为。在战斗结束后,他们的军队在冷酷的斩首了成千上万的人。相比之下,在埃及苏丹之后,萨拉丁成功地从十字军手中夺回耶路撒冷,禁止对十字军进行复仇和暴力行为,犹太人获得国家资金重建犹太教会堂,教堂保持不动.49这与穆斯林帝国对待基督徒和犹太人的方式是一致的。在耶路撒冷穆斯林统治的500年间,从七世纪到十一世纪,基督教教堂基本上没有被触及,犹太人被允许返回并重新安置在该地区。当基督教十字军在该地区造成严重破坏,毁坏犹太教堂和清真寺,杀害犹太人和穆斯林时,这种和谐被十字军东征暴力打断了。

Christian empires were no less brutal towards their own populations, and the Inquisitions stand out as an example of the incredibly repressive forms that Christian rule took in Europe. The Inquisitions consisted of a series of movements orchestrated by the Catholic Church and Christian orthodoxy to reassert their economic control over Europe. The Spanish Inquisition, for instance, is remembered for its utter brutality, mass torture, and the burning of men and women at the stake. Many Jews and Christians fled Europe to escape the Inquisition and sought a new home under the Muslim Ottoman Empire (1299–1922). Ottoman society was far more tolerant, Jews and Christians lived peacefully and some even attained high positions in the bureaucracy (sometimes through conversion to Islam but at other times even without conversion).50

基督教帝国对自己的人民同样残酷,而宗教裁判所也是基督教统治在欧洲所采取的令人难以置信的镇压形式的一个例子。 宗教裁判所包括一系列由天主教会和东正教协调的运动,以重建他们对欧洲的经济控制。 例如,西班牙宗教裁判所因其彻底的野蛮行为,大规模的酷刑以及男人和女人在火刑中的焚烧而被人们记住。 许多犹太人和基督徒逃离欧洲逃离宗教裁判所并在穆斯林的奥斯曼帝国(1299-1922)下寻找新家。 奥斯曼社会更加宽容,犹太人和基督徒和平地生活,有些甚至在官僚机构中占据高位(有时通过皈依伊斯兰教,但有时甚至没有皈依).50

Today, no sane person would look at this brutal history of Christianity and argue that all Catholics are bloodthirsty fanatics. To my knowledge, no mainstream newspaper or magazine has drawn a straight line between the Crusades and the Holocaust. Yet, when it comes to demonizing Muslims, it would appear that this sort of logic is acceptable.

今天,没有理智的人会看到这种残酷的基督教历史,然后争辩说所有的天主教徒都是嗜血的狂热分子。 据我所知,没有主流报纸或杂志在十字军与大屠杀之间划出一条直线。 然而,当涉及到妖魔化穆斯林时,似乎这种逻辑是可以接受的。

On balance, the history of Christianity is just as violent as, if not more violent than, that of Islam, yet Orientalists have undermined this history and cast Islam as the violent aggressor. The scholarly bigot Bernard Lewis claims, for instance, that

总的来说,基督教的历史与伊斯兰教的历史一样暴力,甚至比伊斯兰教更为暴力,但东方主义者埋葬了这段历史,并将伊斯兰教视为暴力侵略者。 例如,学术上的偏执狂Bernard Lewis 声称:

[t]he struggle between Islam and the West has lasted fourteen centuries. It has consisted of a long series of attacks and counterattacks, jihads and crusades, conquests and reconquests. Today much of the Muslim world is again seized by an intense—and violent—resentment of the West. Suddenly, America has become the archenemy, the incarnation of evil, the diabolic opponent of all that is good…for Muslims.51

伊斯兰教与西方之间的斗争持续了14个世纪。 它包括一系列的攻击和反击,圣战和十字军东征,征服和重新征服。 今天,穆斯林世界的大部分地区再次被对西方的强烈的和暴力的怨恨所占据。突然之间,对穆斯林来说,美国已经成为大敌,邪恶的化身,一切善良的反对者……

Rewriting history, Lewis argues that Islam is the aggressor, while the West simply responds, whereas in truth “resentment,” to the extent that such a thing exists in the Middle East, is a product of imperialist intervention in the region.

重写历史之后,Lewis认为伊斯兰教是侵略者,而西方只是回应,而实际上“怨恨”,在中东存在这种程度的事物,是帝国主义干预该地区的产物。

Mamdani recently observed that after 9/11, the sales of the Koran rose as Americans sought out the holy book of the Muslims to find an explanation for 9/11. He pointed out that, on the contrary, when the U.S. bombed and destroyed Afghanistan and Iraq, the people of the Middle East didn’t rush off to buy the Bible to look for explanations of U.S. policies. For there are no cultural or religious explanations for these wars. The explanations are historical, political, and economic, but by focusing on religious wars, the peddlers of the “clash of civilizations” thesis insist that we look for cultural explanations instead. This recourse to “culture talk” then takes attention away from the real reasons for U.S. intervention, offering up instead some vague references to transhistorical civilization and cultural rivalries.52 There are some in the Middle East who share this view and see U.S. intervention as a cultural and religious war. However, in this they are just as mistaken as their Western counterparts. The U.S. is in Iraq and Afghanistan not to wage a religious war but to assert its control over the region’s strategic resource: oil. This is why Saudi Arabia, whose royal family adheres to the ultra-conservative Wahhabi/Salafi strand of Islam, is an ally of the U.S., while the largely secular Syrian Baathists are not.

Mamdani最近观察到在9/11之后,随着美国人寻找穆斯林的圣书以寻找出对9/11的解释,古兰经的销售量上升了。他指出,恰恰相反的是,当美国轰炸并摧毁阿富汗和伊拉克时,中东人民并没有急于购买圣经以寻求对美国政策的解释。因为这些战争没有文化或宗教解释。解释是历史的,政治的和经济的,但通过关注宗教战争,“文明冲突”论的小贩们坚持认为我们应当寻找文化解释。这种求助于“文化谈话”然后将注意力从美国干预的真正原因上转移开来,提供了对跨文化文明和文化对抗的一些含糊的依据.52中东有一些人赞同这种观点并认为美国的干预是文化和宗教战争。然而,在这方面,他们与西方同行们一样错误。美国在伊拉克和阿富汗并没有发动宗教战争,而是主张控制该地区的战略资源:石油。这就是为什么沙特阿拉伯,其王室坚持伊斯兰教的极端保守的瓦哈比/萨拉菲派,是美国的盟友,而不是大部分世俗化的叙利亚复兴派。(备注:叙利亚复兴派受到部分社会主义的影响,偏左派,后来被老阿萨德政变推翻。)

Myth 5: The West spreads democracy, while Islam spawns terrorism

迷思5:西方传播民主,而伊斯兰教则产生恐怖主义

The classic version of this myth states that Islamic civilization [sic] is not capable of democracy, and it can only produce despotism. Since it is a static and unchanging society, it is the burden of the West to civilize, modernize, and democratize. This “white man’s burden” argument has been used, in different forms and guises, by all the European powers in the past. It is no wonder, then, that today the U.S. too finds it useful, just as it seeks, for the first time, to actually occupy and administer a Middle Eastern country. The Bush administration has insisted again and again that the U.S. is in the Middle East to bring democracy to the people of the region.

这个迷思的经典版本指出,伊斯兰文明[sic]不具备民主的能力,只能产生专制。 由于它是一个静止不变的社会,它是西方负担,西方应当去文明,现代化和民主化它们。过去,所有欧洲大国都以不同的形式和伪装使用了这种“白人的负担”论点。因此,毫无疑问的,今天美国也认为它有用,正如它第一次寻求实际占领和管理一个中东国家一样。 布什政府一再坚持要求美国在中东地区为该地区人民带来了民主。

The reality, needless to say, is quite different from this rhetoric. The U.S. has never had an interest in “bringing democracy” to the people of the Middle East, or to any other people for that matter. If anything, the U.S. has a record of wrecking democratic movements and replacing them with dictatorships.53

不用说,现实与这种修辞完全不同。 美国从来没有兴趣为中东人民或其他任何人“带来民主”。 如果有的话,美国有破坏民主运动并用独裁统治取而代之的记录。53(关于这一点,我博客上有一篇文章进行了总结:被美国推翻的民选政府,支持极权独裁的“民主灯塔”

After the Second World War, the Middle East and North Africa were rocked by national liberation struggles. Between 1932 and 1962, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria all succeeded in shaking off the hold of their colonial masters (mainly Britain and France). In the wake of these struggles there was a widespread mood for reform and change in region, and new political and social forces emerged. Secular Arab nationalism gained a stronghold, but socialist and communist parties also vied for political influence.

第二次世界大战后,中东和北非受到了民族解放斗争的震撼。 1932年至1962年间,埃及,伊拉克,叙利亚,黎巴嫩,利比亚,摩洛哥,突尼斯和阿尔及利亚都成功地摆脱了殖民主子(主要是英国和法国)的控制。 在这些斗争之后,地区出现了改革和变革的普遍情绪,出现了新的政治和社会力量。 世俗的阿拉伯民族主义获得了一个据点,但社会主义者和共产党也在争夺政治影响力。

U.S.-Middle East policy has been motivated by one chief objective: namely, to control the oil wealth of that region, at any cost. Consequently, U.S. foreign policy has been directed toward preventing the emergence of any government or movement that might threaten its dominance in the region. Thus the U.S. ruling class viewed the emergence of Arab nationalism and socialism as a threat. From the 1950s to the 1970s, U.S. policy in the region was twofold: to minimize the influence of the Soviet Union, and to squash all progressive and leftist challenges to U.S. domination.

美国的中东政策的动机指向一个主要目标:即不惜一切代价控制该地区的石油财富。因此,美国的外交政策旨在防止可能威胁其在该地区的主导地位的任何政府或运动的出现。因此,美国的统治阶级认为阿拉伯民族主义和社会主义的出现是一种威胁。 从1950s到1970s,美国在该地区的政策是双重的:尽量减少苏联的影响,并将所有进步力量和左翼力量挑战压缩到无法挑战美国的统治地位的地步。

It achieved these goals in various ways: it maintained powerful naval forces and military bases in the region. When necessary and where possible it intervened militarily, such as in 1958 when U.S. Marines briefly entered Lebanon to block an attempt by Arab nationalist forces to topple the pro-Western government in power. It propped up dictatorships and repressive regimes such as the Saudi monarchy and funded, trained, and armed the military and security forces of its allies. It also hatched coups to get rid of unfriendly governments. In 1953, the CIA toppled the secular nationalist Mohammed Mossadeg who had been democratically elected to power in Iran in 1951. Mossadeg’s crime was that he nationalized the oil industry. The U.S. then replaced him with Reza Pahlavi, the Shah, who ruled with an iron fist, murdered and tortured tens of thousands of political dissenters, and abolished all political parties but his own.

它以各种方式实现了这些目标:它在该地区保持了强大的海军力量和军事基地。 必要时尽可能进行军事干预,例如1958年美国海军陆战队短暂进入黎巴嫩以阻止阿拉伯民族主义势力推翻亲西方政府的企图。它支持沙特王室等独裁政权和压迫政权,并为其盟国的军事和安全部队提供资金,培训和武装。它还策划政变以摆脱不友好的政府。 1953年,中央情报局推翻了世俗民族主义者穆罕默德·莫萨阿德(Mohammed Mossadeg),他于1951年通过伊朗的民主选举上台。莫撒阿德的罪行在于他将石油工业国有化。然后,美国用沙阿Reza Pahlavi(巴列维)取代了他,他用铁拳统治,谋杀并折磨了成千上万的政治反对者,并废除了除了他自己之外的所有政党。

The strongest challenge to the U.S. was Arab nationalism. Arab nationalists like Gamel Abdel Nasser attempted to unify Arabs across different countries as a way to fight imperialism, particularly U.S. imperialism. The program of Arab nationalism rapidly acquired revolutionary overtones in response to militant working-class pressures from below. Nasser, the president of Egypt, went so far as to declare himself an advocate of “Arab socialism.” Although what he meant by socialism was a more or less authoritarian state planning of the economy, or “state capitalism,” even this was too much for the U.S., as it pushed Egypt closer to its Cold War rival, the USSR.54

对美国的最大挑战是阿拉伯民族主义。 像Gamel Abdel Nasser(纳赛尔)这样的阿拉伯民族主义者试图将不同国家的阿拉伯人统一起来,作为反抗帝国主义,特别是美国帝国主义的一种方式。 阿拉伯民族主义方案迅速获得革命性的色彩,以应对来自下方的激进的工人阶级的压力。 埃及总统纳赛尔走得很远,甚至宣称自己是“阿拉伯社会主义”的支持者。虽然他所指的社会主义是一个或多或少专制的国家经济计划,或“国家资本主义”,即使这对美国来说也太多了,因为它推动埃及更接近其冷战对手,苏联.54

Thus, the U.S. ruling class used every means necessary to not only block Arab nationalism, but also curtail the influence of various communist and socialist parties. This involved, for instance, aiding governments and right-wing paramilitaries in killing leftists, and in 1963, the CIA supplied the Baathists with the names of Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) members after the Baathists grabbed power in a coup. It involved cultivating Israel as the proxy of the U.S. in the region, particularly after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. It also meant supporting and funding Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, which the U.S. saw as a bulwark against the Left.

因此,美国统治阶级利用一切必要手段不仅阻止了阿拉伯民族主义,而且还削弱了各种共产党和社会主义政党的影响力。 例如,这涉及帮助政府和右翼准军事人员杀害左翼,并且在1963年,中央情报局在复兴主义者政变夺权后,向复兴主义者提供了伊拉克共产党成员的名字。 它涉及培养以色列作为美国在该地区的代理人,特别是在1967年阿拉伯—以色列战争之后。它还意味着支持和资助伊斯兰组织,例如埃及的穆斯林兄弟会,美国认为这是反对左派的堡垒。(备注:呵呵,看来美国在埃及和在阿富汗做了同样的暴行啊,把伊斯兰原教旨主义势力亲手喂大了。)

If today the main political forces in the Middle East are Islamist parties and organizations, it is in no small part due to U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. played a key role in marginalizing secular and leftist forces, thereby creating the political vacuum that Islamist groups would come to fill. In addition, the U.S. funded, armed, and trained the Mujahideen in Afghanistan to fight their proxy war against the Soviets in the 1980s. In the process, the U.S. created an army of jihadist fighters who would turn on their patrons once the Soviets were defeated. This turn was to be expected, given that modern Islamist organizations, whether mainstream or right wing, came into being as a means to fight imperialism (first British and French colonialism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and then later U.S. imperialism).

如果今天中东的主要政治力量是伊斯兰政党和组织,那在很大程度上要归功于美国的外交政策。美国在使世俗和左翼势力边缘化方面发挥了关键作用,从而创造了伊斯兰组织将要填补的政治真空。此外,美国资助,武装和训练了阿富汗的圣战士队,以便让他们在1980s在对苏联的代理人战争中作战。 在这个过程中,美国创建了一支圣战分子的军队,一旦苏联被击败,他们就会转向他们的保护人。 鉴于现代伊斯兰组织,无论是主流还是右翼组织,都是作为一种对抗帝国主义的手段(19世纪和20世纪初的英国和法国殖民主义,以及后来的美国帝国主义)而出现的转变。

There are also internal factors that explain the rise of political Islam. Arab nationalism, despite its radical rhetoric and promises, had weaknesses and contradictions. Ultimately, it was a movement of the middle classes in the interest of the middle classes. And like their counterparts in many other postcolonial nations, the Arab nationalists failed to deliver economic growth and prosperity for the vast majority of ordinary people, establishing oppressive dictatorships that crushed dissent. The Left in the region, primarily the thoroughly Stalinized communist parties, failed to offer an independent class-based alternative to the nationalists, but rather tailed them uncritically. The ICP, for example, offered support to the nationalist Qasim regime in 1959, even denouncing class struggle as “left-wing extremism,” at the same time that the party was being repressed by the regime.55 The failure of nationalist movements, combined with the crushing impact of poverty and the pressures of capitalism, the weakness of the Left, and the support given at times by local ruling classes to Islamic parties have all played a part in strengthening the parties of Islamism.56

还有内部因素可以解释政治伊斯兰教的兴起。阿拉伯民族主义尽管有激进的修辞和承诺,却存在弱点和矛盾。终究这是为了中产阶级的利益,这是中产阶级的运动。与许多其他后殖民国家的同行一样,阿拉伯民族主义者未能为绝大多数普通民众带来经济增长和繁荣,并建立了镇压不同意见的压迫性的独裁统治。该地区的左派,主要是完全斯大林化的共产党,未能为民族主义者们提供一个独立的以阶级为基础的替代方案,而是不加批判地将他们排除在外。例如,ICP在1959年为民族主义的卡西姆政权提供了支持,甚至谴责阶级斗争为“左翼极端主义”,同时该政党正在被该政权所压制.55民族主义运动的失败,结合贫困的压力和资本主义的压力,左翼的弱点,以及地方统治阶级有时给予伊斯兰政党的支持,都在加强伊斯兰主义政党方面发挥了作用.56

In short, it is a combination of these pressures—U.S. imperialism, on the one hand, and internal dynamics on the other—that laid the groundwork for the emergence of political Islam. And radical Islamist groups, far from being the direct outgrowth of the teaching of the Prophet in the seventh century, are the products of particular historical conditions.

简而言之,伊斯兰原教旨主义的崛起是这些压力的结合—一方面是美国帝国主义,另一方面是内部动力—这为政治伊斯兰教的出现奠定了基础。 极端的伊斯兰主义团体,远不是七世纪先知教导的直接产物,而是特定历史条件的产物。

Conclusion

总结

Today, the weakness of the Left and the collapse of liberalism in the U.S. has meant that much of the history discussed in this article remains hidden. Many liberals, and some on the left as well, have bought into the clash of civilizations argument. Thus, when liberals went along with Bush’s argument that the U.S. invaded Afghanistan to liberate the women of that country, they bought into the racist idea that it is legitimate for the U.S. to “democratize” the Middle East because the people of the region are incapable of doing it themselves. On the flip side of this coin, some antiwar liberals have argued that it is not legitimate for the U.S. to “democratize” the Middle East because “democracy” is an alien concept to the people of the region.

今天,左派的弱点和美国自由主义的崩溃意味着本文所讨论的大部分历史都是被隐藏的。 许多自由主义者,以及一些左派,已经陷入了文明冲突的争论中。 因此,当自由派同意布什关于美国入侵阿富汗以解放该国妇女的论点时,他们接受了种族主义观点,认为美国将中东“民主化”是合法的,因为该地区的人民没有能力自己做。在这个硬币的另一面,一些反战自由主义者认为,美国将中东“民主化”是不合法的,因为“民主”对该地区人民来说是一个陌生的概念。

Confronting Islamophobia and challenging American racism towards the people of the Middle East is an essential precondition for the rebirth of a strong antiwar movement. Thus far, the movement’s inability, or unwillingness, to confront Islamophobia has been one of its biggest weaknesses. And while Bush argues that “the calling of our generation” is to fight “Islamofascism,” we need to assert instead that the calling of our generation is to build an anti-racist antiwar movement that can challenge the attacks on Muslims and Arabs domestically and that can stop U.S. imperialism in its tracks and shape the course of the twenty-first century. Our future, quite literally, depends on building such a movement.

面对伊斯兰恐惧症和挑战针对中东人民的美国种族主义是强大的反战运动重生的重要前提。 到目前为止,运动无法或不愿意面对伊斯兰恐惧症一直是其最大的弱点之一。 虽然布什认为“我们这一代人的呼吁”是为了打击“伊斯兰法西斯主义”,但我们需要说的是,与之相反的是,我们这一代的呼吁是建立一个反种族主义的反战运动,可以挑战对国内穆斯林和阿拉伯人的袭击。这可以阻止美国帝国主义继续作恶,并塑造二十一世纪的历程。从字面上看,我们的未来取决于建立这样的运动。

http://www.isreview.org/issues/52/islamophobia.shtml

英国社会主义医疗系统NHS介绍

要说这个世界上运转的比较好的福利国家医疗系统,英国的NHS(National Health Service)是一定会在内的,而未来中国的医疗系统也可以参考NHS。相比之下,美国的以私人保险公司为主的医疗系统就很糟糕了,几千万人得不到保障(奥巴马曾经试图解决这个问题,但被唐纳德希特勒和共和党搅黄了),私人保险公司浪费大量资源在市场营销上,穷人看不起病。

对英国有一定了解的人,大概已经猜到NHS是谁推行的了:没错,就是被撒切尔和其他资本主义哈巴狗们臭骂“左疯”的工党!虽然90年代之后布莱尔为首的工党败类把工党变成了资本主义哈巴狗党,但是当年推行NHS的工党可是个在党章里写着要建设社会主义的如假包换的社会主义政党。

关于工党历史,有兴趣的人可以大致看下Labour Party (UK)wiki,我这里就不具体介绍了,简单来说,工党起源于多个社会主义组织和独立工会组织,主要倾向于社会民主主义,一直以实现社会主义为目标,但在上世纪90年代被布莱尔为首的工党败类改造为鼓吹狗屁自由市场的资本主义哈巴狗党,直到2015年Jeremy Corbyn赢得党内选举,成为主席之后,工党才重新恢复对社会主义的追求。有兴趣的人可以看下工党官网,注意现在工党的Logo是红色玫瑰,而红色玫瑰是社会民主主义(democratic socialism,或称民主社会主义)的标志。

来看下NHS的具体历史吧:

By the end of World War II, the concept of an integrated, state-funded hospital service had become established and, in 1948, the newly-elected Labour (socialist) government created a National Health Service (NHS) as none of a series of welfare reforms designed to guarantee basic levels of personal and social security. For the first time, a UK government assumed responsibility for the provis ion of a comprehensive preventive and curative service for the whole population.
到第二次世界大战结束时,政府资助的综合医院服务的概念已经建立,并且在1948年,新当选的工党(社会主义)政府创建了一个国家健康服务(NHS),而不是一系列的旨在保障基本生活水平和社会保障水平的福利改革。英国政府首次承担起为全体人民提供全面预防和治疗服务的责任。(事实上,NHS是世界上第一个政府负责的公共医疗系统。)
The fundamental principles underlying the NHS were, and still largely are, that services would be funded predominantly from general taxation and that they would in general be free at the point of use, comprehensive and available to all, regardless of means to pay. A small but significant privately-funded health care systems has always existed alongside the NHS, expanding and contracting in line with the country’s broader economic state.However, for nearly fifty years, British people have received almost all their health care without paying directly for it.
NHS的基本原则曾经是,并且在很大程度上现在仍然是,医疗服务将主要由一般税收资助,并且它们通常在使用时免费,全面且可供所有人使用,无论支付方式如何。一个小但明显的私人医疗保健系统一直与NHS一起存在,根据该国更广泛的经济状况扩大或收缩。然而,近50年来,英国人几乎没有直接支付过医疗保健费用。
The structure of the new service reflected its disparate origins and artificial divisions between different elements persisted for many years. There were three main strands¹:
新服务的结构反映了其不同的起源,并且不同元素之间的人为划分持续了多年。 主要有三条线:
•State owned (nationalised) hospitals
国家拥有(国有化的)医院
Hospitals that had previously been run by voluntary charitable organisations and local government became the responsibility of Regional Hospitals Boards, with local responsibility delegated to Hospitals Management Committees. Acute specialities retained their traditional high status in comparison with the relatively low profile services for the elderly or the mentally ill. Until the early 1990s long-term care was provided in large, impersonal institutions and it is only relatively recently that acute services for the elderly and mentally ill have been integrated with other types of hospital care.
以前由志愿慈善组织和当地政府管理的医院由区域医院委员会负责,地方责任委托给医院管理委员会。与针对老年人或精神疾病患者的相对低调的服务相比,急诊保持其传统的高地位。直到1990s初期,大型非个人机构才提供长期护理,而且最近才将老年人和精神病患者的急症服务与其他类型的医院护理相结合。
•A national network of general practitioners
一个全国全科医生网络
A network of General Practitioners (GPs or family doctors) replaced the panel system. They were responsible for personal primary health care and received fees which were set and paid nationally. They were also the gatekeepers to other health services, referring patients on (e .g. to hospital services) as they thought appropriate. Executive Councils, which received money directly from the Ministry of Health, administered the family practitioner services.
全科医生网络(全科医生或家庭医生)取代了面板系统。 他们负责个人初级卫生保健,并收取全国政府设定的和支付的费用。他们也是其他医疗服务的守门人,在他们认为合适的情况下转介患者(例如医院服务)。执行理事会直接从卫生部获得资金,管理家庭医生服务。
•Community and domiciliary health services
社区和家庭健康服务
Services such as home nurses, public and environmental health and health prevention/promotion continued to be run by separate, elected Local (municipal Authorities or Councils, which were also responsible for housing, roads and education.
家庭护士,公共和环境卫生以及健康预防/促进等服务继续由独立的当选地方(市政当局或理事会)负责,这些机构或理事会也负责住房,道路和教育。
The three strands were financed centrally but managed separately. Throughout the history of the NHS, this initial division of functions between separate statutory organisations created problems in the provision of comprehensive and co-ordinated services. It is only recently that all three strands of direct health care have been provided within, and commissioned by, the NHS. Nonetheless, functions such as personal social services, long term care for most elderly people and responsibility for the environment, housing, roads education and employment (w hich are of fundamental importance to overall health) remain the preserve of local and central government. Periodic attempts to create a more cohesive approach to social policy in general, and health in particular, have not been very successful.
这三条线是集中提供资金但分开管理的。 在整个NHS的历史中,不同法定组织之间的这种初始职能分工在提供全面和协调的服务方面产生了问题。 直到最近,所有三条线的直接医疗保健都在NHS内部提供并由其委托。 尽管如此,个人社会服务,对大多数老年人的长期护理以及对环境,住房,道路教育和就业(对整体健康至关重要)的责任等功能仍然在地方和中央政府中保留。 定期尝试制定更具凝聚力的社会政策方法,特别是健康方法,并未取得很大成功。
这是大致介绍,具体内容有兴趣的人去NHS的官网上自己看吧:https://www.nhs.uk/NHSEngland/AboutNHSservices/Pages/NHSServices.aspx
哦,说一个坏消息:NHS从上世纪80年代开始就一直受到威胁,被迫“内部市场化”,被削减资金,而这是谁干的呢?是撒切尔这个保守主义纳粹垃圾和一直都是资本主义哈巴狗的纳粹保守党干的:

 

In the 1980s, however, Margaret Thatcher’s government began an attack on the principles of the NHS that has not yet subsided. As public health doctor and scholar Allyson Pollock describes in NHS Plc: The Privatisation of our Health Care, Thatcher’s government imposed intermittent austerity funding and the incremental imposition of market-based reforms such as the “internal market” and the “private finance initiative,” signaling a retreat from the NHS’s initial collectivist provisions and a partial move toward commodification.

然而,在1980s,玛格丽特·撒切尔政府开始攻击迄今为止尚未消失的NHS原则。正如公共卫生医生和学者Allyson Pollock在NHS Plc所描述的那样:我们的医疗保健被私有化,撒切尔政府实施间歇性紧缩资金以及逐步实施市场化改革,如“内部市场”和“私人融资计划”,标志着从NHS最初的集体主义供应撤退,并部分转向商业化。(医疗市场化会带来什么后果,看看中国那些活活病死和被疾病一夜回到解放前的人就知道。顺便说一句,撒切尔是哈耶克的信徒,其”名言“为:”没有社会这回事“”穷人穷困是个人原因“”没人有权成为同性恋“,呵呵,标准的资本主义哈巴狗纳粹嘴脸。

The Labour government of Tony Blair, as she notes, continued down the road first paved by Thatcher. However, Blair’s government did eventually initiate a much-needed increase in funding: to just under 7 percent a year, almost twice the historical average of 4 percent. This overdue boost, however, would not survive the Great Recession.

正如她所指出的那样,托尼·布莱尔的工党政府继续沿着撒切尔首先铺好的道路前进。 然而,布莱尔政府最终确实开始增加了急需的资金:每年仅低于7%,几乎是历史平均值4%的两倍。 然而,这种过期的推动力将无法在大衰退中存活下来。

In 2010, David Cameron’s Conservative-led government was elected and destabilized the NHS through two great upheavals. First, the government reorganized the NHS through the passage of the 2012 Health and Social Care Act; second, it instituted a period of funding austerity the likes of which the NHS had never seen.

2010年,戴维•卡梅伦的保守党领导的政府当选,并通过两次重大动荡破坏了NHS的稳定。 首先,政府通过2012年“健康与社会护理法”重组了NHS; 第二,它设立了一个资金紧缩的时期,这是NHS从未见过的。

来源:Saving the NHS

社会主义者铸造了NHS,而资本主义哈巴狗们用尽手段破坏NHS,所以,什么是资本主义?资本主义就是少数有钱人奴役大部分没钱的人;什么是社会主义?社会主义就是不让任何一个人掉队。

生态社会主义宣言

乔尔·柯维尔 迈克尔·洛威[1]
Ecosocialist Manifesto
by Joel Kovel and Michael Lowy

21世纪在一种灾难性氛围中开场。前所未有的生态环境的破坏,世界秩序的混乱,恐怖和分裂的战争,在一条带状大陆上分布开来,沿着中非、中东直到南美洲西北部等地区的国家在战争中震荡不安。在我们看来,生态危机与社会崩溃是紧密联系在一起的,并且应当被视为同样的结构力量的表现。
生态危机主要是因为疯狂的工业化进程超过了地球所能承受的限度而引起的。社会的崩溃则根源于帝国主义,即全球化所带来的影响——它会碾碎所有在它前进道路上的人类社会。这些力量实际上是同一推动力的不同方面。这个推动力就是世界资本主义系统的扩张,我们必须将它视为工业化和全球化进程的根本动力。
我们反对对这种体制的凶残性的轻描淡写:粉饰其所带来的生态代价,借用民主及人权的名义使其所带来的生命代价模糊化。
我们坚持只能根据资本主义的实际表现来看待它。
这个体制,由于对利润的持续增长的迫切追求,不断影响着大自然和生态平衡,使生态系统遭到严重破坏,使从远古演变至今才适宜各种生物蓬勃生长的地域支离破碎,挥霍资源,并且为了积累资本的需要而把自然生命力变成冷冰冰的交换价值。
人类是需要有自决权、群体情感以及生活意义的,资本却把世界上大多数人仅仅当作是劳动力的储备,剩余者则被弃之若草芥。
资本已经通过消费主义和非政治化的大众文化侵入并且破坏了社区的整体性。
它已经使财富和权力上的不平等扩至人类历史上前所未有的水平。
它已经同腐败的依附国家勾结起来,构成了一张网络,让依附国家本地的精英集团来干镇压国内人民的勾当,而中心国家免受声誉上的伤害。
资本还撒开了一张完全在西方列强尤其是美国这个超级大国监视之下的跨国网络,破坏周边国家的自主性,用债务束缚他们,并且维持一个强大的军事力量以迫使他们顺从于资本主义中心。
我们坚信:现存的资本主义体系无法调节它所带来的危机,更别提战胜它们了。它无力解决生态危机,因为这样做需要限制资本的积累,而这正是这个系统所无法接受的。因为它的信条就是:“增长!否则就灭亡!”
它也不能解决恐怖以及其他形式的暴力反抗行为所带来的危机,因为这样做就意味着放弃这个帝国的逻辑基础,就要对资本增长以及帝国的整个生存方式加以无法接受的限制。它仅有的选择就是诉诸暴力,这样就更加使人心疏离,埋下恐怖主义未来的种子。然后再反恐,由此演变出一个新的危险的法西斯政权的变种。
总之,资本主义世界体系已经在历史上破产了,它变成了一个无法适应世界现状的帝国,其空前庞大恰恰暴露其根本虚弱。以生态学的观点来看的话,它是不可持续发展的,所以如果我们还想要一个可供我们生存的未来的话,我们必须改变它,要从根本上替换掉它。
于是,又回到了罗莎·卢森堡那句直截了当的名言:“要么社会主义,要么野蛮主义!”而野蛮主义的面貌现在反映出最近一个世纪的印记,表现为巨大的生态灾难,恐怖对恐怖,以及它们向法西斯主义的堕落。
但是为什么要选择社会主义呢?为什么要重新拾起这个字眼呢?它不是似乎由于20世纪中它的各流派都失败了而已经被抛到历史垃圾堆去了吗?
其实原因只有一个,那就是:尽管社会主义没有实现,它的实质却依然代表着对资本统治的取代。如果要战胜资本,使文明能够延续,一个必然的结果就是社会主义,因为只有它代表着向后资本主义社会的突破。如果我们说资本主义根本上是不可持续发展的,并且会崩溃成为如上文所说的“野蛮主义”,那么就意味着我们需要建立一个“社会主义”,它能够战胜资本主义目前的危机。并且,如果社会主义在过去没能完成这项任务的话,那么这就将成为我们的义务,因为如果我们不愿走向一个野蛮的终点的话,我们就必须向一个能够可持续发展下去的世界奋斗。正如卢森堡所指出的野蛮主义的变化所反映出的世界现实,社会主义,不仅是在名义上,并且在实际上将成为这次的选择。
正是基于上述理由,我们决定将我们对于社会主义的阐释命名为生态社会主义,并且我们将尽我们所能来实现它。

为什么是生态社会主义?

我们并不将生态社会主义视为对社会主义的否定,相反,我们认为它是在生态危机情况下对20世纪“第一阶段”社会主义的实现。如社会主义一样,生态社会主义是建立在这样一种理解上的,即资本不过是物化的死劳动,而生态社会主义则是建立在所有的生产者自由发展的基础上,换句话说,它要中止生产者和生产资料之间的分离。我们也清楚这个目标在过去直到现在一直未能实现,原因太过复杂,很难一一列举。但我们可以大致上将这些原因总结为,在遭到现存的资本主义国家敌视包围压迫的情况下,一些国家由于经济欠发达,使得生产者和生产资料之间重新结合的社会主义初衷未能实现。这种困境对现实的社会主义有着很大的负面影响,简单来说就是这些国家拒绝内部的民主化,并且模仿资本主义的经济增长主义,最终导致这些社会的崩溃以及自然环境的破坏。生态社会主义具有和第一阶段社会主义相同的解放目标,并且反对社会民主主义卑贱的改良主义目标和官僚社会主义的增长主义取向。生态社会主义坚持在一个生态学的框架内重新定义社会主义生产的途径和目标。它是通过“限制增长”这样一个维持社会可持续发展的前提来达到目的的,但是这并不意味着匮乏、艰苦或压迫。
我们的目标实际上是对人类需求的一种转化,是将其导向重质量的方向,而非重数量的方向。从商品生产的角度来说,这意味着重视使用价值高于重视交换价值。这是一个立足于当前经济活动之上的计划,意义深远。
在社会主义的条件下,生态主义的生产方式是解决当前日益严重的危机的基础。一个由生产者自由组织而成的社会,并不会止步于它自身的民主化,它要进一步坚持以全人类的自由为自己的立足点和目标。这就要求它要克服主观上的和客观上的帝国主义冲动。在实现这个目标的道路上,它要努力克服一切形式的压迫,特别包括性别的和种族的压迫,并且,它消除了导向原教旨主义混乱和恐怖主义的条件。总之,这个世界性的社会与自然界能够保持生态上的和谐。这样一种社会在当前是无法想象的。这种趋势的一个实际结果将会是,比如,渐渐减少对化石燃料的依赖——它一直同工业资本主义相始终。而这反过来会使被石油帝国主义所占据的土地解放出来,同时使全球变暖以及其他一些生态危机带来的影响得到控制。
任何人在读到上述倡议的时候,无法不为其隐含着多少实际及理论上的困难而苦恼,也无法不为其距离当前世界的实际情况太远而沮丧。要知道,现状本身是得到现实的制度和现有主流意识的维护的。我们并不需要详细地说明这点,因为这显而易见。我们坚持的只是要正确地衡量这些问题。我们的计划不需要列出方案中的每一步,更不是向占据优势的敌人妥协,相反,我们只想促进一种有别于现状的发展逻辑,一种能够对现状带来足够和必要的改变的发展逻辑。此外,就是开始促成能够导向最终目标过渡的中间步骤。我们开展这个工作,是为了更深入地思考改变的种种可能性,同时还想吸引志同道合者。如果这些主张有任何可取之处,那么类似的想法以及实现这些想法的实践,将会在全世界无数个角落一起萌芽。生态社会主义将是国际化的,放之四海而皆准的,否则它将什么都不是。我们视我们时代的危机为一个革命机会。我们的义务就是证实它,并且实现它。

https://www.marxists.org/chinese/reference-books/marxist.org-chinese-ecosocialist.htm