Israel Before 1967 Was Not a Democracy

1967年之前的以色列一点都不民主

Before 1967, Israel definitely could not have been depicted as a democracy. As we have seen in previous chapters, the state subjected one-fifth of its citizenship to military rule based on draconian British Mandatory emergency regulations that denied the Palestinians any basic human or civil rights.

在1967年以前，以色列绝对不能被描绘成一个民主国家。 正如我们在前几章所看到的那样，根据严厉的英国强制性紧急条例，该州将五分之一的公民纳入军事统治，这些条例否认了巴勒斯坦人的任何基本的人权或公民权利。

Local military governors were the absolute rulers of the lives of these citizens: they could devise special laws for them, destroy their houses and livelihoods, and send them to jail whenever they felt like it. Only in the late 1950s did a strong Jewish opposition to these abuses emerge, which eventually eased the pressure on the Palestinian citizens.

地方军事总督是这些公民生命的绝对统治者：他们可以为他们制定特别法律，摧毁他们的房屋和生计，并不顾他们的感受将他们送进监狱。 直到20世纪50年代后期，犹太人强烈反对这些虐待行为，才最终缓解了对巴勒斯坦公民的压力。

For the Palestinians who lived in prewar Israel and those who lived in the post-1967 West Bank and the Gaza Strip, this regime allowed even the lowest-ranking soldier in the IDF to rule, and ruin, their lives. They were helpless if such a solider, or his unit or commander, decided to demolish their homes, or hold them for hours at a checkpoint, or incarcerate them without trial. There was nothing they could do.

对于生活在战前以色列的巴勒斯坦人和住在1967年西岸和加沙地带的巴勒斯坦人来说，这个政权甚至允许以色列国防军中最低级的士兵去统治和毁灭他们的生命。 如果这样的士兵或他的部队或指挥官决定拆除他们的房屋，或者在检查站将他们监禁几个小时，或者未经审判就对他们进行监禁，他们是无助的。 他们无能为力。

At every moment from 1948 until today, there had been some group of Palestinians undergoing such an experience.

从1948年到今天的每一个时刻，都有一些巴勒斯坦人有过这样的经历。

The first group to suffer under such a yoke was the Palestinian minority inside Israel. It began in the first two years of statehood when they were pushed into ghettos, such as the Haifa Palestinian community living on the Carmel mountain, or expelled from the towns they had inhabited for decades, such as Safad. In the case of Isdud, the whole population was expelled to the Gaza Strip.

遭受这种枷锁的第一批人是以色列境内的巴勒斯坦少数民族。 它开始于建国的头两年，当时它们被推入贫民窟，例如生活在Carmel山上的Haifa巴勒斯坦社区的巴勒斯坦人，或被驱逐出他们居住数十年的城镇，例如Safad。 就Isdud的案例而言，全部人口都被驱逐到加沙地带。

In the countryside, the situation was even worse. The various Kibbutz movements coveted Palestinian villages on fertile land. This included the socialist Kibbutzim, Hashomer Ha-Zair, which was allegedly committed to binational solidarity.

在农村，情况更糟。 各种基布兹运动在肥沃的土地上将巴勒斯坦人的村庄强行变成泥地。 这包括社会主义基布兹，哈森哈泽尔，他们声称这是致力于两国间的团结。

Long after the fighting of 1948 had subsided, villagers in Ghabsiyyeh, Iqrit, Birim, Qaidta, Zaytun, and many others, were tricked into leaving their homes for a period of two weeks, the army claiming it needed their lands for training, only to find out on their return that their villages had been wiped out or handed to someone else.

在1948年的战斗平息很久之后，Ghabsiyyeh，Iqrit，Birim，Qaidta，Zaytun和其他许多村民被诱骗离开家园两周，军队宣称需要他们的土地进行训练，而他们返回时发现他们的村庄已被毁灭或交给别人。

This state of military terror is exemplified by the Kafr Qasim massacre of October 1956, when, on the eve of the Sinai operation, forty-nine Palestinian citizens were killed by the Israeli army. The authorities alleged that they were late returning home from work in the fields when a curfew had been imposed on the village. This was not the real reason, however.

1956年10月的Kafr Qasim大屠杀证明了这种军事恐怖状态，当时在西奈行动前夕，有四十九名巴勒斯坦公民被以色列军队杀死。 当局称，当村里实施宵禁时，他们迟迟不回家下班。 然而，这不是真正的原因。

Later proofs show that Israel had seriously considered the expulsion of Palestinians from the whole area called the Wadi Ara and the Triangle in which the village sat. These two areas — the first a valley connecting Afula in the east and Hadera on the Mediterranean coast; the second expanding the eastern hinterland of Jerusalem — were annexed to Israel under the terms of the 1949 armistice agreement with Jordan.

后来的证据表明，以色列认真考虑将巴勒斯坦人从称为Wadi Ara和村落所在的三角地带的整个地区驱赶出去。这两个地区 – 第一个连接东部的Afula和地中海沿岸的Hadera的山谷; 第二个扩大东耶路撒冷腹地 – 根据1949年与约旦的停战协定的条款，它们被并入以色列。

As we have seen, additional territory was always welcomed by Israel, but an increase in the Palestinian population was not. Thus, at every juncture, when the state of Israel expanded, it looked for ways to restrict the Palestinian population in the recently annexed areas.

正如我们所看到的，以色列总是欢迎更多的领土，但巴勒斯坦人口的增加并不受欢迎。 因此，在以色列国扩大的每个时刻，它都在寻找办法限制最近被吞并的地区的巴勒斯坦人。

Operation “Hafarfert” (“mole”) was the code name of a set of proposals for the expulsion of Palestinians when a new war broke out with the Arab world. Many scholars today now think that the 1956 massacre was a practice run to see if the people in the area could be intimidated to leave.

“Hafarfert”（“mole”）行动是在与阿拉伯世界发生新的战争时驱逐巴勒斯坦人的一系列构想的代号。 今天许多学者认为，1956年的屠杀是一个实践，看看该地区的人是否可能被吓到离开。

The perpetrators of the massacre were brought to trial thanks to the diligence and tenacity of two members of the Knesset: Tawaq Tubi from the Communist Party and Latif Dori of the Left Zionist party Mapam. However, the commanders responsible for the area, and the unit itself that committed the crime, were let off very lightly, receiving merely small fines. This was further proof that the army was allowed to get away with murder in the occupied territories.

由于以色列议会的两名议员的勤奋和顽强：共产党的Tawaq Tubi和左翼犹太复国主义党Mapam的Latif Dori，这两个大屠杀的肇事者受到审判。 然而，负责该地区的指挥官以及犯下这一罪行的部队本身却被轻易放过，只被处以小额罚款。 这进一步证明了，军队被允许在被占领土上进行谋杀。

Systematic cruelty does not only show its face in a major event like a massacre. The worst atrocities can also be found in the regime’s daily, mundane presence.

系统性的残忍不仅在大屠杀等重大事件中表现出来。 在这个政权的日常和平凡的存在中也可以发现最严重的暴行。

Palestinians in Israel still do not talk much about that pre-1967 period, and the documents of that time do not reveal the full picture. Surprisingly, it is in poetry that we find an indication of what it was like to live under military rule.

以色列的巴勒斯坦人对1967年以前的时期仍然没有多少谈论，当时的文件也没有透露全貌。 令人惊讶的是，我们在诗歌中发现了生活在军事统治之下是怎样的。

Natan Alterman was one of the most famous and important poets of his generation. He had a weekly column, called “The Seventh Column,” in which he commented on events he had read or heard about. Sometimes he would omit details about the date or even the location of the event, but would give the reader just enough information to understand what he was referring to. He often expressed his attacks in poetic form:

Natan Alterman是他那一代中最着名和最重要的诗人之一。 他有一个名为“第七纵队”的每周专栏，他在其中评论他阅读或听说过的事件。 有时他会忽略有关日期甚至事件地点的详细信息，但会给读者提供足够的信息来了解他指的是什么。 他经常以诗歌的形式表达他的攻击：

The news appeared briefly for two days, and disappeared. And no one seems to care, and no one seems to know. In the far away village of Um al-Fahem,

消息短暂出现两天，并消失。 似乎没有人关心，似乎也没有人知道。 在遥远的Um al-Fahem村，
Children — should I say citizens of the state — played in the mud And one of them seemed suspicious to one of our brave soldiers who

儿童 – 我应该说国家的公民 – 在泥里玩耍，其中一个似乎对我们的一个勇敢的士兵来说是可疑的，他
shouted at him: Stop!

对他喊：停下！
An order is an order

命令就是命令
An order is an order, but the foolish boy did not stand, He ran away

命令就是命令，但这个愚蠢的男孩没有停下，他跑了
So our brave soldier shot, no wonder And hit and killed the boy.

所以我们勇敢的士兵开枪射击，击中并打死了这个男孩。

And no one talked about it.

没有人谈论它。

On one occasion he wrote a poem about two Palestinian citizens who were shot in Wadi Ara. In another instance, he told the story of a very ill Palestinian woman who was expelled with her two children, aged three and six, with no explanation, and sent across the River Jordan. When she tried to return, she and her children were arrested and put into a Nazareth jail.

有一次，他写了一首关于两名巴勒斯坦公民在Wadi Ara遭到枪击的诗。 在另一个例子中，他讲述了一个病重的巴勒斯坦妇女的故事，她和两个三岁和六岁的孩子一起被驱逐，但没有任何解释，并被送往约旦河。 当她试图返回时，她和她的孩子们被逮捕并被关入拿撒勒监狱。

Alterman hoped that his poem about the mother would move hearts and minds, or at least elicit some official response. However, he wrote a week later:

Alterman希望他的关于母亲的诗能够引起人们的注意，或者至少引起官方的回应。 不过，他一周后写道：

And this writer assumed wrongly

这位作者的假设是错误的
That either the story would be denied or explained But nothing, not a word.

但是这个故事没有被否认或解释，一个词也没有。

There is further evidence that Israel was not a democracy prior to 1967. The state pursued a shoot-to-kill policy towards refugees trying to retrieve their land, crops, and husbandry, and staged a colonial war to topple Nasser’s regime in Egypt. Its security forces were also trigger happy, killing more than fifty Palestinian citizens during the period from 1948–1967.

有进一步的证据表明，以色列在1967年之前不是民主国家。政府对试图夺回他们的土地，农作物和农业的难民实行射杀政策，并举行了一场殖民战争，以推翻纳赛尔在埃及的政权。 其安全部队也很高兴的开枪，在1948年至1967年期间杀死了五十多名巴勒斯坦公民。

Subjugation of Minorities in Israel Is Not Democratic

征服以色列的少数民族是不民主的

The litmus test of any democracy is the level of tolerance it is willing to extend towards the minorities living in it. In this respect, Israel falls far short of being a true democracy.

任何民主的试金石都是它对其中的少数群体延伸的宽容意愿的程度。 在这方面，以色列远未成为真正的民主国家。

For example, after the new territorial gains several laws were passed ensuring a superior position for the majority: the laws governing citizenship, the laws concerning land ownership, and most important of all, the law of return.

例如，在新的领土取得之后，通过了多项法律，确保了多数人的优越地位：有关公民权的法律，关于土地所有权的法律，以及最重要的是返回法。

The latter grants automatic citizenship to every Jew in the world, wherever he or she was born. This law in particular is a flagrantly undemocratic one, for it was accompanied by a total rejection of the Palestinian right of return — recognized internationally by the UN General Assembly Resolution 194 of 1948. This rejection refuses to allow the Palestinian citizens of Israel to unite with their immediate families or with those who were expelled in 1948.

后者为世界上每一个犹太人提供自动公民身份，无论他出生在哪里。 特别是这项法律是一种公然不民主的法律，因为它伴随着巴勒斯坦人的回归权 – 被联合国大会1948年第194号决议国际承认。这种拒绝法律拒绝让以色列的巴勒斯坦公民和他们的直系亲属或在1948年被驱逐的人团结起来。

Denying people the right of return to their homeland, and at the same time offering this right to others who have no connection to the land, is a model of undemocratic practice.

剥夺人民返回家园的权利，同时向与土地无关的其他人提供这种权利，这是典型的不民主的做法。

Added to this was a further layering of denial of the rights of the Palestinian people. Almost every discrimination against the Palestinian citizens of Israel is justified by the fact that they do not serve in the army. The association between democratic rights and military duties is better understood if we revisit the formative years in which Israeli policy makers were trying to make up their minds about how to treat one-fifth of the population.

此外，巴勒斯坦人民的权利受到了进一步的剥夺。 几乎所有针对以色列巴勒斯坦公民的歧视都被解释为因为他们不在军队服役。 如果我们重新审视以色列政策制定者试图如何处理五分之一人口的想法，那么民主权利与军事责任之间的关系就会得到更好的理解。

Their assumption was that Palestinian citizens did not want to join the army anyway, and that assumed refusal, in turn, justified the discriminatory policy against them. This was put to the test in 1954 when the Israeli ministry of defense decided to call up those Palestinian citizens eligible for conscription to serve in the army. The secret service assured the government that there would be a widespread rejection of the call-up.

他们的假设是，巴勒斯坦公民不想加入军队，而根据这种假设，这种歧视政策反过来也是合理的。 1954年，当以色列国防部决定召集那些有资格被征召的巴勒斯坦公民在军队中服役时，这一点就经受了考验。 秘密机构向政府保证，巴勒斯坦人会广泛的拒绝接受这个呼吁。

To their great surprise, all those summoned went to the recruiting office, with the blessing of the Communist Party, the biggest and most important political force in the community at the time. The secret service later explained that the main reason was the teenagers’ boredom with life in the countryside and their desire for some action and adventure.

令他们非常惊讶的是，所有被召集的人都前往招聘办公室，同时得到了当时社区最大最重要的政治力量 – 共产党的祝福。 秘密机构后来解释说，主要原因是青少年对农村生活的厌倦以及他们对某些行动和冒险的渴望。

Notwithstanding this episode, the ministry of defense continued to peddle a narrative that depicted the Palestinian community as unwilling to serve in the military.

尽管如此，国防部仍继续推销关于巴勒斯坦社区不愿意服兵役的叙述。

Inevitably, in time, the Palestinians did indeed turn against the Israeli army, who had become their perpetual oppressors, but the government’s exploitation of this as a pretext for discrimination casts huge doubt on the state’s pretense to being a democracy.

不可避免的是，巴勒斯坦人确实会转而反对以色列军队，他们已经成为他们永久的压迫者，但政府以此为借口进行歧视，让人对他们声称民主国家这一点产生了巨大的怀疑。

If you are a Palestinian citizen and you did not serve in the army, your rights to government assistance as a worker, student, parent, or as part of a couple, are severely restricted. This affects housing in particular, as well as employment — where 70 percent of all Israeli industry is considered to be security-sensitive and therefore closed to these citizens as a place to find work.

如果你是巴勒斯坦公民，并且你没有在军队服役，你作为工人，学生，家长或作为夫妻的一部分的政府援助的权利受到严格限制。 这尤其会影响住房和就业 – 在以色列所有工业中，70％被认为是对安全敏感的，因此对这些公民是关闭的。

The underlying assumption of the ministry of defense was not only that Palestinians do not wish to serve but that they are potentially an enemy within who cannot be trusted. The problem with this argument is that in all the major wars between Israel and the Arab world the Palestinian minority did not behave as expected. They did not form a fifth column or rise up against the regime.

国防部的基本假设不仅是巴勒斯坦人不希望服役，而且他们是一个不可信任的潜在的敌人。 这个论点的问题在于，在以色列和阿拉伯世界之间的所有重大战争中，巴勒斯坦少数族群的表现并不如预期。 他们没有形成第五纵队，或者起义。

This, however, did not help them: to this day they are seen as a “demographic” problem that has to be solved. The only consolation is that still today most Israeli politicians do not believe that the way to solve “the problem” is by the transfer or expulsion of the Palestinians (at least not in peacetime).

然而，这并没有帮助到他们：直到今天，他们仍然被视为需要解决的“人口”问题。 唯一令人感到安慰的是，今天仍然大多数以色列政客不相信解决“问题”的方式是转移或驱逐巴勒斯坦人（至少不是在和平时期）。

Israeli Land Policy Is Not Democratic

以色列的土地政策一点也不民主

The claim to being a democracy is also questionable when one examines the budgetary policy surrounding the land question. Since 1948, Palestinian local councils and municipalities have received far less funding than their Jewish counterparts. The shortage of land, coupled with the scarcity of employment opportunities, creates an abnormal socioeconomic reality.

当人们审视围绕土地问题的预算政策时，宣称自己是民主国家也是有问题的。 自1948年以来，巴勒斯坦地方议会和市镇得到的拨款比犹太人少得多。 土地短缺，再加上就业机会的稀缺，造成了一个异常的社会经济现实。

For example, the most affluent Palestinian community, the village of Me’ilya in the upper Galilee, is still worse off than the poorest Jewish development town in the Negev. In 2011, the Jerusalem Post reported that “average Jewish income was 40 percent to 60 percent higher than average Arab income between the years 1997 to 2009.”

例如，最富裕的巴勒斯坦社区，即上Galilee的Me’ilya村，比Negev最贫穷的犹太发展城镇还要糟糕。 在2011年，“耶路撒冷邮报”报道说：“平均犹太人收入比1997年至2009年阿拉伯人平均收入高出40％至60％。”

Today more than 90 percent of the land is owned by the Jewish National Fund (JNF). Landowners are not allowed to engage in transactions with non-Jewish citizens, and public land is prioritized for the use of national projects, which means that new Jewish settlements are being built while there are hardly any new Palestinian settlements. Thus, the biggest Palestinian city, Nazareth, despite the tripling of its population since 1948, has not expanded one square kilometer, whereas the development town built above it, Upper Nazareth, has tripled in size, on land expropriated from Palestinian landowners.

今天，90％以上的土地归犹太人国家基金会（JNF）所有。 不允许土地所有者与非犹太公民进行交易，公共用地优先用于国家项目，这意味着新的犹太人定居点正在建设，而几乎没有任何新的巴勒斯坦定居点。 因此，巴勒斯坦最大的城市Nazareth尽管自1948年以来人口增加了三倍，但并没有扩大一平方公里，而在Nazareth以上建成的发展中城市，在从巴勒斯坦地主手中征用的土地上，规模增加了三倍。

Further examples of this policy can be found in Palestinian villages throughout Galilee, revealing the same story: how they have been downsized by 40 percent, sometimes even 60 percent, since 1948, and how new Jewish settlements have been built on expropriated land.

在Galilee各地的巴勒斯坦村庄可以找到这一政策的其他例子，它们揭示了同样的故事：自1948年以来，它们如何被缩小40％，有时甚至达到60％，以及在被征用的土地上新建犹太人定居点的方式。

Elsewhere this has initiated full-blown attempts at “Judaization.” After 1967, the Israeli government became concerned about the lack of Jews living in the north and south of the state and so planned to increase the population in those areas. Such a demographic change necessitated the confiscation of Palestinian land for the building of Jewish settlements.

在其他地方，这已经开始了全面的“犹太化”尝试。1967年以后，以色列政府担心在南部和北部生活的犹太人的数量太少，因此计划增加这些地区的人口。 这种人口变化需要没收巴勒斯坦土地来建造犹太人定居点。

Worse was the exclusion of Palestinian citizens from these settlements. This blunt violation of a citizen’s right to live wherever he or she wishes continues today, and all efforts by human rights NGOs in Israel to challenge this apartheid have so far ended in total failure.

更糟糕的是巴勒斯坦公民被排除在这些定居点之外。 这种对公民的生存权利的直接侵犯，以及以色列境内的非政府人权组织对以色列种族隔离进行挑战的种种努力迄今已彻底失败。

The Supreme Court in Israel has only been able to question the legality of this policy in a few individual cases, but not in principle. Imagine if in the United Kingdom or the United States, Jewish citizens, or Catholics for that matter, were barred by law from living in certain villages, neighborhoods, or maybe whole towns? How can such a situation be reconciled with the notion of democracy?

以色列最高法院只能在少数个案中质疑这项政策的合法性，但原则上不能。 想象一下，如果在英国或美国，犹太公民或天主教徒因此而被法律禁止居住在某些村庄，社区或整个城镇？ 这种情况如何与民主概念相协调？

Destroying Palestinians’ Houses Is Not Democratic

毁灭巴勒斯坦人的房屋一点也不民主

House demolition is not a new phenomenon in Palestine. As with many of the more barbaric methods of collective punishment used by Israel since 1948, it was first conceived and exercised by the British Mandatory government during the Great Arab Revolt of 1936–39.

毁灭房屋在巴勒斯坦不是一个新现象。 与1948年以来以色列采用的许多更加野蛮的集体惩罚方法一样，它最初是在英国军政府在1936年至1939年的大阿拉伯起义期间提出和执行的。

This was the first Palestinian uprising against the pro-Zionist policy of the British Mandate, and it took the British army three years to quell it. In the process, they demolished around two thousand houses during the various collective punishments meted out to the local population.

这是第一次反对英国授权的亲犹太复国主义政策的巴勒斯坦起义，并且英国军队花了三年时间才平息它。 在这个过程中，在对当地居民进行各种集体惩罚期间，他们拆除了大约两千间房屋。

Israel demolished houses from almost the first day of its military occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The army blew up hundreds of homes every year in response to various acts undertaken by individual family members.

以色列几乎在军事占领西岸和加沙地带的第一天就拆毁了房屋。 为了应对个别家庭成员的各种行为，军队每年都会炸毁数百个家庭。

From minor violations of military rule to participation in violent acts against the occupation, the Israelis were quick to send in their bulldozers to wipe out not only a physical building but also a focus of life and existence. In the greater Jerusalem area (as inside Israel) demolition was also a punishment for the unlicensed extension of an existing house or the failure to pay bills.

从轻微违反军事统治到参与反对占领的暴力行为，以色列人很快派出推土机，不仅消灭了一座实体建筑，而且还消灭了生活和生存的核心。 在大耶路撒冷地区（就像在以色列境内），拆迁也是对无证延长现有住房或未支付账单的惩罚。

Another form of collective punishment that has recently returned to the Israeli repertoire is that of blocking up houses. Imagine that all the doors and windows in your house are blocked by cement, mortar, and stones, so you can’t get back in or retrieve anything you failed to take out in time. I have looked hard in my history books to find another example, but found no evidence of such a callous measure being practiced elsewhere.

最近又回到了以色列剧目中的另一种集体惩罚形式是堵住房屋。 想象一下，房子里的所有门窗都被水泥，砂浆和石头挡住了，所以你不能及时取回任何你未能及时取出的东西。 我在我的历史书中努力寻找另一个类似案例，但没有发现在其他地方实践这种无情措施的证据。

Crushing Palestinian Resistance Is Not Democratic

镇压巴勒斯坦人的反抗一点也不民主

Finally, under the “enlightened occupation,” settlers have been allowed to form vigilante gangs to harass people and destroy their property. These gangs have changed their approach over the years.

最后，在“开明占领”下，定居者被允许组成民团，骚扰人民并摧毁他们的财产。 这些黑帮多年来改变了他们的方式。

During the 1980s, they used actual terror — from wounding Palestinian leaders (one of them lost his legs in such an attack), to contemplating blowing up the mosques on Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem.

在1980s，他们用实质上的恐怖手段 – 炸伤巴勒斯坦领导人（其中一人在这样的袭击中丧生），并考虑炸毁耶路撒冷的Haram al-Sharif清真寺。

In this century, they have engaged in the daily harassment of Palestinians: uprooting their trees, destroying their yields, and shooting randomly at their homes and vehicles. Since 2000, there have been at least one hundred such attacks reported per month in some areas such as Hebron, where the five hundred settlers, with the silent collaboration of the Israeli army, harassed the locals living nearby in an even more brutal way.

在本世纪，他们每天都在骚扰巴勒斯坦人：拔掉他们的树木，摧毁他们的土地，并随机对他们的家和车辆射击。 自2000年以来，在Hebron等地区每月至少发生一百次此类攻击，在这些地区，有五百名定居者在以色列军队的沉默合作下，以更残酷的方式骚扰住在附近的当地居民。

From the very beginning of the occupation then, the Palestinians were given two options: accept the reality of permanent incarceration in a mega-prison for a very long time, or risk the might of the strongest army in the Middle East. When the Palestinians did resist — as they did in 1987, 2000, 2006, 2012, 2014, and 2016 — they were targeted as soldiers and units of a conventional army. Thus, villages and towns were bombed as if they were military bases and the unarmed civilian population was shot at as if it was an army on the battlefield.

从占领一开始，巴勒斯坦人就有两种选择：接受在一座巨型监狱中永久监禁的持续了很长时间的现实，或者面对中东最强大的军队的威胁。 当巴勒斯坦人抵抗时 – 就像他们在1987年，2000年，2006年，2012年，2014年和2016年所做的那样 – 他们成为常规军队的士兵和部队的目标。 因此，村庄和小镇被轰炸，好像它们是军事基地一样，手无寸铁的平民被枪杀，好像它是战场上的一支军队一样。

Today we know too much about life under occupation, before and after Oslo, to take seriously the claim that nonresistance will ensure less oppression. The arrests without trial, as experienced by so many over the years; the demolition of thousands of houses; the killing and wounding of the innocent; the drainage of water wells — these are all testimony to one of the harshest contemporary regimes of our times.

今天，我们对Oslo之前和之后的占领下的生活知之甚少，以认真对待这一声明，即不抵抗将确保较少的压迫。 多年来经历过这么多次未经审判的逮捕; 数千房屋的拆除; 无辜的杀害和伤害; 水井的排水 – 这些都证明了以色列是我们这个时代最残忍的政权之一。

Amnesty International annually documents in a very comprehensive way the nature of the occupation. The following is from their 2015 report:

大赦国际每年以非常全面的方式记录占领的性质。 以下是他们2015年的报告：

In the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, Israeli forces committed unlawful killings of Palestinian civilians, including children, and detained thousands of Palestinians who protested against or otherwise opposed Israel’s continuing military occupation, holding hundreds in administrative detention. Torture and other ill-treatment remained rife and were committed with impunity.

在包括东耶路撒冷在内的西岸，以色列部队非法杀害包括儿童在内的巴勒斯坦平民，并拘留数千名抗议或以其他方式反对以色列持续军事占领的巴勒斯坦人，数百人被行政拘留。 酷刑和其他虐待仍然猖獗，并且逍遥法外。

The authorities continued to promote illegal settlements in the West Bank, and severely restricted Palestinians’ freedom of movement, further tightening restrictions amid an escalation of violence from October, which included attacks on Israeli civilians by Palestinians and apparent extrajudicial executions by Israeli forces. Israeli settlers in the West Bank attacked Palestinians and their property with virtual impunity. The Gaza Strip remained under an Israeli military blockade that imposed collective punishment on its inhabitants. The authorities continued to demolish Palestinian homes in the West Bank and inside Israel, particularly in Bedouin villages in the Negev/Naqab region, forcibly evicting their residents.

当局继续促进西岸的非法定居点，并严格限制巴勒斯坦人的行动自由，10月份暴力升级进一步加紧，包括巴勒斯坦人袭击以色列平民和以色列部队明显法外处决。 西岸的以色列定居者几乎不受惩罚地袭击巴勒斯坦人及其财产。 加沙地带仍然受到以色列对其居民实行集体惩罚的军事封锁。 当局继续在西岸和以色列境内拆毁巴勒斯坦人的住房，特别是在Negev/Naqab地区的贝都因人村庄，强行驱逐其居民。

Let’s take this in stages. Firstly, assassinations — what Amnesty’s report calls “unlawful killings”: about fifteen thousand Palestinians have been killed “unlawfully” by Israel since 1967. Among them were two thousand children.

我们分阶段进行。 首先，刺杀 – 大赦国际的报告称之为“非法杀人”：自1967年以来，大约有1万5千名巴勒斯坦人被以色列“非法”杀害，其中有两千名儿童。

Imprisoning Palestinians Without Trial Is Not Democratic

不经审判关押巴勒斯坦人一点也不民主

Another feature of the “enlightened occupation” is imprisonment without trial. Every fifth Palestinian in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip has undergone such an experience.

“开明占领”的另一个特点是不经审判而入狱。 约旦河西岸和加沙地带每五名巴勒斯坦人中就有一人经历了这样的经历。

It is interesting to compare this Israeli practice with similar American policies in the past and the present, as critics of the boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement claim that US practices are far worse. In fact, the worst American example was the imprisonment without trial of one hundred thousand Japanese citizens during World War II, with thirty thousand later detained under the so-called “war on terror.”

把这种以色列的做法与过去和现在的类似美国政策相比较是很有趣的，批评抵制，撤资和制裁（BDS）的运动声称美国的做法更糟。 事实上，美国最糟糕的例子是二战期间未经审判监禁了10万日本公民，后来在所谓的“反恐战争”中拘留了三万人。

Neither of these numbers comes even close to the number of Palestinians who have experienced such a process: including the very young, the old, as well as the long-term incarcerated.

这些数字都没有接近经历过这种暴行的巴勒斯坦人的数量：包括年轻人，老人以及长期被监禁者。

Arrest without trial is a traumatic experience. Not knowing the charges against you, having no contact with a lawyer and hardly any contact with your family are only some of the concerns that will affect you as a prisoner. More brutally, many of these arrests are used as means to pressure people into collaboration. Spreading rumors or shaming people for their alleged or real sexual orientation are also frequently used as methods for leveraging complicity.

未经审判就被逮捕是一种创伤性的经历。 你不知道对你的指控，与律师没有任何联系，几乎没有与你的家人有任何联系，只有一些会影响你作为囚犯的担忧。 更残酷的是，这些逮捕中的许多被用来作为压制人们合作的手段。 传播谣言或羞辱人们宣称的或真正的性取向也常被用作离间的手段。

As for torture, the reliable website Middle East Monitor published a harrowing article describing the two hundred methods used by the Israelis to torture Palestinians. The list is based on a UN report and a report from the Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem. Among other methods it includes beatings, chaining prisoners to doors or chairs for hours, pouring cold and hot water on them, pulling fingers apart, and twisting testicles.

至于酷刑，可靠的网站Middle East Monitor发表了一篇令人痛心的文章，描述了以色列人用来折磨巴勒斯坦人的200种方法。 这份清单是根据联合国的一份报告和以色列人权组织B’Tselem的报告撰写的。 其中包括殴打，将囚犯束缚在门或椅子上数小时，向他们泼冷水和热水，拉开手指，扭动睾丸。

Israel Is Not a Democracy

以色列一点也不民主

What we must challenge here, therefore, is not only Israel’s claim to be maintaining an enlightened occupation but also its pretense to being a democracy. Such behavior towards millions of people under its rule gives the lie to such political chicanery.

因此，我们在这里必须挑战的不仅仅是以色列维持开明的占领的声称，而且还有它的民主伪装。 在其统治下的针对数百万人的这种行为揭露了这种政治上的骗局。

However, although large sections of civil societies throughout the world deny Israel its pretense to democracy, their political elites, for a variety of reasons, still treat it as a member of the exclusive club of democratic states. In many ways, the popularity of the BDS movement reflects the frustrations of those societies with their governments’ policies towards Israel.

然而，尽管世界各地的大部分民间社会都拒绝了以色列的民主幌子，他们的政治精英出于各种原因仍将其视为民主国家专属俱乐部的成员。 在许多方面，BDS运动的普及反映了这些社会对他们的政府对以色列政策的不满。

For most Israelis these counterarguments are irrelevant at best and malicious at worst. The Israeli state clings to the view that it is a benevolent occupier. The argument for “enlightened occupation” proposes that, according to the average Jewish citizen in Israel, the Palestinians are much better off under occupation and they have no reason in the world to resist it, let alone by force. If you are a noncritical supporter of Israel abroad, you accept these assumptions as well.

对于大多数以色列人来说，这些反驳在最好情况下是无关紧要的，在最坏情况下则是恶意的。 以色列政府坚持认为它们是一位仁慈的占领者。 “开明占领”的论点认为，根据以色列普通犹太公民的说法，巴勒斯坦人在占领下的状况要好得多，他们没有任何理由反抗它，更不用说用武力反抗了。 如果你是以色列在国外的非批判支持者，你也接受这些假设。

There are, however, sections of Israeli society that do recognize the validity of some of the claims made here. In the 1990s, with various degrees of conviction, a significant number of Jewish academics, journalists, and artists voiced their doubts about the definition of Israel as a democracy.

然而，以色列社会的一些部门确实承认了这里提出的一些主张的有效性。 在20世纪90年代，大量犹太学者，记者和艺术家不同程度的表达了将以色列定义为民主国家的怀疑。

It takes some courage to challenge the foundational myths of one’s own society and state. This is why quite a few of them later retreated from this brave position and returned to toeing the general line.

挑战自己的社会和国家的基础性的神话需要一定的勇气。 这就是为什么其中不少人后来从这个勇敢的位置撤退了，返回了总体路线。

Nevertheless, for a while during the last decade of the last century, they produced works that challenged the assumption of a democratic Israel. They portrayed Israel as belonging to a different community: that of the nondemocratic nations. One of them, the geographer Oren Yiftachel from Ben-Gurion University, depicted Israel as an ethnocracy, a regime governing a mixed ethnic state with a legal and formal preference for one ethnic group over all the others. Others went further, labeling Israel an apartheid state or a settler-colonial state.

尽管如此，在上个世纪的最后十年里，他们制作了一些作品，挑战了民主以色列的假设。 他们将以色列描绘为属于不同的社区：非民主国家的社区。 其中一位来自Ben-Gurion大学的地理学家Oren Yiftachel将以色列描绘成一个民族独裁国家，一个管理混合民族国家的政权，对一个凌驾在其他所有其他民族的民族有合法和正式的偏爱。 其他人走得更远，将以色列称为种族隔离国家或定居者 – 殖民地国家。

In short, whatever description these critical scholars offered, “democracy” was not among them.

总之，无论这些批判学者提出的描述是怎样的，“民主”都不在其中。

Ilan Pappe, Jacobin: No, Israel Is Not a Democracy – And Never Was