The Stolen Generations(澳大利亚政府把原住民儿童从父母手中夺走,对儿童强迫洗脑同化,待翻译)

Stolen Generation header image

Between 1910-1970, many Indigenous children were forcibly removed from their families as a result of various government policies.

Between 1910-1970, many Indigenous children were forcibly removed from their families as a result of various government policies. The generations of children removed under these policies became known as the Stolen Generations. The policies of child removal left a legacy of trauma and loss that continues to affect Indigenous communities, families and individuals.


What happened and why?

The forcible removal of Indigenous children from their families was part of the policy of Assimilation. Assimilation was based on the assumption of black inferiority and white superiority, which proposed that Indigenous people should be allowed to “die out” through a process of natural elimination, or, where possible, should be assimilated into the white community.[1]

Children taken from their parents as part of the Stolen Generation were taught to reject their Indigenous heritage, and forced to adopt white culture. Their names were often changed, and they were forbidden to speak their traditional languages. Some children were adopted by white families, and many were placed in institutions where abuse and neglect were common.[2]

Assimilation policies focused on children, who were considered more adaptable to white society than Indigenous adults. “Half-caste” children (a term now considered derogatory for people of Aboriginal and white parentage), were particularly vulnerable to removal, because authorities thought these children could be assimilated more easily into the white community due to their lighter skin colour.[3]

Assimilation, including child removal policies, failed its aim of improving the lives of Indigenous Australians by absorbing them into white society. This was primarily because white society refused to accept Indigenous people as equals, regardless of their efforts to live like white people.


Ruth’s story

When Ruth was 4 years old, she was separated from her mother on Cherbourng mission in Queensland. Ruth was 6 months old when she first arrived at Cherbourg. Times were tough; it was during the Depression, and Ruth’s mother had gone to Cherbourg seeking help for her ageing parents.

But once she arrived at the mission, Ruth’s mum was prevented from leaving. What was intended as a temporary visit became years of separation and control. “People would say it was for your own good, but my own good was to stay with my mum,” says Ruth.

At first Ruth was allowed to stay with her mum in the women’s dormitory. But eventually every child was removed to a separate dormitory. Ruth was 4 when she was taken from her Mum. “Once you were taken from your parents, you had no more connection with them,” she explains.

For a short time, Ruth still saw her Mum from a distance. But when Ruth was 5, her mother was sent away from Cherbourg and forced to leave her daughter behind.


Why does the Stolen Generations still matter today?

The forcible removal of Indigenous children from their families had a profound impact that is still felt today.

For the children who were taken: 

  • Many were psychologically, physically, and sexually abused while living in state care or with their adoptive families.
  • Efforts to make stolen children reject their culture often caused them to feel ashamed of their Indigenous heritage.
  • Many children were wrongly told that their parents had died or abandoned them, and many never knew where they had been taken from or who their biological families were.
  • Living conditions in the institutions were highly controlled, and children were frequently punished harshly, were cold and hungry and received minimal if any affection.
  • The children generally received a very low level of education, as they were expected to work as manual labourers and domestic servants (see Unfinished Business).
  • Medical experts have noted a high incidence of depression, anxiety, post traumatic stress and suicide among the Stolen Generations [4]

For their families:

  • Many parents never recovered from the grief of having their children removed.
  • Some parents could not go on living without their children, while others turned to alcohol as a coping mechanism.
  • The removal of several generations of children severely disrupted Indigenous oral culture, and consequently much cultural knowledge was lost.
  • Many of the Stolen Generations never experienced living in a healthy family situation, and never learned parenting skills. In some instances, this has resulted in generations of children raised in state care. [5]

What has been done about this?

In 1995, the Australian government launched an inquiry into the policy of forced child removal. The report was delivered to Parliament on the 26th May 1997. It estimated that between 10 per cent and 33 per cent of all Indigenous children were separated from their families between 1910-1970.

The report, Bringing Them Home, acknowledged the social values and standards of the time, but concluded that the policies of child removal breached fundamental human rights. The Keating government commissioned the inquiry into the Stolen Generations, but the Howard government received the report. Howard’s government was skeptical of the report’s findings, and largely ignored its recommendations.


Stop and think: losing the ones you love most

What would you do if one day the police turned up to your home and took your children away simply because of the colour of your skin? How would you feel knowing you had no way of getting your children back and no higher authority to appeal to?

Imagine if one day you were at home with your parents and government officials came and took you away to live with strangers, and told you that you had to learn to live, eat, speak and dress differently than you were used to. How might that experience continue to affect you throughout your life?

Almost every Indigenous family has been affected by the forcible removal of one or more children across generations. Many people, families and communities are still coming to terms with the trauma that this has caused.

https://www.australianstogether.org.au/discover/australian-history/stolen-generations

想要一个更平等的社会?全民基本收入也许不是你想要的那个政策(Want a more equal society? Universal Basic Income might not be the policy you are looking for)

The case for a Universal Basic Income (UBI) has rapidly become part of mainstream political debate. The Labour Party is actively considering the policy, in the US it was revealed Hillary Clinton almost included it as a manifesto pledge. Trials have recently begun across the world, including close to home in Scotland.

1,全民基本收入(UBI)的案例迅速成为主流政治辩论的一部分。 工党正在积极考虑这项政策,在美国,Hillary Clinton几乎将其列为宣言承诺。 最近世界各地开始进行试验,包括靠近家乡的苏格兰。

The policy is again in the news as the Finnish government chose not to fund an extension to their two-year basic income trial. This led to much speculation as to what this means for the policy, leading many to argue that a basic income had fallen flat. In reality, the government simply chose not to fund an extension to what was always intended as a time limited policy experiment. But this provides a useful chance for reflection on the idea of Universal Basic Income, its aims and the debate that surrounds it.

2,该政策再次出现在新闻中时,芬兰政府选择不资助延长他们的两年基本收入试验。 这引发了很多猜测,认为这对政策意味着什么,导致很多人认为基本收入已经失败。 事实上,政府只是选择不资助一个已经被设计为有时间限制的试验。 但是,这为思考普遍基本收入这一想法,它的目标以及围绕它展开的辩论提供了一个有用的机会。

The idea of Universal Basic Income, or Citizens Income, is superficially quite simple. A monthly payment made to every adult and/or child in the population, of equal value and with no conditions attached. No need to search for or be in work, no means testing, just a condition of citizenship.

3,全民基本收入或公民收入这个想法在表面上很简单。 每位成年人和/或儿童每月得到一笔钱,价值相等,没有附加条件。 不需要正在找工作或在工作,也不需要测试,只是公民权利的一部分。

For its proponents, UBI has several benefits. It would remove bureaucracy, and therefore cost, from the system through eliminating means testing, and protects workers in an increasingly insecure labour market. This latter point is particularly important in an age where many are concerned about the impact that automation and AI might have on our working lives, and the resultant power balances between capital and labour.

4,对于其支持者来说,UBI有几个优点。 它将通过测试消除手段来消除系统中的官僚作风,从而消除系统成本,并且在日益不安全的劳动力市场中保护工人。 后一点在许多人担心自动化和AI可能对我们的工作生活产生的影响以及由此产生的资本与劳动力之间的权力平衡的时代显得特别重要。

These benefits, and a perceived coalition of support from both left and right, have led many to view UBI as a potentially revolutionary policy which could bring about positive change to a welfare state battered by years of austerity and ideologically driven reforms.

5,这些好处,以及来自左翼和右翼两方的联合支持已经使许多人认为UBI是一项潜在的革命性政策,可以为受到多年紧缩和意识形态驱动的改革的打击的福利国家带来积极变化。

However, the superficial simplicity of a Universal Basic Income belies a multiplicity of versions, and raises several questions. At what level should a UBI be paid? How does it factor in children? How will it support those with disabilities or who are out of work? Will it sit alongside or replace existing social security arrangements? And most importantly, what are the economic arrangements which govern how a UBI would be paid for?

6,然而,全民基本收入的表面简单特性掩盖了多种版本,并提出了几个问题。 UBI应该在怎样的级别上支付? 它如何影响儿童? 它将如何支持那些残疾人或失业的人? 它会单独存在还是替代现有的社会保障安排? 最重要的是,关于如何支付UBI的经济安排是什么?

In reality, those who advocate Universal Basic Income have varied motivations for doing so, and there are also multiple versions of what a UBI could look like in practice. For instance, there is a drastic rift between those for whom UBI is about transforming the economy and those for whom it is about papering over its cracks. This acknowledgement is often lacking from the UBI debate, but should be of primary interest.

7,事实上,那些主张全民基本收入的人有不同的动机,而且在实践中也有多种版本的UBI。 例如,在认为UBI是转变经济的那些人中间与在认为UBI是那些为了抹平社会裂缝的人之间存在着巨大的裂痕。 在关于UBI的辩论中通常缺乏这种认知,但这应该是主要的议题。

Those who seek a radical departure from capitalism see UBI as part of a radical platform to move away from a world in which work is central to our lives, identities and economies. In their book Inventing the Future, Alex Williams and Nick Srnicek argue that UBI is a fundamental part of delivering a new economy in which citizens have much greater freedom over when and if they work.

8,那些试图彻底抛弃资本主义的人将UBI视为一个激进平台的一部分,用以摆脱一个以工作在我们的生活,身份和经济中占中心地位的世界。 在他们的书“发明未来”中,Alex Williams和Nick Srnicek认为UBI是提供新经济的基础部分,在那里公民们在工作时间和是否工作方面拥有更大的自由。

To do this, Williams and Srnicek acknowledge that UBI “must provide a sufficient amount of income to live on” so that people can refuse employment, thereby freeing them to engage in more meaningful labour, whether paid or unpaid. This is often picked on to claim that a UBI would simply be unaffordable. There is truth in this. While Williams and Srnickek have not proposed a specific payment level, modelling conducted by IPPR shows that were a UBI paid at a high enough level to meet the Minimum Income Standard (a measure of what the public think people need for an acceptable minimum standard of living), it would cost around £1.7 trillion a year – equivalent to almost all of the UK’s GDP in 2016.

9,为了做到这些,Williams和Srnicek认为UBI“必须提供足够的收入来维持生活”,以便人们可以拒绝就业,从而把他们解放出来,使他们能够从事更有意义的劳动,无论是带薪还是无偿。 这常常导致有人声称UBI简直无法承受。 这是有道理的。 虽然Williams和Srnickek没有提出具体的支付水平,IPPR进行的模拟表明,当UBI的支付水平足以满足最低收入标准(衡量公众认为人们需要达到可接受的最低生活标准的程度 )时,每年需要1.7万亿英镑左右的费用 – 几乎等同于2016年英国所有的GDP。

What this shows is that for UBI to be a viable proposition at these levels, there would need to be a fundamental transformation in the ownership of the economy. Williams and Srnicek acknowledge this, arguing that UBI will only work in combination with large scale and collectively owned automation, a reduction in the working week and a shift in social attitudes around the value of the ‘work ethic’.

10,这表明,对于UBI而言,在这些层面上可行的主张将需要对经济所有权进行根本性转变。 Williams和Srnicek承认这一点,认为UBI只能与大规模和集体所有的自动化相结合,工作周的减少,以及围绕“职业道德”价值观的社会态度的转变。

It is this level of transformation which sets the ‘post-workists’ against many other proponents of the policy. Those who argue for a basic income from a post-work platform have little in common with the tech entrepreneurs of Silicon Valley who are funding trials of UBI in the US. For this group, the appeal of a basic income lies in its ability to offset the impacts of automation and AI, whilst their creators still accrue the benefits. Here, rather than using technology to facilitate a radical platform, UBI is a capitulation to the rise of inequality in the age of the robot and AI.

11,正是这种转变级别使得“后工作主义者”反对许多其他这一政策的支持者。 那些主张从工作后平台获得基本收入的人与在美国资助UBI试验的硅谷科技企业家几乎没有共同之处。 对于这个群体来说,基本收入的吸引力在于它能够抵消自动化和人工智能的影响,同时他们的创造者仍然获得收益。 在这里,UBI不是利用技术来建立一个激进的平台,而是对在机器人和人工智能时代上升的不平等的投降。

This critique has been central to the argument forwarded by left wing opponents to UBI who argue that it is an individualistic policy that accepts a status quo in which capital exploits labour. These criticisms recognise that as an indiscriminate policy UBI is blind to structural inequalities in a way the labour market isn’t. As Anna Cootes notes, UBI fails “to tackle the underlying causes of poverty, unemployment and inequality”.

12,这种批判是左翼反对者向UBI提出的论点的核心,他们认为这是一种接受资本剥削劳工的现状的个人主义政策。 这些批评认识到作为一项不进行任何区分的政策,UBI对于结构性不平等是盲目的,并不像劳动力市场那样。 正如Anna Cootes指出的,UBI未能“解决贫困,失业和不平等的根本原因”。

That there are radically different visions for Universal Basic Income is somewhat lost in a policy debate, which often presents UBI as a catch all policy which can offer both cost-effective efficiency and radical emancipation for those on low incomes. Worryingly this tension, and the myth of a coalition of support between left and right which underpins it, might see policymakers sleep walking into a position that suits very few.

13,对于全民基本收入存在着极端不同的看法在政策辩论中有所丢失,这种辩论常常将UBI视为所有能够为低收入者提供具有成本效益的效率和激进解放的政策的一项措施。 令人担忧的是,这种紧张局势和支撑它的左翼和右翼的联合支持的神话可能会让政策制定者们走入一个适合很少人的位置。

In Scotland for example, the Green Party has proposed a model of UBI which could get close to being fiscally neutral. This would see much of the existing welfare system replaced by a payment of £5,200 per year for adults and £2,600 for children, alongside significant reform the tax system. In this scenario, personal allowances would be removed and combined tax and NI rates increased for all.

14,例如,在苏格兰,绿党提出了一个UBI模型,该模型可能接近于财务中性。这将看到许多现有的福利制度被替换成向成年人支付5,200英镑,向儿童支付2,600英镑,同时还有重大的税制改革。 在这种情况下,个人津贴将被撤销,复合税率和国民税率都会增加。

Citing security in the labour market as a key reason for the policy proposal, this model has been welcomed by proponents of UBI. However, at £400 a month for adults while also removing almost all the welfare state, it is unlikely to buy much economic freedom for those on low incomes or insecure and exploitative employment contracts. In reality some would see their incomes drop. For instance, in Scotland lone parents would see their monthly earnings fall by around £300 a month.

15,确保劳动力市场的安全性是作为政策提案的一个关键理由,这种模式受到了UBI的支持者的欢迎。 然而,对于成年人而言每月400英镑同时也移除了几乎所有福利国家,但对于低收入者或签订了不安全和剥削的就业合同的人来说,购买很多经济自由的可能性不大。 事实上有些人会看到他们的收入下降了。 例如,在苏格兰,单身父母每月的收入会下降300英镑左右。

What’s more, a model of UBI paid at this level would also have notable impacts on rates of relative poverty. Were this model introduced in the UK as a whole, it would also raise relative child poverty by 17%, placing a further 750,000 children into households who earn below 60% of the median income. This is because while it would raise the incomes of those earning the least, it would also raise incomes for all but the highest income decile, lifting the poverty line higher.

16,更重要的是,这种在这一水平上的UBI支付模式也会对相对贫困率产生显著影响。 如果这个模型在整个英国引入,它还会使儿童的相对贫困率增加17%,并将75万名儿童增加到收入水平低于中等收入的60%的家庭中。这是因为虽然这会提高收入最低的人的收入,但除了最高收入等级之外,它还会提高其他所有人的收入,从而抬高了贫困线。

Research commissioned by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation has similarly found that UBI schemes increase relative poverty for working age adults, children and pensioners. The introduction of a UBI, according to their modelling, could see the number of children in poverty rise by up to 60%.

17,Joseph Rowntree基金会委托进行的研究同样发现UBI计划增加了在工作年龄的成年人,儿童和养老金领取者的相对贫困程度。 根据他们的模型,UBI的引入会造成贫困儿童的人数上升60%。

Increasing the incomes of those at the bottom of the distribution is imperative. This is demonstrated clearly by the rise of food banks deprivation and income crisis in the UK since 2010, which is a direct result of government policy choices. However, using a UBI to achieve this, at the expense of say increases or reforms to Universal Credit and a more generous and less conditional unemployment benefit, comes at the cost of addressing, and in fact exacerbating, relative poverty.

18,增加分配底层人员的收入势在必行。 自2010年以来,英国食品银行的匮乏和收入危机的抬头就清楚地表明了这一点,这是政府政策选择造成的直接结果。 然而,使用UBI来实现这一目标,其代价是增加或改革普遍债务,以及更慷慨和更少条件限制的失业福利,这是以造成相对贫困为代价的,并且事实上加剧了相对贫困。

Action on relative poverty is important, and inequality is not cost free. As Kate Pickett and Richard Wilkinson show in their book ‘The Spirit Level’, countries with higher rates of inequality perform worse against a range of social outcomes – physical health, mental health, drug abuse, education, imprisonment, obesity, social mobility, trust and community life.

19,对相对贫困进行行动很重要,不平等不是免费的。 正如Kate Pickett和Richard Wilkinson在他们的书“精神等级”中所表明的那样,不平等程度较高的国家对一系列社会结果表现更差 – 身体健康,心理健康,药物滥用,教育,监禁,肥胖,社会流动,信任和社区生活。

The pursuit of a fiscally neutral UBI has led to a series of proposals which, if implemented, would do little to raise the material circumstance of those in poverty nor provide sufficient additional power in the labour market. In light of this, can it be really said that such proposals meaningfully fit with a progressive, radical vision for the welfare state?

20,追求财政中立的UBI已经产生了一系列提案,如果得到落实,这些提案几乎无助于提高贫困人口的物质状况,也不会为劳动力市场提供足够的额外动力。鉴于此,这样的建议是否真的可以说符合福利国家渐进式的激进愿景?

The need to act in delivering a better vision for the welfare state is clear. In 2016, 22% per cent of adults and 30% of children were living in poverty. By 2019/20 the number of children in poverty could increase by 500,000. This is driven by political choices, the consequence of welfare reform and austerity. As such, it is welcome that as a society we are discussing more ambitious plans for the collectivisation of income and wealth and how it can be best deployed to support the needs of all in society.

21,明确表达出为福利国家提供更好愿景的必要性是很清晰的。在2016年,22%的成年人和30%的儿童生活在贫困中。 到2019/20年,贫困儿童人数可能增加到50万。 这是由政治选择推动的,福利改革和紧缩造成的后果。因此,值得欢迎的是,作为一个社会,我们正在讨论更加雄心勃勃的关于集体化收入和财富的计划,以及如何最好地分配以支持社会上的所有人的需求。

However, unless we are to engage in a radical economic transformation which drastically increases common ownership of economy, it is unlikely that Universal Basic Income on its own will do more than lock us into our current predicament. In the meantime, we need to look for equally radical policies which make a much more material difference to the lives of those on low incomes and who suffer from structural inequalities. Proponents of UBI need to go big or go home.

22,然而,除非我们要进行一场彻底的经济转型,这会大大增加集体的经济所有权,否则基本收入本身不可能做除了把我们锁在目前的困境中的之外的事。与此同时,我们需要寻求同样激进的政策,这些政策对低收入者和遭受结构性不平等问题的人的生活产生更大的物质影响。 UBI的支持者们需要做大,或回家。

https://www.opendemocracy.net/neweconomics/want-equal-society-universal-basic-income-might-not-policy-looking/

华尔街上的中国太子党(1-4)

华盛顿 — 美国证券交易委员会目前正在对投资银行摩根大通香港办公室雇用中国高官子女一事进行调查 。观察人士指出,美国大公司雇佣中国高干子女的目的是打开通向中国市场的方便之门,然而这样做有可能违反了美国的反海外腐败法。

这次美国证券交易委员会 (The Securities and Exchange Commission) 对摩根大通 (JPMorgan) 的调查主要涉及两名中国政界高层的子女。《纽约时报》的报道指出,摩根大通香港办公室在2007年和2010年分别雇用了原铁道部副总工程师张曙光的女儿张曦曦和中国光大集团(China Everbright Group) 董事长唐双宁的儿子唐晓宁。随后,中国中铁股份有限公司(China Railway Group) 和中国光大集团相继成为摩根大通的客户。

华尔街银行为发展在中国的业务而雇用中国政界高层子女的做法并非个案。例如,前国家主席江泽民的孙子江志成曾任职高盛公司 (Goldman Sachs)、前国务院总理温家宝的女儿温如春曾在瑞士信贷 (Credit Suisse) 银行工作、前总理朱镕基的儿子朱云来在1995至1997年间曾任职安达信 (Arthur Anderson) 和瑞士信贷。前人大委员长吴邦国的女婿冯绍东也曾在2006年帮助美林证券 (Merrill Lynch) 赢得了中国工商银行上市的合同,融资额为220亿美元。

《中国即将崩溃》(The Coming Collapse of China) 一书的作者章家敦 (Gordon Chang) 律师说,这种用工作来换取合同的利益交易被称为“猎捕大象”(Elephant Hunting)。

章家敦说:“这个现象自从中国开放以来就有了。八十年代我在香港居住的时候这个现象就存在了。重要的国家官员就像‘大象’,他们的孩子通常在国外的商学院接受很好的教育。所以如果华尔街银行要得到大额合同的话,他们必然要去接近这些高官的子女。这就是所谓的‘猎捕大象’。”

章家敦认为,这在中国非常普遍,因为中国的体制不能提供一个开放的、公平竞争的市场,所以做生意在很大程度上要靠“关系”。

他说,在张曦曦和唐晓宁加入摩根大通后,中铁和光大成为摩根大通的客户,这决非巧合。 章家敦说:“我相信如果摩根大通没有雇用这两名高官子女,它是不会赢得那些合同的。虽然这并不证明其中有违反了《反海外腐败法》的腐败行为,但是至少引发推测,是不是其中有些问题。”

美国联邦法律《反海外腐败法》 (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) 在1977年签署,由美国司法部和美国证券交易委员会执行。南伊利诺伊大学法学院 (Southern Illinois University School of Law) 助理教授 (Assistant Professor) 迈克尔•凯勒 (Michael Koehler) 说:“《反海外腐败法》是一项禁止美国公司以及在美国进行证券交易的外国公司向外国官员贿赂,以达到赢得生意的目的。”

凯勒是反腐败法案方面的专家,他说除了直接的贿赂,间接的贿赂例如通过第三方代理、顾问、总代理、合资伙伴等也是被禁止的。

根据美国证券交易委员会公布的数据统计,自2010年以来,证交会调查的案件中至少有七件涉及贿赂中国官员。国际金融公司摩根士丹利 (Morgan Stanley) 的前高管加思•彼得森 (Garth R. Peterson) 在2012年就因为涉嫌贪污及贿赂一名中国官员而受到证交会和司法部的调查。其它受到指控的公司有IBM、 辉瑞制药有限公司 (Pfizer)、Biomet、洛克威尔自动化公司 (Rockwell Automation) 等。

这些案例中比较常见的是用现金、礼品、旅行、娱乐等方式来行贿,而通过雇用中国官员家属来获得业务的案子数量比较少。凯勒说,上一次类似案件是在2010年,美国司法部指控戴姆勒•克莱斯勒公司 (Daimler Chrysler) 违反了《反海外腐败法》。根据司法部公布的文件,其中一项指控是该公司在2002年,获得中国石化(Sinopec) 业务之后,给中国石化一名中国政府官员夫人支付了5万7千欧元的“佣金”。虽然有合同,但实质上这位夫人并没有为这家公司工作。

凯勒说,雇用高官家属本身并不一定违法。 他说:“这件事情本身并没有错,但是要调查这其中是否有贪腐的动机。例如,被雇用的那个人是否胜任这项职位,支付给那个人的工资是否符合市场的价位,等等。”

《纽约时报》的报道指出,美国证交会在今年5月要求摩根大通提交有关资料,包括在职工资、雇用纪录、离职后与摩根大通之间的通信纪录、以及相关合同及协议等。

章家敦认为,虽然摩根大通提交了很多材料,但是证交会要找到摩根大通违反《反海外腐败法》的证据有一定难度。他说:“我认为证交会是在查找摩根大通投行和中国高官之间贪腐交易的协议,如果摩根大通雇用他们的子女,摩根大通将会得到项目或好处。实际上我认为要找到这样的证据是非常困难的,因为很少有明确的协议,通常是双方之间的共识,所以这当中的过程是比较微秒的。”

除了在华尔街公司任职外,很多中国政界高层的子女也开始在中国建立风险投资基金、私募基金等。例如,前国家总理温家宝的儿子温云松在2009年参与创立了新天域资本公司 (New Horizon Capital),并为双汇集团对美国史密斯菲尔德食品公司 (Smithfield Foods) 的收购融资。2012年美国梦工厂 (DreamWorks SKG) 宣布在上海成立合资公司东方梦工厂(Oriental DreamWorks),而投资方之一的上海联合投资有限公司 (Shanghai Alliance Investment Ltd.) 的法人代表江绵恒正是前国家主席江泽民的儿子。同年,美国证交会也开始对包括梦工厂在内的至少5家好莱坞电影公司进行调查,切入点是这些公司是否为进入中国市场而有违反《反海外腐败法》的行贿行为。

在美国政府加强对华尔街在中国雇用太子党调查的同时,中国政府也发起了一场反腐倡廉运动。章家敦说:“习近平的反腐倡廉运动是有一定的成效,但这只是暂时的,因为它不涉及问题的根源,而腐败的根源是不负责任的政治体制以及政府过多干预经济活动。虽然也有很多贪官进了监狱,但是他们并不是由独立的检察官在一个独立的法院系统中受判的。往往是当权者的政治敌人被送入了监狱,所以这并不是真正的反腐败。这其实是政治斗争。”

章家敦认为这次的调查会令很多华尔街公司更加小心,重新考虑在中国的投资风险,以及如何通过合法的途径做生意。

华盛顿 — 纽约时报曝光美国证券交易委员会(SEC)正在调查摩根大通(JP Morgan Chase)是否通过雇用中国高官子女以获得在中国丰厚业务的消息多少让人感到有些吃惊,因为国际大型金融机构通过雇用中国高官后代以获得在华业务的做法已经盛行了至少二十多年。

*华尔街青睐官二代由来已久*

“在过去将近二十年,(它)都是一个很突出的现象,就是西方国家(公司)利用中国高官、领导人子女和关系拓展在中国的市场,”纽约城市大学的夏明说,“这里边从胡耀邦、赵紫阳的子女或者是亲属,到以后朱镕基、江泽民他们的亲属,到今天披露出来的中国的高官,包括王岐山、周小川,还有戴相龙等等。他们都是跟西方国家有非常密切的关系。”

国际大型金融机构雇用中国高官子女的例子不胜枚举。比较有名的包括2004年,瑞银集团(UBS)出巨资将前中国政协主席李瑞环的儿子李振智从美林证券(Merrill Lynch)挖走,年薪高达1000万美元。而当时作为新手的李振智仅在美林任职一年。

*官二代独钟金融*

与大多数赴海外求学的中国学生不同的是,有背景的中国高官子女一般都选择金融领域。曼达林基金(Mandarin Capital Partners)合伙创始人傅格礼(Alberto Forchielli)说:“金融领域是官二代的最佳选择。他们不学医、不学建筑。他们主要学商科,目标就是进军金融业,要么是去一家投行,要么就选择进入私募股权公司。这非常普遍,因为做金融被认为是非常成功、非常赚钱的行业。” 傅格礼曾毕业于哈佛商学院,他目前还是中欧国际商学院上海企业咨询顾问委员会成员。

西方投行雇用中国精英阶层子女当然也有比较充分的理由。Weiss Berzowski Brady LLP律师事务所的商业律师石明轩(Charles Stone)说:“问题是很多太子党,他们原本非常优秀,他们受到了非常好的教育,他们上哈佛大学商学院等等。我们(美国)的公司认为,如果哈佛要,我们当然也要。” 石明轩还兼任北京大学民营经济研究院教授。

*华尔街看重官二代人脉关系*

但显然,西方大型金融机构更为看重的是富二代、官二代在中国强大的人脉关系。这些公司希望借此敲开中国金融市场的大门,因为聘请高官的子女或亲属作顾问或雇员可以帮助它们突破中国金融市场的层层阻力和限制。“关键在于,中国国家指导的资本主义使得关系资本主义成为美国要打通这些由国家垄断和国家控制的行业的一个敲门砖。”纽约城市大学的夏明说。

不过,这些高官的后代往往不会在某一家国际投资银行做太久。“他们往往是拿到一个比较低的职位,做几年后就离开。他们不会一直干下去。” 傅格礼说。

*官二代把华尔街当跳板*

随着中国经济地位的提高,精英子弟先在国际投行镀金然后回国创立自己的风险投资公司或私募股权公司已经成为他们成功发迹的模式。前面提到的李瑞环长子李振智在麻省理工学院斯隆管理学院获得MBA学位后,曾先后就职于美林和瑞银,后自立门户。李瑞环的次子李振福在辞去诺华制药(Novartis)中国区总裁后于2011年初创立私募基金“德福资本”。

前全国人大常委会委员长吴邦国的女婿冯绍东2008年离开美林后成立了中广核产业基金。冯绍东在2006年帮助美林获得中国工商银行在香港上市承销权的运作中发挥了关键作用。工行上市在当时是有史以来最大的首次公开发行(IPO)。

温家宝的前任朱镕基的长子朱云来曾就读于芝加哥德保罗大学(DePaul University),获得会计硕士学位。他先后在安达信和瑞士信贷第一波士顿(Credit Suisse First Boston)工作,90年代末回国进入中国国际金融有限公司(中金公司)。

高官子女不在国际投行做久有诸多原因,但最重要的是捞不到太多油水。 “中国领导人的子女,如果他们在美国留下来,一方面美国是一个成熟的市场,没有爆发的机会,”夏明说,“另一方面,如果他们在美国长期任职下去的话,基本上最后也就是一个中高层的职务,那么也不会带来暴利。”

华盛顿 — 美国证券交易委员会(SEC)调查摩根大通(JP Morgan Chase)是否通过雇用中国高官子女以获得在中国丰厚业务的时机令人颇感费解。华尔街投行的此类做法已经有至少二十年的历史。

但《中国行将崩溃》一书作者章家敦却认为,美国政府早该出手了。他说:“我认为我们不应该对这个调查感到吃惊。实际上,唯一让人惊讶的是联邦政府怎么会拖这么久才开始真正着手去审视这个问题。”

有分析指出,美国监管机构对华尔街的这一行为早有察觉,只是一直苦于找不到确凿证据。美国证交会此次出手或许是已经找到了突破口。

但Weiss Berzowski Brady LLP律师事务所的商业律师石明轩(Charles Stone)认为,媒体对SEC调查摩根大通做出了过度解读。他说:“我们5月份已经知道,美国的官员已经说过,他们可能要把摩根大通拿来作个例子。(他们)现在在中国雇用太子党的问题很可能是跟以前的问题有关系。”

摩根大通的确最近一直麻烦不断,特别是该公司去年在“伦敦鲸”(London Whale)交易爆仓事件中对金融衍生品押注失败,造成60亿美元的交易损失。这一事件引发了美国国会和行政监管机构对摩根大通的一系列调查。

但无论如何,调查把中国的腐败问题再次展现在世人眼前。章家敦认为,华尔街投行为获得生意而雇用高官后代的做法折射出中国政治经济的结构性问题。

“当然,世界各地的银行都会雇用有关系的人,但这在中国更为普遍,”章家敦说,“这是中国经济中一个结构性问题。中国拥有一个自上而下的政治体制。只要共产党仍然维持一党专制的话,这个体制就不会转变成一个开放、透明和以市场为主导的体制。”

长期以来,中国作为一个巨大的市场一直让西方企业爱恨交加。西方企业为打入中国市场而不得不入乡随俗地遵循中国商界和政界的各项潜规则。中国推行的以国家主导的权贵资本主义使得裙带之风盛行。在中国做生意,往往不是拼实力,而是拼关系“硬不硬”。

美国对摩根大通雇用中国高官子女的调查从某种意义上反应出美国对中国关系资本主义模式的担忧。纽约城市大学的政治学教授夏明说:“美国从某种程度上意识到,尤其是战略层次上意识到,中国的资本主义模式会对全球的投资环境,对全球的商业和资本运行的环境都会带来巨大的威胁。对美国和整个西方的生活方式都会进行某种腐蚀。所以我觉得,现在西方的政界和商界,甚至在普通老百姓的层面上形成越来越强烈的对中国资本抱有怀疑、抵触和仇视的情绪。”

曼达林基金(Mandarin Capital Partners)合伙创始人傅格礼(Alberto Forchielli)也认为,美国证交会对摩根大通的调查突显美国上下弥漫的一股对中国的不利氛围。他说:“我认为美国现在整体上对中国的氛围都不好。这是肯定的。”傅格礼1981年毕业于哈佛商学院,他目前还担任中欧国际商学院上海企业咨询顾问委员会成员。

与此同时,华尔街同中国的联系正在减少。纽约城市大学的夏明说:“我认为,西方的投资银行,尤其是以华尔街为首基本上是在非常谨慎的把它们在中国的投资紧缩。所以我们看到,包括高盛、摩根士丹利在内的投行都把它们在中国的一些标志性建筑和房产脱手。在最近一两年,外资、尤其是美元逃离中国市场是在加剧。”

夏明表示,华尔街的银行家们非常精明,当他们意识到他们无法再从中国市场捞取好处的时候,就会转战其它新兴市场。“应该说,华尔街和中南海的蜜月已经破裂。我觉得这种破裂会带来巨大的政治后果。这种政治后果不仅牵扯到腐败问题,而且会牵扯到最根本的中国奇迹还能不能维护下去,中国的模式会不会最终破产的问题。”

由于中国新一代领导人上台以来一直迟迟未能推出关键的改革措施,再加上以朱云来、温云松为代表的“红色贵族”对中国金融市场的垄断让华尔街对中国越来越失望。这似乎也为美国监管部门过问有关的腐败问题提供了契机,因为在夏明看来,美国证交会选择在此时调查摩根大通涉嫌腐败将不至影响到华尔街在中国的根本利益。

华盛顿 — 美国政府根据联邦法律《反海外腐败法》(Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) 对摩根大通雇佣中国高官子女展开调查。但是观察人士指出,这一行动其实已经是马后炮,因为最近几年,中共太子党对于华尔街投资银行来说,价值已经大大缩水。在失去了华尔街的青睐之后,中共高官的一些子女开始独辟蹊径,回中国,尤其是香港,打造自己的金融帝国。

和张曦曦和唐晓宁一样,很多“太子党”都已经离开了华尔街银行,转而涉足私募基金。例如,前国家总理温家宝的儿子温云松在2005年创立了新天域资本公司 (New Horizon Capital)。根据英国《金融时报》报道,这家公司管理着数十亿美元的资金,投资方包括了德意志银行 (Deutsche Bank)、摩根大通 (JPMorgan Chase & Co.)、以及瑞银 (UBS) 等。而前政治局常委李瑞环的儿子李振福也创立了德福资本 (GL Capital Group) 并担任首席执行官。

预期最早今年上市的阿里巴巴是中国最大的电子商务公司,去年包括博裕资本 (Boyu Capital)、中国投资有限责任公司 (China Investment Corp.)、 中信资本 (CITIC Capital)、国家开发银行 (China Development Bank) 在内的投资者收购了阿里巴巴集团5.6%的股份。前国家主席江泽民的孙子江志成正是博裕资本的合伙人之一,1986年出生的江志成毕业于哈佛大学经济系。博裕资本在2010年注册,预计将在2013年晚些时候推出第二期基金,筹资目标是15亿美元。

包括江志成在内,很多“太子党”都毕业于美国或欧洲名校,例如,温云松是美国西北大学凯洛管理学院 (Kellogg School of Management) 的工商管理硕士、李振福曾在美国芝加哥大学读工商管理,但是章家敦 (Gordon Chang) 认为他们也从家庭关系中受惠。他说:“这些‘太子党’开始成立自己的公司,并利用他们的关系,包括他们的父母以及父母的朋友等关系,在体制中获益。中国政治体制的本质就是要靠关系,你认识什么人,而不是主要靠你的能力。”

除了自创私募基金外,很多“太子党”也任职于国企参与的金融机构。纽约城市大学 (The City University of New York) 政治学 (Political Science and Global Affairs) 教授夏明 (Ming Xia) 说:“中国管理资本的体系是一个高度中央集权化的体系。高干的子女抓紧了非常好的一个机会,他们被西方国家雇用后,积累了在投行的经验后,正好中国出现了大量的过剩资本。这表现在中国的外汇储备达到三万亿,中国的外汇储备以及中国在美国买的国债等都需要大量的人来管理,所以成立了中金公司等来管理这些资产。”

中国国际金融有限公司 (China International Capital Corporation Limited.) ,简称中金公司 (CICC),成立于1995年7月,是中国第一家合资投行,注册资本是2.25亿美元。中金公司的首个大型项目是中国电信(香港)(现中国移动)42亿美元的海外首次公开发行。2004年,前总理朱鎔基的长子朱云来出任中金公司的首席执行官。

此外,前人大委员长吴邦国的女婿冯绍东以及现任政治局常委刘云山的儿子刘乐飞也分别担任中广核产业投资基金总裁和中信产业基金的董事长兼首席执行官。

对于如何管理中国的外汇储备等资产,夏明教授认为:“显然他们也只能相信自己的子女,所以这样的话大量高干子女就利用这个机会在推动和利用中国经济的金融化和货币化,一方面来维持政权的运作,另一方面也在捞取自己的私利。”

中国有越来越多的国企投行和基金,这对华尔街投行在中国的盈利有一定影响。据《华尔街日报》报道,中国公司支付给华尔街的首次公开募股 (Initial Public Offering) 费用已经从2012年的6.52亿美金降低到2013年同期的7, 700万美金。波士顿咨询公司(Boston Consulting Group) 的资深合伙人兼董事总经理邓俊豪 (Tjun Tang) 也认为中国“太子党”对于华尔街已经没有那么大的价值了。

另一方面,中国政治的变动也会对股市价格产生影响。据《华尔街日报》报道,在薄熙来事件发生后,中国光大集团股票的成交量下跌了10%,薄熙来的哥哥薄熙永曾任该集团的副主席。这次美国证券交易委员会 (The Securities and Exchange Commission) 对摩根大通雇用两名中国政界高层子女的调查也令摩根大通的股价下跌。

在美国政府对摩根大通进行贪腐调查的同时,中国近期也对一些外资企业是否违反《反垄断法》加强调查。章家敦说:“我认为这主要是为了帮助国企。因为外企已经在中国的市场有很大的竞争力,北京不希望看到国企的市场份额减少。北京要把机会留给国企,因为国企为政府带来收入,并且也是中共的支柱。”

夏明教授也认同,这从某种程度上是中国为保护国企的行为,因为经济改革到了一定程度,有可能危及中国政治体制。中国很多行业都还是被国企垄断,诸如石油、电信、银行等。

据悉,摩根大通也已聘请纽约宝维斯律师事务所(Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP)对其香港分行的招聘情况进行内部调查。

https://www.letscorp.net/archives/54344

其他资料来源:https://www.voachinese.com/a/wallstreet-princelings-20130823/1735753.html

https://www.voachinese.com/a/china-princelings-wall-streets-2/1737535.html

https://www.voacantonese.com/a/wall-street-chinese-pricelings/1739482.html

财团游说者们是如何征服美国民主的(How Corporate Lobbyists Conquered American Democracy)

Something is out of balance in Washington. Corporations now spend about $2.6 billion a year on reported lobbying expenditures—more than the $2 billion we spend to fund the House ($1.18 billion) and Senate ($860 million). It’s a gap that has been widening since corporate lobbying began to regularly exceed the combined House-Senate budget in the early 2000s.
1,在华盛顿,一些东西失去了平衡。财团们现在一年花费大约26亿美元在游说支出上,这是被报道出的数据——超过20亿花费在白宫(11.8亿)和参议院(8.6亿)。自从财团游说在2000s早期开始经常超越组合的白宫-参议院花费时,鸿沟变大了。
Today, the biggest companies have upwards of 100 lobbyists representing them, allowing them to be everywhere, all the time. For every dollar spent on lobbying by labor unions and public-interest groups together, large corporations and their associations now spend $34. Of the 100 organizations that spend the most on lobbying, 95 consistently represent business.
2,今天,最大的公司们拥有超过100名代表他们的游说者,允许他们在任何地方,任何时间出现。大型公司和他们的合作者们花在游说工会和公共利益组织上的花费是过去的34倍。在100个游说花费最多的组织中,95个是商业公司。

One has to go back to the Gilded Age to find business in such a dominant political position in American politics. While it is true that even in the more pluralist 1950s and 1960s, political representation tilted towards the well-off, lobbying was almost balanced by today’s standards. Labor unions were much more important, and the public-interest groups of the 1960s were much more significant actors. And very few companies had their own Washington lobbyists prior to the 1970s. To the extent that businesses did lobby in the 1950s and 1960s (typically through associations), they were clumsy and ineffective. “When we look at the typical lobby,” concluded three leading political scientists in their 1963 study, American Business and Public Policy, “we find its opportunities to maneuver are sharply limited, its staff mediocre, and its typical problem not the influencing of Congressional votes but finding the clients and contributors to enable it to survive at all.”

3,财团们的游说质量不断自我强化,相对于其他反对力量,已经成为了压倒性的力量。一个人只有回到镀金时代才能再次看到商业公司绝对主导美国政治的情形。的确即使是在更多数决定的1950s和1960s,政治代表也向富人倾斜,但按照今天的标准来看游说是几乎平衡的。独立工会更为重要,1960s公共利益组织是更为明显的表演者。1970s时只有很少的公司在华盛顿有他们自己的游说者。在1950s和1960s商业公司的确进行了游说(典型的是通过协会),这些游说是愚蠢的和无效的。“当我们查看典型的游说时,”三位领导地位的政治科学家们在1963年的研究《美国的商业和公共政策》中总结道,“我们发现谨慎行动者们被严格限制,它的雇员很平庸,而典型问题不是影响国会投票者,而是找到能够维持其存活的客户和捐献者。”

Things are quite different today. The evolution of business lobbying from a sparse reactive force into a ubiquitous and increasingly proactive one is among the most important transformations in American politics over the last 40 years.  Probing the history of this transformation reveals that there is no “normal” level of business lobbying in American democracy. Rather, business lobbying has built itself up over time, and the self-reinforcing quality of corporate lobbying has increasingly come to overwhelm every other potentially countervailing force. It has also fundamentally changed how corporations interact with government—rather than trying to keep government out of its business (as they did for a long time), companies are now increasingly bringing government in as a partner, looking to see what the country can do for them.

4,今天事情变得完全不同了。商业游说从稀疏的相关联的力量演化为普遍的增长的活跃力量,这是在过去40年间美国政治领域发生的最重要的转变。对这一转变的历史探索揭示了:在美国民主中,没有什么“正常”的商业游说等级。商业游说随着时间流逝增强了自己,公司游说的质量自我强化到了压倒其他潜在的反制力量。它也从根本上改变了公司如何与政府互动——比起将政府排除在生意之外(他们在很长时间之内都这么做),公司们现在越来越多的将政府当成伙伴,查看国家能为他们做什么。
If we set our time machine back to 1971, we’d find a leading corporate lawyer earnestly writing that, “As every business executive knows, few elements of American society today have as little influence in government as the American businessman, the corporation, or even the millions of corporate stockholders. If one doubts this, let him undertake the role of ‘lobbyist’ for the business point of view before Congressional committees.”That lawyer was soon-to-be Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr., whose now-famous “Powell Memorandum” is a telling insight into the frustration that many business leaders felt by the early 1970s. Congress had gone on a regulatory binge in the 1960s—spurred on by a new wave of public-interest groups. Large corporations had largely sat by idly, unsure of what to do.In 1972, against the backdrop of growing compliance costs, slowing economic growth and rising wages, a community of leading CEOs formed the Business Roundtable, an organization devoted explicitly to cultivating political influence. Alcoa CEO John Harper, one of the Roundtable’s founders, said at the time, “I think we all recognize that the time has come when we must stop talking about it, and get busy and do something about it.”This sense of an existential threat motivated the leading corporations to engage in serious political activity. Many began by hiring their first lobbyists. And they started winning. They killed a major labor law reform, rolled back regulation, lowered their taxes, and helped to move public opinion in favor of less government intervention in the economy.
5,如果我们将时间机器设置回1971,我们会看到一个处于领导位置的公司律师诚实的写下了这些:“就像每个商业执行人所知道的,美国社会中几乎没有哪个元素在政府中的影响力和美国商人们和企业们甚至几百万企业股票持有者一样少。如果有人怀疑这点,让他去在国会会议之前实现成功扮演“游说者”的角色吧。”该律师就是即将成为最高法院大法官的Lewis F. Powell Jr,他的著名的“Powell备忘录”深刻分析了1970s初期许多商业界领导者感受到的挫败感来源。在新一轮公共利益集团的推动下,国会在20世纪60年对企业进行了大量监管。大型企业闲着,不知道该怎么做。在1972年,在各种成本增加,经济增长减速和工资上涨的背景下,由一流的首席执行官组成的社团组成了“商业圆桌会议”,一个目的为培养政治影响力的组织美国铝业公司CEOJohn Harper,圆桌会议创始人之一,在当时说,“我认为我们所有人都认识到现在是时候了,我们必须停止讨论这个问题然后忙着做些事。”这种对存在的威胁的感觉促使处于领导地位的企业参与严肃的政治活动。许多人开始雇佣他们的第一批游说者。他们开始赢了。他们毁灭一项重大的劳工法律改革,放宽监管规定,降低税收,并帮助推动公众舆论,宣传减少政府对经济的干预。
By the early 1980s, corporate leaders were “purring” (as a 1982 Harris Poll described it). Corporations could have declared victory and gone home, thus saving on the costs of political engagement. Instead, they stuck around and kept at it. Many deepened their commitments to politics. After all, they now had lobbyists to help them see all that was at stake in Washington, and all the ways in which staying politically active could help their businesses.Those lobbyists would go on to spend the 1980s teaching companies about the importance of political engagement. But it would take time for them to become fully convinced. As one company lobbyist I interviewed for my new book, The Business of America Is Lobbying, told me, “When I started [in 1983], people didn’t really understand government affairs. They questioned why you would need a Washington office, what does a Washington office do? I think they saw it as a necessary evil. All of our competitors had Washington offices, so it was more, well we need to have a presence there and it’s just something we had to do.”To make the sell, lobbyists had to go against the long-entrenched notion in corporate boardrooms that politics was a necessary evil to be avoided if possible. To get corporations to invest fully in politics, lobbyists had to convince companies that Washington could be a profit center. They had to convince them that lobbying was not just about keeping the government far away—it could also be about drawing government close.
6,在1980s初期,企业领导者在“呜咽”(就像1982年哈里斯民意调查所描述的那样)。公司本来可以宣布胜利并回家,从而节省在政治参与上的花费。相反,他们坚持下去了。许多人加深了对政治的参与。毕竟,他们现在有游说者来帮助他们看到华盛顿所关注的问题,而所有在政治上积极参与的手段都可以帮助他们的生意。那些游说者们会继续像在1980s一样教育公司们关于政治参与的重要性但他们需要时间才能被完全说服。正如我在我的新书“在美国生意是游说”中采访的一位公司游说者告诉我的那样,“当我开始(1983年)时,人们并不真正理解政府事务。他们质疑为什么你需要一个在华盛顿的办公室,一个华盛顿的办公室能做什么?我认为他们把这当成一个必要的罪恶。我们所有的竞争对手都在华盛顿有办公室,所以更多的是,我们需要在那里设立办公室,而这只是我们必须做的事情。“为了作成生意,游说者们不得不违背在企业董事会会议室被长期坚持的理念,就是政治是应当被避免的必要罪恶。为了让企业充分的在政治中投资,游说者们不得不说服公司华盛顿可能成为一个利润中心。他们必须说服老板们,游说不仅仅是让政府远离 – 这也可能是关于拉近与政府的关系。
As one lobbyist told me (in 2007), “Twenty­-five years ago… it was ‘just keep the government out of our business, we want to do what we want to,’ and gradually that’s changed to ‘how can we make the government our partners?’ It’s gone from ‘leave us alone’ to ‘let’s work on this together.’” Another corporate lobbyist recalled,“When they started, [management] thought government relations did something else. They thought it was to manage public relations crises, hearing inquiries… My boss told me, you’ve taught us to do things we didn’t know could ever be done.”As companies became more politically active and comfortable during the late 1980s and the 1990s, their lobbyists became more politically visionary. For example, pharmaceutical companies had long opposed the idea of government adding a prescription drug benefit to Medicare, on the theory that this would give government bargaining power through bulk purchasing, thereby reducing drug industry profits. But sometime around 2000, industry lobbyists dreamed up the bold idea of proposing and supporting what became Medicare Part D—a prescription drug benefit, but one which explicitly forbade bulk purchasing—an estimated $205 billion benefit to companies over a 10-year period.What makes today so very different from the 1970s is that corporations now have the resources to play offense and defense simultaneously on almost any top-priority issue. When I surveyed corporate lobbyists on the reasons why their companies maintained a Washington office, the top reason was “to protect the company against changes in government policy.” On a one-to-seven scale, lobbyists ranked this reason at 6.2 (on average). But closely behind, at 5.7, was “Need to improve ability to compete by seeking favorable changes in government policy.”While reversing history is obviously impossible, there is value in appreciating how much things have changed. And there are ways to bring back some balance: Investing more in the government, especially Congress, would give leading policymakers resources to hire and retain the most experienced and expert staff, and reduce their reliance on lobbyists. Also, organizations that advocate for less well-resourced positions could use more support. If history teaches anything, it’s that the world does not need to look as it does today.
7,正如一位游说者告诉我的那样(2007年):“二十五年前……游说的目的只是让政府停止干预我们的生意,我们想做我们想做的事情,”然后逐渐改变为“我们如何才能把政府变成我们的伙伴?’它从’不要管我们’发展到’让我们一起工作’。“另一位企业游说者回忆说:”当他们开始时,(管理层)认为政府关系是用来做其他事的。他们认为这是管理公关危机,听取调查……我的老板告诉我,你教会我们去做我们之前不知道如何做的事。“随着公司在1980s和1990s期间在政治上变得更积极和舒适,他们的游说者们变得更有政治远见。例如,制药公司长期以来反对政府将处方药利润增加到医疗保险中,理论上说这将通过大宗采购赋予政府讨价还价的能力,从而减少药品工业的利润。但在2000年左右,工业游说者们梦想着提出一个关于支持医疗保险D部分的大胆的想法 – 一种对处方药利润的增加,但明确禁止大宗采购 – 在10年内估计为公司带来了2050亿美元的收益。使得今天与1970s非常不同的是公司现在有资源在几乎任何最高优先级的问题上同时进攻和防守。当我调查公司游说者们他们的公司维持在华盛顿办公室的原因时,最重要的原因是“保护公司对抗政府政策的变化”。在一个一到七的范围内,游说者们将这一原因排在6.2(平均)。但紧随其后的,评分为5.7,“需要通过寻求政府政策进行有利变化来提高竞争力”。虽然扭转历史很明显不可能,但确认有多少事情发生变化是有价值的。并且有办法恢复一些平衡:对政府,特别是国会进行更多投资,将使处于领导地位的政策制定者的资源能够雇佣和留住最有经验和最专业的人员,并减少他们对游说者的依赖。另外,可以倡导对资源不足的组织进行更多的支持。如果历史教给我们任何事情,那就是世界不需要看起来像现在这样。
 
.https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/04/how-corporate-lobbyists-conquered-american-democracy/390822/

孩奴的焦虑

一到这个季节,空气里就充满了焦虑的气味。

去往楼顶中考辅导班的学生,使得电梯突然紧张起来。挤在稚嫩面孔里的老住户,只好小心收紧身体,屏息与之共上下。这些准备考初中的孩子,寄身塔楼楼顶那幢复式结构房子,每日成群结队活动。

他们一律戴近视眼镜,身形歪斜,脸上很少映现少年的光泽,看人的眼神多是飘忽不定。他们吃住在辅导速成班里,接受强化训练,大人为他们交了数千元学费。住户们一眼即可辨别出那些家长,因为他们眼里写满了期待与惶惑。

去小区鞋屋擦皮鞋,四十来岁的老板娘正在训斥儿子:

“为你花这么多钱,你还偷偷玩游戏!你对得起谁?我擦一双鞋才挣七块五,你一小时就要三百。你算过没有,我这双手得擦够五十双臭鞋,才能给你请一对一老师。”

呆头呆脑的五年级学生低头不语。

这对来自保定的夫妻,租用一间二十平米的屋子,以擦鞋擦沙发谋生,他们已经扎根小区十馀年。原本是三人经营,丈夫上门擦洗皮沙发,妻子管店,妻子一个阴郁而枯瘦的弟弟负责擦鞋。租金从九百元涨到三千元,养不起人,老板娘只好让弟弟出外打工。

我是看着他们的后代从一个虎头虎脑的小孩,一步步长成胖乎乎的眼镜男,清澈的眸子一变而为游弋、空洞的眼神。

“考不上好初中,就输了。我们输不起啊。”

她眼里浮起南中国海般浩荡的焦虑。

千里外的老家,大弟为儿子学好奥数,高价请了研究生一对一辅导。幺弟春节就托人为女儿补课,想让女儿考上大学。或许是压力过大,小时候活泼的侄女,一脸疙瘩,身子几乎缩成熊猫状。

一个在西部四线城市工作的朋友,女儿一个月后也将步入高考战场。原本不用功的孩子,突然意识到机会的宝贵,逼迫母亲为自己报贵族辅导班,每天三小时课程,收费六百元,一个十天短期班竟需六千元。夫妻俩一月的收入也就这么多。女儿平日上各种补习班,每年要花费一万多元。值不值得花这么多钱,一家人为此大吵一架,父女俩结成花钱同盟,掌管家庭财权的妻子只好认输,她明白又要过一段苦日子了。

攥紧命运之手!决战高考!

这是涂抹在无数高考工厂墙壁上的动员令。

许多家长明知道大学毕业也没多大用,还得托关系找工作,但还是决意拼死一搏,将孩子和钱财送入产业化怪兽张开的饕餮大嘴里。省吃俭用的血汗钱,就这样被专横的教育悉数吞噬。孩子毁了,父母累了穷了,这就是现实。

在中国,自一个生命呱呱坠地起,父母就开始了不见尽头的马拉松比赛,直到身心俱衰,才有可能卸下这泰山般的重负。在现有教育制度面前,家长们如同一头头被点着屁股的斗牛,日复一日进行痛苦的狂奔——浇在尾巴上的汽油,足够烧十几年而不竭。

漫山遍野的孩奴,遮蔽了太阳的光辉。

这是一场人为设定的乱局。

就业、任用对文凭的要求,规定了教育的根本属性——提供缴费者所需要的标准证书。一个显见的事实是,中国式的教育,只是为了庞大的证书需求而存在。

畸形发展的产业化教育制造了天量证书,文凭的贬值自然不可避免。本来各有所用的文凭,依次轮番贬值,专科,本科,研究生,博士生,博士后。每一个为了谋取较好收益的个体,不得不倾力参与瘟疫式的文凭升级拼搏,专升本,本升研,研升博……专科贱,本科不值钱,研究生满街走,博士帽随风飘扬。

因为权力和人情的腐蚀作用,用人单位最后大都采用惟文凭是举的录取原则。在外人看来,这恰恰是其唯一公平的地方,因而更加热衷于参与文凭竞争。

在洞悉此国秘密的人眼里,文凭只是个道具,它仅仅抬高了准入门槛。因为同级别文凭竞争背后,就是赤裸裸的关系博弈:谁拥有或能撬动权力关系,以及谁支付的贿赂价码(含最管用的性贿赂)更具有竞争力。官后代富后代貌似也参与文凭大战,其实只是走个过场,运用权力或金钱获取所需要的证书,然后一路畅通进入上升快车道,最后高调标榜“能力之外的资本为零”,以此摧毁无权无势者的自信心。老子英雄儿好汉,老子混蛋儿滚蛋。他们要告诉社会的就是这个颠扑不破的血统定律。半个世纪前,热血青年遇罗克就是为了挑战这个新中国的主体真理而付出了生命的代价。

当权贵拿走盘子里的蛋糕之后,剩下的碎渣子由乌泱乌泱的百姓争抢。

为了让参与者全情投入,教育食利阶层设计了一款异常刺激的争斗游戏。打个比方吧,本来大学每年招十人,横竖都只有十人成为幸运儿。如果不加码,游戏就有些乏味,也无从攫取超额利益。于是,他们进行了高超的顶层制度设计,通过不断提高考试难度,不断改变录取标准,让每个人都惶惶不安,因为担心自己被剔除,从而永不松懈地参与搏斗。

在课堂教学之外,一整套标榜快速提高成绩的教育培训机构傲然挺立。这些戕害性灵、榨取钱财的吸血工厂,本身即是由权势者开设,或由那些跟权力完成勾兑的人开办。他们和教育当局联手操纵游戏进程,并攫取最大的利益。

在此庞然大物面前,家长和孩子彻底丧失了自尊和自信心。他们沦为可怜的奴隶,就像被毒蛇摄取了灵魂的老鼠,一跳一跳葬身于死亡之口。

教育主管部门每年煞有介事的减负,无不成为培训机构敛财的契机和动力——他们所标榜的减负力度愈大,它们赚取的钱财愈多。猫鼠一家亲,他们活色生香的表演,只是为了蒙蔽旁观者,以此令入局者更加沉浸其中,这是猫鼠游戏的本质。

这是一场政府主导的合法死亡游戏。他们规定了每个家长的生活方式,彻底改变了每个人的命运,还塑造了可怕的国民性格。

“政教合一”制度下的教育垄断,正在无情地窒息中国的生机。

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001077713?page=1

The Residential School System(加拿大的以“文明”为名的儿童古拉格,待翻译)

Residential Schools

Children’s dining room, Indian Residential School, Edmonton, Alberta. Between 1925-1936. United Church Archives, Toronto, From Mission to Partnership Collection.Prime Minister Stephen Harper, official apology, June 11, 2008

 

What was the Indian residential school system?

The term residential schools refers to an extensive school system set up by the Canadian government and administered by churches that had the nominal objective of educating Aboriginal children but also the more damaging and equally explicit objectives of indoctrinating them into Euro-Canadian and Christian ways of living and assimilating them into mainstream Canadian society. The residential school system operated from the 1880s into the closing decades of the 20th century. The system forcibly separated children from their families for extended periods of time and forbade them to acknowledge their Aboriginal heritage and culture or to speak their own languages. Children were severely punished if these, among other, strict rules were broken. Former students of residential schools have spoken of horrendous abuse at the hands of residential school staff: physical, sexual, emotional, and psychological. Residential schools provided Aboriginal students with an inferior education, often only up to grade five, that focused on training students for manual labour in agriculture, light industry such as woodworking, and domestic work such as laundry work and sewing.

Residential schools systematically undermined Aboriginal culture across Canada and disrupted families for generations, severing the ties through which Aboriginal culture is taught and sustained, and contributing to a general loss of language and culture. Because they were removed from their families, many students grew up without experiencing a nurturing family life and without the knowledge and skills to raise their own families. The devastating effects of the residential schools are far-reaching and continue to have significant impact on Aboriginal communities. Because the government’s and the churches’ intent was to eradicate all aspects of Aboriginal culture in these young people and interrupt its transmission from one generation to the next, the residential school system is commonly considered a form of cultural genocide.

From the 1990s onward, the government and the churches involved—Anglican, Presbyterian, United, and Roman Catholic—began to acknowledge their responsibility for an education scheme that was specifically designed to “kill the Indian in the child.” On June 11, 2008, the Canadian government issued a formal apology in Parliament for the damage done by the residential school system. In spite of this and other apologies, however, the effects remain.

What led to the residential schools?

European settlers in Canada brought with them the assumption that their own civilization was the pinnacle of human achievement. They interpreted the socio-cultural differences between themselves and the Aboriginal peoples as proof that Canada’s first inhabitants were ignorant, savage, and—like children—in need of guidance. They felt the need to “civilize” the Aboriginal peoples. Education—a federal responsibility—became the primary means to this end.

Prime Minister Sir John A. Macdonald commissioned journalist and politician Nicholas Flood Davin to study industrial schools for Aboriginal children in the United States. Davin’s recommendation to follow the U.S. example of “aggressive civilization” led to public funding for the residential school system. “If anything is to be done with the Indian, we must catch him very young. The children must be kept constantly within the circle of civilized conditions,” Davin wrote in his 1879 Report on Industrial Schools for Indians and Half-Breeds (Davin’s report can be read here.)

In the 1880s, in conjunction with other federal assimilation policies, the government began to establish residential schools across Canada. Authorities would frequently take children to schools far from their home communities, part of a strategy to alienate them from their families and familiar surroundings. In 1920, under the Indian Act, it became mandatory for every Indian child to attend a residential school and illegal for them to attend any other educational institution.1

Male students in the assembly hall of the Alberni Indian Residential School, 1960s. United Church Archives, Toronto, from Mission to Partnership Collection.

Female students in the assembly hall of the Alberni Indian Residential School, 1960s. United Church Archives, Toronto, from Mission to Partnership Collection.

Living conditions at the residential schools

The purpose of the residential schools was to eliminate all aspects of Aboriginal culture. Students had their hair cut short, they were dressed in uniforms, and their days were strictly regimented by timetables. Boys and girls were kept separate, and even siblings rarely interacted, further weakening family ties.2  Chief Bobby Joseph of the Indian Residential School Survivors Society recalls that he had no idea how to interact with girls and never even got to know his own sister “beyond a mere wave in the dining room.”3  In addition, students were strictly forbidden to speak their languages—even though many children knew no other—or to practise Aboriginal customs or traditions. Violations of these rules were severely punished.

Residential school students did not receive the same education as the general population in the public school system, and the schools were sorely underfunded. Teachings focused primarily on practical skills. Girls were primed for domestic service and taught to do laundry, sew, cook, and clean. Boys were taught carpentry, tinsmithing, and farming. Many students attended class part-time and worked for the school the rest of the time: girls did the housekeeping; boys, general maintenance and agriculture. This work, which was involuntary and unpaid, was presented as practical training for the students, but many of the residential schools could not run without it. With so little time spent in class, most students had only reached grade five by the time they were 18. At this point, students were sent away. Many were discouraged from pursuing further education.

Abuse at the schools was widespread: emotional and psychological abuse was constant, physical abuse was meted out as punishment, and sexual abuse was also common. Survivors recall being beaten and strapped; some students were shackled to their beds; some had needles shoved in their tongues for speaking their native languages.4  These abuses, along with overcrowding, poor sanitation, and severely inadequate food and health care, resulted in a shockingly high death toll. In 1907, government medical inspector P.H. Bryce reported that 24 percent of previously healthy Aboriginal children across Canada were dying in residential schools.5  This figure does not include children who died at home, where they were frequently sent when critically ill. Bryce reported that anywhere from 47 percent (on the Peigan Reserve in Alberta) to 75 percent (from File Hills Boarding School in Saskatchewan) of students discharged from residential schools died shortly after returning home.6

In addition to unhealthy conditions and corporal punishment, children were frequently assaulted, raped, or threatened by staff or other students. During the 2005 sentencing of Arthur Plint, a dorm supervisor at the Port Alberni Indian Residential School convicted of 16 counts of indecent assault, B.C. Supreme Court Justice Douglas Hogarth called Plint a “sexual terrorist.” Hogarth stated, “As far as the victims were concerned, the Indian residential school system was nothing more than institutionalized pedophilia.”7

The extent to which Department of Indian Affairs and church officials knew of these abuses has been debated. However, the Royal Commission of Aboriginal Peoples and Dr John Milloy, among others, concluded that church and state officials were fully aware of the abuses and tragedies at the schools. Some inspectors and officials at the time expressed alarm at the horrifying death rates, yet those who spoke out and called for reform were generally met with silence and lack of support.8  The Department of Indian Affairs would promise to improve the schools, but the deplorable conditions persisted.9

Some former students have fond memories of their time at residential schools, and certainly some of the priests and nuns who ran the schools treated the students as best they could given the circumstances. But even these “good” experiences occurred within a system aimed at destroying Aboriginal cultures and assimilating Aboriginal students.

The shift away from the residential school system

“Sister Marie Baptiste had a supply of sticks as long and thick as pool cues. When she heard me speak my language, she’d lift up her hands and bring the stick down on me. I’ve still got bumps and scars on my hands. I have to wear special gloves because the cold weather really hurts my hands. I tried very hard not to cry when I was being beaten and I can still just turn off my feelings…. And I’m lucky. Many of the men my age, they either didn’t make it, committed suicide or died violent deaths, or alcohol got them. And it wasn’t just my generation. My grandmother, who’s in her late nineties, to this day it’s too painful for her to talk about what happened to her at the school.”

– Musqueam Nation former chief George Guerin,
Kuper Island school
Stolen from our Embrace
, p 62

European officials of the 19th century believed that Aboriginal societies were dying out and that the only hope for Aboriginal people was to convert them to Christianity, do away with their cultures, and turn them into “civilized” British subjects—in short, assimilate them. By the 1950s, it was clear that assimilation was not working. Aboriginal cultures survived, despite all the efforts to destroy them and despite all the damage done. The devastating effects of the residential schools and the particular needs and life experiences of Aboriginal students were becoming more widely recognized.10 The government also acknowledged that removing children from their families was severely detrimental to the health of the individuals and the communities involved. In 1951, with the amendments to the Indian Act, the half-day work/school system was abandoned.11

The government decided to allow Aboriginal children to live with their families whenever possible, and the schools began hiring more qualified staff.12 In 1969, the Department of Indian Affairs took exclusive control of the system, marking an end to church involvement. Yet the schools remained underfunded and abuse continued.13 Many teachers were still very much unqualified; in fact, some had not graduated high school themselves.14

In the meantime, the government decided to phase out segregation and begin incorporating Aboriginal students into public schools. Although these changes saw students reaching higher levels of education, problems persisted. Many Aboriginal students struggled in their adjustment to public school and to a Eurocentric system in which Aboriginal students faced discrimination by their non-Aboriginal peers. Post-secondary education was still considered out of reach for Aboriginal students, and those students who wanted to attend university were frequently discouraged from doing so.15

The process to phase out the residential school system and other assimilation tactics was slow and not without reversals. In the 1960s, the system’s closure gave way to the “Sixties Scoop,” during which thousands of Aboriginal children were “apprehended” by social services and removed from their families. The “Scoop” spanned roughly the two decades it took to phase out the residential schools, but child apprehensions from Aboriginal families continue to occur in disproportionate numbers. In part, this is the legacy of compromised families and communities left by the residential schools.

The last residential school did not close its doors until 1986.16

Long-term impacts

It is clear that the schools have been, arguably, the most damaging of the many elements of Canada’s colonization of this land’s original peoples and, as their consequences still affect the lives of Aboriginal people today, they remain so.

—John S. Milloy, A National Crime

The residential school system is viewed by much of the Canadian public as part of a distant past, disassociated from today’s events. In many ways, this is a misconception. The last residential school did not close its doors until 1986. Many of the leaders, teachers, parents, and grandparents of today’s Aboriginal communities are residential school survivors. There is, in addition, an intergenerational effect: many descendents of residential school survivors share the same burdens as their ancestors even if they did not attend the schools themselves. These include transmitted personal trauma and compromised family systems, as well as the loss in Aboriginal communities of language, culture, and the teaching of tradition from one generation to another.

According to the Manitoba Justice Institute, residential schools laid the foundation for the epidemic we see today of domestic abuse and violence against Aboriginal women and children.17 Generations of children have grown up without a nurturing family life. As adults, many of them lack adequate parenting skills and, having only experienced abuse, in turn abuse their children and family members. The high incidence of domestic violence among Aboriginal families results in many broken homes, perpetuating the cycle of abuse and dysfunction over generations.

Many observers have argued that the sense of worthlessness that was instilled in students by the residential school system contributed to extremely low self-esteem. This has manifested itself in self-abuse, resulting in high rates of alcoholism, substance abuse, and suicide. Among First Nations people aged 10 to 44, suicide and self-inflicted injury is the number one cause of death, responsible for almost 40 percent of mortalities.18 First Nations women attempt suicide eight times more often than other Canadian women, and First Nations men attempt suicide five times more often than other Canadian men.19 Some communities experience what have been called suicide epidemics.

Many Aboriginal children have grown up feeling that they do not belong in “either world”: they are neither truly Aboriginal nor part of the dominant society. They struggle to fit in but face discrimination from both societies, which makes it difficult to obtain education and skills. The result is poverty for many Aboriginal people. In addition, the residential schools and other negative experiences with state-sponsored education have fostered mistrust of education in general, making it difficult for Aboriginal communities and individuals to break the cycle of poverty.

In the 1980s, residential school survivors began to take the government and churches to court, suing them for damages resulting from the residential school experience. In 1988, eight former students of St. George’s Indian Residential School in Lytton, B.C., sued a priest, the government, and the Anglican Church of Canada in Mowatt v. Clarke. Both the Anglican Church and the government admitted fault and agreed to a settlement. Another successful case followed in 1990, made by eight survivors from St. Joseph’s school, in Williams Lake, against the Catholic Church and the federal government.20

The court cases continued, and in 1995, thirty survivors from the Alberni Indian Residential School filed charges against Arthur Plint, a dorm supervisor who had sexually abused children under his care. In addition to convicting Plint, the court held the federal government and the United Church responsible for the wrongs committed.

The Anglican Church publicly apologized for its role in the residential school system in 1993, the Presbyterian Church in 1994, and the United Church in 1998. Most recently, in April 2009, Assembly of First Nations leader Phil Fontaine accepted an invitation from Pope Benedict XVI and travelled to Vatican City with the goal of obtaining an apology from the Catholic Church for its role in the residential school system. After the meeting, the Vatican issued a press release stating that “the Holy Father expressed his sorrow at the anguish caused by the deplorable conduct of some members of the Church and he offered his sympathy and prayerful solidarity.”21

Truth and Reconciliation Commissions

Truth and Reconciliation Commissions are used around the world in situations where countries want to reconcile and resolve policies or practices, typically of the state, that have left legacies of harm. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission is a non-adversarial way to allow residential school survivors to share their stories and experiences and, according to the Department of Indian Affairs, will “facilitate reconciliation among former students, their families, their communities and all Canadians” for “a collective journey toward a more unified Canada.

Meanwhile, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples had been interviewing Indigenous people across Canada about their experiences. The commission’s report, published in 1996, brought unprecedented attention to the residential school system—many non-Aboriginal Canadians did not know about this chapter in Canadian history. In 1998, based on the commission’s recommendations and in light of the court cases, the Canadian government publicly apologized to former students for the physical and sexual abuse they suffered in the residential schools. The Aboriginal Healing Fund was established as a $350 million government plan to aid communities affected by the residential schools. However, some Aboriginal people felt the government apology did not go far enough, since it addressed only the effects of physical and sexual abuse and not other damages caused by the residential school system.

In 2005, the Assembly of First Nations launched a class action lawsuit against the Canadian government for the long-lasting harm inflicted by the residential school system. In 2006, the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement was reached by the parties in conflict and became the largest class action settlement in Canadian history.22 In September 2007, the federal government and the churches involved agreed to pay individual and collective compensation to residential school survivors. The government also pledged to create measures and support for healing and to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

The Indian Residential School Survivors Society was formed in 1994 by the First Nations Summit in British Columbia and was officially incorporated in 2002 to provide support for survivors and communities in the province throughout the healing process and to educate the broader public. The Survivors Society provides crisis counselling, referrals, and healing initiatives, as well as acting as a resource for information, research, training, and workshops.23 It was clear that a similar organization was needed at the national level, and in 2005, the National Residential School Survivors Society was incorporated.24

Official government apology

I have just one last thing to say. To all of the leaders of the Liberals, the Bloc and NDP, thank you, as well, for your words because now it is about our responsibilities today, the decisions that we make today and how they will affect seven generations from now.

My ancestors did the same seven generations ago and they tried hard to fight against you because they knew what was happening. They knew what was coming, but we have had so much impact from colonization and that is what we are dealing with today.

Women have taken the brunt of it all.

Thank you for the opportunity to be here at this moment in time to talk about those realities that we are dealing with today.

What is it that this government is going to do in the future to help our people? Because we are dealing with major human rights violations that have occurred to many generations: my language, my culture and my spirituality. I know that I want to transfer those to my children and my grandchildren, and their children, and so on.

What is going to be provided? That is my question. I know that is the question from all of us. That is what we would like to continue to work on, in partnership.

Nia:wen. Thank you.

—Beverley Jacobs, President, Native Women’s Association of Canada, June 11, 2008

Read the full transcript and watch the video here.

We feel that the acceptability of the apology is very much a personal decision of residential school survivors. The Nisga’a Nation will consider the sincerity of the Prime Minister’s apology on the basis of the policies and actions of the government in the days and years to come. Only history will determine the degree of its sincerity.

—Kevin McKay, Chair of the Nisga’a Lisims Government, June 12, 2008

In September 2007, while the Settlement Agreement was being put into action, the Liberal government made a motion to issue a formal apology. The motion passed unanimously. On June 11, 2008, the House of Commons gathered in a solemn ceremony to publicly apologize for the government’s involvement in the residential school system and to acknowledge the widespread impact this system has had among Aboriginal peoples. You can read the official statement and responses to it by Aboriginal organizations here. The apology was broadcast live across Canada (watch it here).

The federal government’s apology was met with a range of responses. Some people felt that it marked a new era of positive federal government–Aboriginal relations based on mutual respect, while others felt that the apology was merely symbolic and doubted that it would change the government’s relationship with Aboriginal peoples.

Although the apologies and acknowledgements made by governments and churches are important steps forward in the healing process, Aboriginal leaders have said that such gestures are not enough without supportive action. Communities and residential school survivor societies are undertaking healing initiatives, both traditional and non-traditional, and providing opportunities for survivors to talk about their experiences and move forward to heal and to create a positive future for themselves, their families, and their communities.

We are on the threshold of a new beginning where we are in control of our own destinies. We must be careful and listen to the voices that have been silenced by fear and isolation. We must be careful not to repeat the patterns or create the oppressive system of the residential schools. We must build an understanding of what happened to those generations that came before us.

— Wayne Christian, Behind Closed Doors: Stories from the Kamloops Indian Residential School, 2000

By Erin Hanson

The Residential School System

專訪社會學家潘毅:離不開蘋果的我們,可以為富士康工人做什麼?

「之前有六七年主要都在北京。回到香港,發現原先的學生堅持把SACOM(大學師生監察無良企業行動)做了下來,我有點被學生感動到」,談及「回到香港」的感受,常年關注勞工問題的香港大學社會學系教授潘毅這樣說。

採訪時,潘毅剛看完蘋果新產品發布會:「還是老樣子,賣手機功能,多薄,科技多進步。我希望標榜自己是進步的高科技公司能重視一點環境保護、勞工、性別權益這些基本的東西。」

2010年,以代工蘋果產品聞名的台資富士康深圳工廠,發生全社會嘩然的工人連環跳樓事件。當時任職香港理工大學應用社會科學系的潘毅,組織起學生、同事,調研富士康工廠,發布了長達七萬字的調查報告,批判富士康用工中存在的種種不公。

1998年,潘毅從倫敦大學亞非學院博士畢業。2005年,她以博士論文《中國女工》獲得米爾斯獎(C. Wright Mills Award)——美國社會研究的大獎之一。然而回看這本成名作,潘毅並不滿意:「《中國女工》跟我現在的書寫風格差很遠。」

《中國女工》探討的更多是社會理論,而她其後的書寫,更多是分析、調研。2011年,潘毅和其他學者合作出版研究中國農民工的《大工地》,2015年則將富士康工人的故事寫入《蘋果背後的生與死》。她覺得這些寫作有點「土」,背後都是幾十頁上百頁紙的報告。

「都是非常令人苦惱的19世紀工匠作風」,潘毅說。

潘毅欣喜於學生一代採用的新媒體技術。但她也直言這些年「大環境不好」,推動關注勞工權益的運動「缺少資源」。

過去幾年,潘毅的主要精力,都在中國四處調研、走訪。回到香港,她有些失望:「小部分的學生仍然關心香港基層、底層問題,也關心國內的底層,但是這個數量越來越減少,這樣下去對推動整個社會發展沒有好處。本來兩邊力量都很弱,應該互相支持才對。」

但她認為自己也沒法批評他們:「我沒有努力過,沒有去跟香港普通學生做工作,沒有努力去做教育。」

訪談

端=端傳媒, 潘=潘毅

端:你從最開始研究深圳工廠中的女工,到跟進富士康的連環跳樓事件,你覺得這些年中國工人的勞動條件和權益變化如何?

潘:我們整個研究隊伍從2010年到現在持續關注富士康,我只能說,從客觀條件來講,基於大家的努力和社會上的運動壓力,某一方面是有改善的。2010年工人連環跳之後,富士康從2011年開始加工資,加到2014年,但2015年之後,底薪已經三年沒有加了,一直停到現在。我們有十幾個工友的案例,他們在富士康打工超過十年。2014年時,如果他們加班加點,可以拿到三千多;如果他週六週日都加,可以拿到四千塊錢。現在的問題反而是,他們加班沒有以前那麼多。這是由於整個全球經濟已經開始下滑。淡季時,他們的工資可以跌到兩千塊錢。

我們的勞動者製做蘋果這麼高價值的產品,卻需要靠加班才能拿到能過活的工資。蘋果非常驕傲自己是做高科技的、高端的、影響人類未來的產品,一秒之內就能把整個世界連接在一起。可它一點都不重視背後是誰在幫它製造iPhone。這些勞動者一個月白班一個月晚班,很消耗身體;還有很多是離鄉別井,沒有家庭生活的。所以蘋果這麼強調人的連接,可事實上幫它製造iPhone的工人,連基本的生活水平都沒能夠達到。這不單是工資的問題,還有生活狀態的問題。

其實蘋果是有能力來處理這些問題的,其他的公司、企業可以說利潤率太薄了,邊際利潤太低,我們提出這些要求它們是達不到的,可是蘋果恰恰不是。蘋果基本上已經是世界五百強中每一年都能排前五名的,一部蘋果手機五六千塊錢,蘋果最少拿40%,工人才拿2.2%或者2.5%,根本達不到3%,所以它是根本有條件可以提高的。

端:蘋果跟其他生產手機、電子設備的企業相比,這方面有區別嗎?

潘:有的,像之前的諾基亞,一早就有CSR,就是企業社會責任部門。它們查廠查得比較認真,加班加點盡量少一點,還會照顧到宿舍裏面有沒有熱水可以喝之類很小的細節。可是蘋果很晚才成立CSR,要到了自殺事件後,很多報告出來之後才成立。

很多品牌是被「打」過的,它們已經有這些經驗,比如Nike,因為整個消費者運動在1990年代後期就是在不斷打Nike,所以它們就知道,到第三世界採購時,要有CSR跟着走。可是蘋果一開始就把整個精力全部拿去開發產品和形象,根本不照顧這一塊。到後來「被打」,才會知道說原來消費者對這一塊是有要求的。

2010年5月26日,富士康跳樓死亡的員工家屬在深圳廠房外陳情,要求賠償及找尋死因。
2010年5月26日,富士康跳樓死亡的員工家屬在深圳廠房外陳情,要求賠償及找尋死因。攝:In Pictures Ltd./Corbis via Getty Images

端:連環跳樓之後,富士康有照顧工人的心理狀況嗎?

潘:它們搞了個排查,就是工人面試的時候,會有一個心理測試。

端:是請了專業機構?

潘:對,然後它們內部還會有關愛中心,有點像社工服務機構,但它們一旦發現了問題,就馬上讓工人的父母勸工人辭職離開。就是說,它們不是發現你的工作壓力太大,有適應問題,通過關愛中心讓你一步步適應下去,而是勸退工人,告訴工人的父母「生命是很寶貴的」,把他們的孩子帶走。

2010年自殺高峰期的時候,富士康就請了大量的心理專家,安排每一條生產線去見心理諮詢師,一組二三十個人見吧,每個人都會講話,問問題。如果發現某個工人的態度不夠好,或者講話有點情緒,諮詢師就馬上把他講的東西記錄下來,評估他們自殺的可能性,可能性最高的就會被勸回去。

後來不會說老是排查,因為不可能讓所有工人每次都見諮詢師,所以就安排在面試時,問很多問題,測試他們反應,發現工人會有點波動時,就不會要他,把他篩走。廠裏面呢?有兩個機構來處理這些問題,一個是關愛中心,一個是工會組織。

關愛中心是所謂的專業輔導,如果你有什麼投訴,比如說你對你生產線的線長有什麼不滿,發現工傷這個賠償不到位,打電話去投訴,中心會約見你。這裏的問題是什麼呢?就是它會把這些意見返回你的生產線的線長,本來你就是對你的生產線有意見,你在投訴你的生產線管理不公平,結果關愛中心把這些資訊轉回去,管理層就會知道說這個工友是在背後捅他。

端:就是說工人在面對諮詢師時,表達的對管理層的意見,會傳遞到管理層那裏去?

潘:是馬上記錄進來。它們有一個非常快速的電腦系統,會蒐集所有資訊,然後返回生產線上面,你在關愛中心講的每一句話都會被記錄,然後返回去。

端:所以有些工友會以為他們可以向諮詢師說真心話,但其實關愛中心不是對工人個體負責,而是對整條生產線和富士康負責?

潘:是,都是為了它們的管理和效率,可是它們是以關愛中心的名義出現。

另外一塊就是工會。我們寫了很多報告,然後給壓力蘋果、富士康,其中一個要求就是應該按中國的工會法來組建、選舉工會。富士康一直反對建立工會,一直等到2007年底,工會才建立起來;工會主席呢?這麼多年還是同一個人。

端:所以你認為富士康的工會是沒有什麼進展的?

潘:沒有的。自殺的事情,太多人關注,所以當時富士康答應媒體會按照中國的工會法律規定組建工會。我們追蹤了整個工會的發展史,做了兩次普查,發現現在比前幾年更退步了。富士康對外講它們的工會入會率已經超過90%,我們的問卷結果則是不到10%的人在工會裏。現在問題就是,整個工會都是虛假的,表面說我們真的會選工會主席,可事實上就是在生產線上面派信得過的管理層,走一個非常虛假的程序選上去,全部都是不規範的。我們訪談裏面有小部分工友有工會意識,他們跑去要求說我現在要登記,想參與選舉。富士康的工會就告訴他們,你們不需要,你們一進來就自動是工會會員了。有個工友說那我想要參與選舉啊,工會就說你以為你是誰啊,你以為隨便就可以選嗎?

所以說,在工會的問題上,消費者需要讓蘋果去履行責任,讓富士康跟中國政府把工會體制搞好。這種壓力,我們還是可以給出來的。

機械化、全球布局與產業轉移

端:富士康的管理層,以前是台灣人在上層,中層和下層是中國大陸的人,現在有分別嗎?

潘:沒有分別。因為整個資本的結構還是台灣的結構,它不可能相信中國的管理階層可以爬得太高。

端:這幾年新聞中,我們反覆看到富士康有很多大項目,比如說要用機器替代工人,在東南亞和包括像印度布局新的工廠,甚至在美國又有一筆投資。這些對中國勞工來說,意味着什麼?

潘:其實從自殺事件之後,富士康就一直講要高度機械化,要大量使用機器人,當時郭台銘也講過,到2014年,他會用100萬台機器人,可是到了2015年,才用了5萬台。我們整個研究下來,認為他還是雷聲大雨點小。

為什麼機器人沒有對外講得那麼多呢?還是因為蘋果的手機換代率太快,這不像我們做汽車,汽車其實是粗製造的作業,你就可以用機器人。可是到手機製作,裏面全都是很精細的,所以主體的勞動者其實還是人。而且手機模板也要換得很快,換一個模板要很高的成本,蘋果的換代率太快,所以造成它沒法用機器去代替工人。其實說機器換人就是威脅中國工人嘛——你們不要要求太高,不要老是鬧情緒、鬧自殺,如果這樣的話我就用機器人把你們所有的人都換掉。去年富士康主動接觸了BBC,說它們的崑山工廠已經高度機械化了,工人從11萬人減到了5萬人,這是它們到現在能講出來的最大影響。

我的理解是,中國工人以後會受很大的影響,因為大部分操作性的東西,用機器人是真的可以取代的。我的看法是在資本主義生產關係下,機器人的出現是必然的。第二是一定會傷害到我們勞動者的權益,而勞動者有沒有工作、能不能養活自己這件事,是與資本無關的。資本是不會考慮這件事情的。工人有沒有活幹,會不會被裁員,與資本的邏輯是無關的。只能是說我們調整了生產關係,進入到社會主義的關係下,使用機器人才是釋放勞動力出來。

近年富士康在中國的工人,已從高峰期接近一百二十萬,跌到現在一百萬左右。圖為2010年5月19日,深圳觀瀾富士康大水坑三村去上班的員工。
近年富士康在中國的工人,已從高峰期接近一百二十萬,跌到現在一百萬左右。圖為2010年5月19日,深圳觀瀾富士康大水坑三村去上班的員工。攝:Imagine China

端:工人對機械化的判斷和反應是什麼樣的呢?

潘:富士康裏面碰到的工友對這方面感觸不深。反而東莞的工人,因為東莞政府搞了一個全面機械化的政策,還貸款給願意機械化的工廠,所以那些製作冰箱之類家電的企業直接就使用機器人了。電器不是蘋果產品,做工沒有那麼精細,所以有條件使用機器人。你東莞政府還給錢我,我為什麼不用呢?不用白不用。所以那些企業就會把工人裁出去,工人馬上受到衝擊,那些工人就會知道說,原來那些機器人對我的影響是可以很大的。可是工人也有兩極化,企業還是留下了小部分技工來操作這些機器人,而且把工資加上去,讓這些人分化,這是工人階級裏面小部分的精英,這些人是會維護使用機器人的。因為他們的工資加了,辛苦度也減少了。可是在富士康裏面,這個問題不嚴重。

端:那麼富士康的全球布局呢?對產業勞工影響大嗎?

潘:富士康在中國的工人,從高峰期接近120萬,跌到現在100萬左右,所以還是會有影響。可是這個影響不大,因為海外的工廠每個地方人都不多,比如說東歐,它們在匈牙利的一個工廠,也就是三五千人,沒辦法跟在中國的工廠比。又比如說印度,富士康總是講要在印度使用四萬人,但他們現在也就是上幾千人而已。它說要去美國,也就是創造三千多個職位,這些都是以千作為單位。而在中國,一個龍華富士康就有20萬人。鄭州現在更大,有二十幾萬。

世界布局在我理解中,生產方面不是重點,而是需要銷售網絡,需要接近它們的市場,比如人口也很龐大的印度,上層階級也會買蘋果手機。而富士康也不僅僅生產蘋果,還生產諸如小米這樣廉價的手機,所以也需要布局到東南亞。

端:那麼,富士康在中國的產業轉移對工人影響如何呢?比如說深圳富士康佔的比例已經下降了,富士康又把工廠轉移到河南,轉移到其他地方。

潘:其實中國的工人都希望能跑到沿海地區來工作,富士康往內地轉移,不是因為沿海招不到工人,而是因為廉價。

往內地去,最低工資低、勞動成本低。這種遷移對工人最主要的影響是什麼呢?我舉一個例子,比如說它要從深圳把一個專門生產蘋果的「單位」轉移去武漢,武漢的最低工資比深圳的低,想留在深圳的工人就由於企業生產的要求,硬性被派去了武漢。如果你不願意去,可能就面臨被裁員。結果工人的工資低了,可是做的工作內容一模一樣,時間也一樣,結果我一個月下來工資少了五六百。武漢工人就爬到工廠最高的一層威脅集體跳樓,逼得武漢市市長出來調停,才加了一點工資。

端:很多人說工廠遷移到內地,工人上班的地點就近了。

潘:對,富士康一直在講嘛,就轉到西部、內地,是為了照顧工人,可以讓他們更多回家,過上家庭生活。其實經過研究,這根本就是沒有用的,因為工廠跟工人家的距離,起碼也要坐兩三個小時車才能到。那假如工人週末回家呢?單程三個小時一趟,再回來一共六個小時,其實一年也只能回去兩、三趟,還是照顧不了他們的家庭生活的。然而工人的工資還比以前低了。

端:這種情況下,工人還會繼續留在工廠裏嗎?他們會離開嗎?

潘:從1988年到現在,差不多30年了,我們還真的能找到在富士康工作超過10年的工友的,可是大部分,大概90%以上的工人,都是在幹半年到一年後就走了。這一兩年,很多老工友其實都很不爽,不開心,想要轉走,但是因為經濟環境不好,他們就得停留在富士康長一點時間了。

另一點是,他們都是男工,年齡大了,又沒有其他的技術含量,想要跳也跳不走。你可以看看之前東莞裕元鞋廠,他們抗議中間有很多四十歲的女工。為什麼有那麼多四十歲的女工呢?因為鞋廠裏面有很多化學工序,對身體健康不好,年輕工人呆不住,可是當你已經三十多歲,走不掉,一直待在工廠裏面,還沒有社保,就得反抗了。富士康現在沒有說面臨所有工友都是四十來歲,像裕元一樣要去爭取社保要去罷工,還沒到那一步,可是你也能看到年齡偏向兩極化。

所以富士康也不斷在用「實習生」的方式招工,從職業學校直接拉人過來,以實習生的名義進工廠。一批一批地招,節省他們的成本。

三十年來,90%以上的富士康工人都是幹半年到一年就走,所以富士康也不斷用「實習生」的方式招工,從職業學校直接拉人過來,以實習生的名義進工廠。從職業學校招工的好處是一批一批地招,成本大大減少了。2010年10月16日,深圳龍華鎮富士康工業園區基層員工頒獎典禮。
三十年來,90%以上的富士康工人都是幹半年到一年就走,所以富士康也不斷用「實習生」的方式招工,從職業學校直接拉人過來,以實習生的名義進工廠。從職業學校招工的好處是一批一批地招,成本大大減少了。2010年10月16日,深圳龍華鎮富士康工業園區基層員工頒獎典禮。攝:China Photos/Getty Images

「我比較注重實踐,比較落地推動運動」

端:蘋果剛剛發布了最新的iPhone,作為一般消費者,很多人都覺得自己其實離不開蘋果的產品,但又發現它生產過程有那麼多勞工問題,這種心態該怎麼面對?

潘:其實外面的消費者真的還不是很清楚蘋果背後的這些勞動條件,富士康的自殺問題很嚴重,當時我們所有人都在關注,可是外面不是。我出去開會的時候還經常碰到有人說,原來富士康是這種情況!就等於說西方的消費者是不清楚的。像新的iPhone,同時發布好幾個版本,這就意味着更重的工人勞動,這些是需要更多人去關注的。

端:亞洲的消費者會比西方的消費者更清楚嗎?

潘:對。亞洲佔蘋果的整個市場已經超過35%,所以雖然說我們是離不開蘋果了,但蘋果也恰恰離不開我們了。我們消費者的群體還不斷在開發,所以我們其實是有討價還價的力量的。我們是知道這些勞動條件的,所以只要我們願意發點聲音,要求蘋果,蘋果還是要來回應這些問題的。而且在蘋果的理解中,使用蘋果的都是高端人士,這些人士是領導社會走向未來的人,所以只要它的消費群體發聲,它還是有條件去改善的。

端:改善的意思是蘋果可以讓出更多的利潤給勞動者嗎?

潘:對,絕對有條件。今天其他行業都比較蕭條、衰退,蘋果也開始衰退一點點,可是它的衰退跟別人的不一樣,查一下蘋果的利潤率表,你還是會看到一個非常驚人的數量,所以說它其實是有能力拿出來重新再分配的。

端:有人會說。假如督促蘋果改善工人的條件,富士康之類的廠家就會遷到別的地方去了,這樣會造成工人失業,或者工廠就直接上機器人了,因為它們覺得用工人太貴了。

潘:是,一定會這樣講的。可是剛才我們也說了,它到外面布局,看似一個非常宏偉的構圖,但實際上是很小的。之前中國勞動法出台,當時的美國總商會在媒體上刊登廣告,說如果勞動法出台,我們作為美國資本,就帶頭撤資離開中國,過了三年之後,我們給這些美國資本做了一個調研,它們離開了嗎?其實它們要是能出去早就出去了,根本出不去才會留下來,中國的工人對它們來說是「好使好用」的。

端:我們談到消費者的責任。之前有篇文章提過歐洲的公平貿易手機。當時有人批判說,這些公平貿易,怎麼搞都是歐洲人玩的,無論發達國家怎麼樣強調環保啊、公平貿易啊,低端的東西仍然是會轉移到第三世界,轉移到中國,轉移到東南亞的。你會認同這種批判嗎?

潘:我理解中,這是對整個全球生產鏈的批判,這是肯定需要的。至於說公平貿易、公平手機的出現,其實還是一些好的嘗試,就算可能做不到位。比如公平手機這件事,它是希望把更多的利潤分配給勞動者,也就是中國工人,它們也希望說中國工人能真正有一個工會組織。後來為什麼還沒有做到位呢?因為公平手機的量太少,就是說支持者還不夠多,這是雞跟雞蛋的問題。比如在歐洲那邊,是先有上萬人購買,然後下訂單的時候才能要求生產線不是像蘋果富士康這種剝削性的,但如果你的量太少,就做不到。有人批評說這些公平貿易手機應推到亞洲來,但亞洲使用的軟件、語言全部都不一樣,需要開發成本。

我的理解是這樣的,它認為歐洲的消費者水平比較高,先支持好,然後才慢慢開拓出去。所以我們沒有必要太快來批評這件事情。

端:但還是會有很多人批判消費者運動,說中產階級靠消費來獲得社會責任。比如齊澤克就會批判這是一種「廉價的正義」,批判說人們通過消費來獲得道德感,但一時的好心是沒法解決資本主義的問題的。你怎麼看這種批判?

潘:這要看我們是站在哪裏講話。如果我必須要否定掉整個資本主義生產關係,我要否定掉整個新自由主義的話,那我當然認為這種消費者的良心運動是在粉刷太平。這個層面的批判,我個人是接受的。可是今天又沒有革命,今天想要推動工人具體權益的話,我們就必須考慮我從哪裏能入手,就真的讓中國工人拿多一點東西。我今天就得利用蘋果很關心的品牌形象,利用消費者給出壓力。當然另一方面,我們也可以說,工人會自己組織起來,會通過罷工提出自己要求,但那是工人自己的事情,我在講的是我們這些人能做什麼。

所以我還是比較注重實踐,比較「落地」來理解這個事情,如果我不落地推動運動,站在一個高度,那我的批評肯定會接近齊澤克的批評,可是我是落地的那個。

「學者跟社會連接,是需要時間的」

端:那麼對你來說,落地意味着什麼?比如作為學者,該如何落地呢?

潘:一個例子就是香港的SACOM(大學師生監察無良企業行動),它的貢獻還是比較大的,不斷給蘋果壓力,不斷號召社會。每一年他們都會去拉橫幅,去香港銅鑼灣最大的蘋果店舉牌,這些照片全部都會送到蘋果的總部去,也確實改善了一些情況。比如以前學生工進富士康,要不就沒有錢,要不就很少錢,也不會上合同,後來基本上都能夠拿到同工同酬了,跟普通工人拿的工資一樣。我們應該不讓它使用學生工,是吧,從高口號上面是這樣,可我們還是能逼到它當下去做一些具體的改善。

作為學者的話,我們知道,整個學術的規範,所謂的國際化,造成的一個惡果就是學術跟社會是分離的,學術是學術自己的系統,有學術的規範,我是在學術的內部裏面追尋我自己的知識跟學術的進步,它其實可以跟社會一點關聯都沒有。

今天香港和中國的學術,在我看來都是退步的。十年前,我們的氣氛會寬鬆一點,是沒有今天這麼管理主義的東西的。你要培養一個好學者,不可以太心急,你可以說你給了很多資源下去,但是我最終可能只有一兩個好的學者出來。當然也是需要平衡的,我也同意不可以完全都不理,任由學者自由發揮,雖然我是一個社會主義者,但也不至於說理想化到那個地步。但現在我覺得完全是一個不理性的制度了。管理主義推行得太過分、太極端了。

學者跟社會連接是需要時間的,還需要非常具體事件的背景。有背景的、有很特殊性的地方,你去到國際的雜誌上是沒辦法對話的。所以現在做政策研究的人少,其中一個原因就是因為政策研究符合不了管理主義的要求,出不了高端的學術論文。所以很多人就做理論,要想一個新的理論出來,去反駁,或者去豐富,變成在理論上不斷創新,但跟現實社會是沒有關係的。

2011年5月7日,香港大學師生監察無良企業行動(SACOM)發起請願,指控蘋果及其代工廠富士康為血汗工廠,示威者戴上喬布斯面具在香港的蘋果專門店抗議。
2011年5月7日,香港大學師生監察無良企業行動(SACOM)發起請願,指控蘋果及其代工廠富士康為血汗工廠,示威者戴上喬布斯(賈伯斯)面具在香港的蘋果專門店抗議。攝: Antony Dickson /AFP/Getty Images

端:其實很多人這些年對你有些批評,說潘老師在理論上沒有創新。

潘:中國的這些問題有新東西嗎?一般來說,學者是不會犧牲時間去做我做的那些東西的,因為那些東西會消耗大量精力,是不斷在處理實際問題。比如勞動者的工傷問題,比如勞動者沒有勞動合同的問題,比如富士康裏面工資的提高問題,這些問題是很具體的。

我們的工作,大部分是學生參與的,今天的學術發表要算到個人頭上,所以它不鼓勵集體合作。其實如果我轉變精力不再去推動社會改革,我也會很快變成個體,你要我在理論上有貢獻的話,一兩個人就夠了。我覺得這是一個選擇,究竟你要選擇要做什麼,做什麼事更加有價值更加有意義。

所以當我們轉過理念來說,我希望學術生產或知識生產是在為更大的社會服務——不管是為女工、為環保或為了其他東西的時候,你就一定會慢慢落地的。而你希望說學術、研究做出來還能促進改變的時候,那就更落地一步了,因為每一個改變都很具體嘛,每一個改變都是只能在現有的條件底下一步步往前走的。所以這樣就不容易出現太空太虛的東西。對我來講,太空太虛表面上很激進,事實上我一眼就看得出來這個人還沒落地,還在空中飛。齊澤克那個問題就是個很好的例子。

有些人認為說我們之前要求說建築工人必須有勞動合同是「改良主義」,說潘老師訴求那麼低,一點都不革命,一點都不進步。可是對建築工人來說,他要組織起來,就必須是一步一步的。你必須要給他一個合法的論述和給他一套能組織起來的東西。

端:對改良主義的批評似乎是說,你幫工人在現有體制下爭取了權益,工人就會沒有革命性了,就可能安逸於個人生活了,不去改變社會了,會有這種情況嗎?

潘:我沒有看到。比如說富士康的工人,他們是有勞動合同的,你會看到富士康的工人今天就沒有抱怨嗎?富士康工人今天就不想組織起來嗎?因為主要的矛盾還是生產關係裏面的矛盾,是一個階級矛盾,這個階級矛盾不會因為有一個勞動合同和沒有一個勞動合同就取消掉的。

潘毅與其他學者的「富士康用工環境和勞工問題」的調研團隊。整個調研歷時近2年,參與成員近百人,其中近20人潛伏進廠,覆蓋富士康在中國大陸的19個廠區,共收集有效問卷2409份,採訪工人500多例,整理第一手採訪資料十萬餘字。
潘毅與其他學者的「富士康用工環境和勞工問題」的調研團隊。整個調研歷時近2年,參與成員近百人,其中近20人潛伏進廠,覆蓋富士康在中國大陸的19個廠區,共收集有效問卷2409份,採訪工人500多例,整理第一手採訪資料十萬餘字。攝:林振東/端傳媒

端:今天有很多人在說中國的「社會主義遺產」,你這些年也寫過很多有關於此的文章。今天的中國政府似乎也在某些程度上「往回轉」,比如重新定義房地產在經濟中的位置。但另一方面,政府未必是從社會主義的角度出發的,它可能是為了維護社會穩定,或者說是為了維護政治安全。很多時候這些「遺產」跟諸如維護家庭、維護社會穩定的內容結合在一起。在這樣一個環境下,左翼可以怎麼樣去看待或者處理這些社會主義遺產?

潘:我的做法是盡量把這些跟底層,包括農民跟工人的具體權益連接在一起,比如說今天在中國還有100萬富士康工人,中國作為一個社會主義國家為什麼會讓工人淪落到這樣的一個地位?中國工人到底還是不是國家的主人翁?這種連接,我認為對整個具體的爭取工人權益運動是有幫助的。這幾年我還是一直在強調建築工人。6000萬到8000萬的建築工人,在社會主義年代這些建築工人都是有身份有地位有驕傲的,今天他們在哪裏?所以我會不斷地用社會主義的東西來對比,讓今天的政策制定者聽到,也讓工人自我組織起來的時候更有底氣。為什麼說底層有很多是相信毛澤東的呢?是因為毛的整套論述對他們是有用的,這個有用不是說一下子就想要造反, 還是在處理自己權益的問題。所以我的看法就是盡量跟具體的要求列在一起。

端:你之前有一次跟學者盧荻辯論,討論中國到底算不算是完全捲入了全球資本主義的邏輯。作為一個香港學者,你如何看待今天香港在全球政經體系中間的位置?

潘:我認為中國從來都沒有離開過全球的經濟體系,我是這樣理解的:當改革開放一開始,中國就已經嵌入到全球的資本主義經濟當中去了,到1990年代中後期變成世界工廠,對我來說,中國早就在資本主義的生產體系中,這是毋庸置疑的,我不知道為什麼眼前全世界都在用made in China 的產品時,這個問題還要拿出來辯論。當然雖然中國的產品在全世界流通,真正受益的還不是中國資本也不是中國老百姓。真正受益最大的還是跨國資本,因為所有這些都是跨國品牌。所以大部分份額還是被蘋果、UNIQLO大塊拿走了,小塊讓給中國的資本,利潤其實很低。但我並不認為說中國資本會比跨國資本更值得同情,或者更值得去保護,因為對我來講資本是沒有國界的,它在一個資本的邏輯裏面,這個所謂的種族概念是不是有效,對我來說是無效的。

所以今天中國資本在外面肯定是被跨國資本欺負,可是對我來講,我為什麼要站在中國資本的立場來講話,而不是站在中國工人的立場來講話呢?

至於香港也是一樣,中國資本代替了香港資本就覺得值得高興嗎?我是不會做這種事情的。對我來說,中國資本進來,把地價炒高。如果說中資進來之後房價真的低了,老百姓買得起房子了,那我也可以說多一句中國資本比以前香港資本以及再以前英國資本要好一些嘛。但現在的問題就是你沒有嘛,你反而進一步地抬高了地價,那我怎麼說你好話呢?我又應該站在哪一個立場說話呢?我不會在資本的立場上說話,資本對我來說是無國界的,就是說我沒有這樣的國族情結。

https://theinitium.com/article/20170915-opinion-foxconn/

罗马尼亚禁妇女堕胎 设“月经警察”监控

独裁与荒诞就像是一对孪生兄弟。有什么样的专制独裁,就会有什么样的荒诞事情发生。

在前罗马尼亚共产党总书记齐奥塞斯库所推行的政策中,最恐怖、最荒诞的要算他的禁止节育和人口增长政策。为了提高人口数量,增强国力,1966年齐奥塞斯库废除了以前关于个人可以自由流产的法律,实施了禁止堕胎的政策。他宣称,胎儿是社会的财富,不生育孩子的人就是背叛国家的人。他规定,禁止离婚,每对罗马尼亚夫妻至少要生四个孩子。紧接着,国家颁布法令,节育和堕胎都属违法,不能受孕的女性要交纳税金,堕胎者将受到判刑和囚禁,妇女月经期要受到严格地检查与盘问。

为保证政令畅通,依据齐奥塞斯库的指令,执法者纷纷进驻机关、工厂、农村、学校以及各个单位,对妇女进行严格的监控,督促她们每月必须做妇科检查,以确保没有使用避孕工具;对那些避孕的妇女和默许堕胎的医生一经查出,严厉打击、处罚监禁。罗马尼亚的老百姓把这些执法者鄙夷地称作“月经警察”。在恐怖的高压下,许多绝望的妇女铤而走险,试图偷渡多瑙河,到邻国匈牙利寻求庇护,但在边境线往往被当作叛国者,遭到罗马尼亚士兵用机关枪的扫射。

前罗马尼亚共产党总书记齐奥塞斯库(图右)

在这项政策实施一年之后,罗马尼亚的婴儿出生率翻了一番,成绩显赫。但地下流产与堕胎的服务也随之出现,怀孕妇女的死亡率不断上升。更让齐奥塞斯库感到闹心和棘手的是,随着婴儿的大量出生,妇产医院的设备、妇产专家、产科医师、儿科医师以及妇幼保健工作者严重缺乏,这可不是单靠行政命令就能马上解决的。仅仅一年中,罗马尼亚的婴儿死亡率就增长了百分之一百四十五点六。消息传出,全世界哗然,各国政要、媒体纷纷谴责:这简直就是“现代社会的滥杀无辜”。面对国内外政治压力,为掩盖这种愚蠢而可怕的后果,齐奥塞斯库下令,婴儿出生一个月以后,再发出生证。如此一来,那些在未满月中夭折的婴儿就不会填写在死亡婴儿的统计当中了。正如一位罗马尼亚作家指出:“很多婴儿从来没有合法地生存过。”这项政策的恶果,还不仅局限于此。在罗马尼亚的儿童养育院及收容所中,有许多被遗弃或身体及精神残疾的孩子,他们的生存状况更加令人震惊。

对于这一段荒诞而悲惨的历史,罗马尼亚年轻的电影导演克里斯蒂安·蒙久(CristianMungiu),在他执导的影片《四月三周两天》,通过两个女大学生一天中所遭遇的堕胎经历,把独裁专制统治对人性的摧残和压迫,以及在这样的环境下,人性的丑陋、冷漠、甚至是邪恶,表现得淋漓尽致。

这部影片讲述的故事发生在1987年的寒冬,此时距离柏林墙倒塌、齐奥塞斯库的独裁政权垮台还有两年。

影片一开始,女大学生奥蒂莉亚(Ottila)正在为同一宿舍的同学嘉碧塔(Gabita)秘密准备行李。奥蒂莉亚匆忙地奔波在简陋的宿舍楼和肮脏的穷街陋巷,向男友借钱,购买走私进口香烟、食品、香皂,预订饭店。所做这一切,就是因为嘉碧塔怀孕了,而且要赶在期末考试之前堕胎。

婴儿

在当时的罗马尼亚,流产和堕胎都是违法行为,且要根据流产者或堕胎者怀孕的时间决定刑期和监禁的长短。为了躲避处罚,她们找到了一个叫毕比(Bebe)的医生私自堕胎,一场噩梦就此开始。

奥蒂莉亚几经周折最终找到一家廉价的旅馆,但医生毕比借口手术费太低,不愿承担犯法坐牢的风险。为了能使嘉碧塔尽快手术,面对毕比医生“任何错误都要付出代价”的要挟,奥蒂莉亚不得不承受羞辱,与毕比做爱,嘉碧塔躲在门外饮泪而泣。

死婴从嘉碧塔体内排出,被包裹在一块白色的浴巾里,手掌般大小,略具人形,上面沾满鲜血和污秽。奥蒂莉亚久久地凝视着尸体,沉默不语。

由于害怕和紧张,奥蒂莉亚迟迟没有找到丢弃死婴尸体的地方。最后,她跌跌撞撞地冲进一个居民楼,慌乱地把装着尸体的书包塞进了楼道里的垃圾箱内。在仅有的一点光亮里,奥蒂莉亚静静地站在那个垃圾箱前,仿佛为自己心灵的失落、为自己所做的一切忏悔。

处理掉死婴的尸体,一切的恐惧与不安都结束了,两个女孩坐在旅馆的餐厅里,默默地等待她们的晚餐。不远处,是一场婚宴的欢闹场面。而这一天,正是嘉碧塔怀孕整整四月三周两天。

自1966年避孕与堕胎被齐奥塞斯库政权明令禁止以来,罗马尼亚人民便丧失了一种基本权利。当人们摆脱不了性爱的天性,为自己种下的爱情之果面临抉择时,他们所遇到竟是罪与非罪的选择。到底国家有没有权力操纵人伦意向?到底能不能强行为私生活立法?对于这些,齐奥塞斯库自有主张。他是党的最高领导,因而他的意志就代表了党的意志,任何人都必须服从。在他统治的国度中,“国王不仅要坐在国王的位置上,而且还要坐在上帝的位置上”。

婴儿

其实,禁止堕胎的法令并非只有罗马尼亚一家,但为什么其他国家并未出现像齐奥塞斯库政权下这样极端、这样缺乏人性的残忍?

1991年,爱尔兰一位十四岁的女孩子被她朋友的父亲强奸后怀孕。罪犯受到了法律的严惩,但无辜受害的女孩也陷入法律对她的伤害。因为,法院援引宪法中“国家承认尚未出生的婴儿生命权”的条文,阻止女孩进行流产。于是,这个事件使整个爱尔兰陷入了一场政治和宗教上的危机。三分之二的爱尔兰人,包括当初投票支持宪法的人,都对女孩的遭遇表示同情。最终,政府支付了诉讼费用,女孩获准可以到爱尔兰以外地区自由旅行,以妥协方式结束了这场危机。

爱尔兰的妥协与齐奥塞斯库的僵硬,充分体现出两种制度的截然不同。美国历史学家鲁道夫·J·鲁梅尔在他1994年出版的《因政府而死》一书中估算了一个数字:在二十世纪,单是种族杀戮的死难者就达一点七亿人。这一数字中几乎不含政治迫害和战争所造成的“正常”死难者人数,同样也不含该书出版后发生的种族杀戮死难者人数,比如在卢旺达或者巴尔干地区发生的种族杀戮死难者。在人类历史中,如此多的人死于暴政,在此前是亘古未有的。

在《通往奴役之路》这本书中,哈耶克认为,坏事不一定是坏人干的,而往往是一些“高尚的”理想主义者干的,特别是,那些极权主义暴行的原则是由一些可尊敬的和心地善良的学者们奠定基础的;“自由”常常在“自由”的名义下被取消,“理性”则是在把“理性”推到至高无上的地步被摧毁的。因此,一种合理的政治制度一定是适应人性的政治制度,而不是强迫改变人性的政治制度,如果一种政治制度是建立在改变人性的基础上,这样的政治制度不可避免地会带来暴力与恐怖。

二十世纪八十年代初,齐奥塞斯库颁布了《大罗马尼亚打字机法》。根据该法,每一个罗马尼亚的公民、企业、事业、机关、学校等单位,凡拥有打字机必须要得到警方的许可,领取使用执照;要成为打字员也必须照此办理,并且要将所打字的样品同时上报。如果打字机需要修理,其使用者及其打字机都需要更新执照。任何继承打字机的罗马尼亚人,都必须将此上交政府当局,或寻求取得使用它的资格;如果不把打字机的键盘上交警方,即使损坏的打字机也不得私自处理,否则严加处罚。

罗马(rome)

自1965年齐奥塞斯库坐上罗共总书记这个职位后,便如钢梁上的铆钉——固定不动,一直到1989年被枪杀。除党的总书记外,他还担任罗马尼亚国务委员会主席、团结阵线主席、国防委员会主席、武装部队和爱国卫队总司令、经济社会发展最高委员会主席、罗马尼亚共和国总统,可谓至尊无上。据英国《经济学家》杂志统计,齐奥塞斯库家族成员在党政军界担任要职的不下三十人。其夫人埃列娜·齐奥塞斯库任罗共中央干部委员会主席,第一副总理,实际上是罗共二号人物;其兄马林·齐奥塞斯库,任国防部副部长兼罗军最高政委;其弟伊利埃·齐奥塞斯库和安德鲁察·齐奥塞斯库,分别任内务部干部培训中心主任和罗马尼亚驻奥地利使馆商务参赞;其妻弟格奥尔基·波特列斯库任全国工会主席;齐奥塞斯库的小儿子尼库·齐奥塞斯库任共青团中央第一书记

http://www.qw13.com/kaogufaxian/201805153343.html

论资本主义的“言论自由”

美国崇拜者们最喜欢吹捧的一点是:美国有言论自由。

真相是:美国只有在资本主义框架下进行忠诚反对的言论自由,或者更准确的说,这是所有被资本主义严重影响的国家的普遍状况。什么是忠诚反对呢?简单来说,你可以反对腐败的政客,可以反对种族歧视,可以支持LGBTQ,可以反对个体老板(实际上这也是要看情况的),可以批评资本主义导致的一些问题,但你就是不能去质疑资本主义本身,更不能去宣传资本主义的替代方案,例如社会民主主义。

哦,我知道很多人会不相信的,那么请看看事实吧:

注意,以下均是将google搜索语言设置为英文时得到的搜素结果,也就是英语系国家的人民(包括美国人民)搜索时得到的结果。

这是对free market(自由市场)的搜索结果数。

 

这是对democratic socialism(社会民主主义)的搜索结果数。

可以看到,free market的搜索结果数为153,000,000,而democratic socialism的搜索结果数为510,000,相差了将近三百倍!哦,解释一下为什么我不用free market capitalism 作为关键词:因为资本主义哈巴狗们在进行宣传时并不会直接说资本主义如何如何好,而是会说市场如何如何好,自由市场如何如何好之类的,反而是社会主义者为了批判资本主义会明确表述出capitalism。

然后我们再来看看实际搜索结果:

从搜索结果来看,其中大部分链接都是支持自由市场的,而少数批判文章也是在资本主义范围内进行的批判。而且可以看见的是,关于自由市场的论述的确很多,以至于翻了三页的结果都是以自由市场为核心的。事实上,再接下来翻几页,搜索结果也是以自由市场为核心的,我这里就不再截图了,有兴趣者可自行搜索。

接下来看看社会民主主义的搜索结果:

可以看到,这其中相当一部分是wiki链接,而且其内容是很不准确和误导性的,例如将社会民主主义和社会主义对立(Democratic socialism is not socialism that is democratic),还有相当一部分是问答网站链接,内容同样也是极为不准确和误导性的。

而其中搜索到的媒体链接,更是故意进行歪曲:例如The Path to Democratic Socialism: Lessons from Latin America,故意将缺乏民主的拉美右翼政权等同于社会民主主义;而这篇‘Yes, I’m Running as a Socialist.’ Why Candidates Are Embracing the Label in 2018,提到了DSA,但却故意将他们等同于凯恩斯主义者:“Many socialist candidates sound less like revolutionaries and more like traditional Democrats who seek a return to policies in the mold of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal. ”还有这篇:Bernie Is Not a Socialist and America Is Not Capitalist:Scandinavia is, by one measure, a freer market than the United States.(哈哈哈哈哈,瑞典政府可是控制房价严禁炒卖的,这一点上就远没美国自由,至于劳工保护和环境保护法律更是比美国严格得多,这篇文章胡扯北欧是自由市场,不过是想要为资本主义洗地而已。)Senator Sanders is not a proponent of socialism, and that is a good thing, for true socialism, whenever and wherever it has been tried, ended in disaster.(又是这种把苏联和中国这类国家资本主义极权等同于社会主义的屁话。)

同时,他们还故意把social democracy(社会民主)和凯恩斯主义混淆,实际上真正的social democracy就是democratic socialism,social democracy和资本主义的liberal democracy是相对的。

同时我们也能发现一点:那就是,如果要从主流媒体上看到自由市场,那是非常容易的,相关文章非常非常多;但如果想从主流媒体上看到不被歪曲的社会民主主义,哪怕只是这个词,都极为困难

至于社会主义的其他流派呢?

托派:

About 10,600,000 results,嗯,是自由市场搜索结果的不到十分之一,至少比社会民主主义强,但请注意:这是在知道了Trotskyism之后才搜索出的结果,而从搜索出的结果来看,相当一部分还是wiki,还有左派网站,而主流媒体上还是除了偶尔的误导和歪曲之外从来不去提及。当然,主流媒体更不会提及这些左派网站。

生态社会主义:

About 108.000 results,好吧,是社会民主主义的五分之一,更惨。同时也可以看到,相当一部分内容又是wiki,以及书籍链接,主流媒体又消失了。

马克思人道主义:

About 529.000 results,嗯,和社会民主主义接近。同时也可以看到,又是wiki和左派网站才会提到,主流媒体又没影了。

接下来比较一下右派和左派人物。首先要说明的是,由于英语系国家重名非常严重,所以单纯的搜索结果数没有比较意义了,因为重名的人都会被搜索到,只有搜索结果内容是有意义的,那么接下来开始比较:

弗里得曼:

可以看到,有不少主流媒体和知名网站都提到了弗里得曼。

Joseph M. Schwartz(社会民主主义者,DSA副主席):

可以看到,除了wiki和其所在大学的网页以及自媒体页面之外,没有其他任何页面提到他,主流媒体又一次失踪了。

哈耶克:

可以看到又有不少主流媒体和知名网站提到他。

David Schweickart(社会民主主义者,论述经济民主模式的书籍《after capitalism》的作者):

wiki,书籍链接,所在大学链接,除此之外又是什么也没有,主流媒体又消失了。

可以看到,资本主义下的主流媒体,对于社会主义主张和人物,在大多数时候都是根本不去提及,而如果提及则会故意歪曲抹黑。可想而知,大部分普通人根本就无从知道真正的社会主义主张,那么他们即使对资本主义再不满,也无法知道到底是什么造成了他们的不满,如何消除不满,再加上极右纳粹们故意挑动仇恨(极右纳粹们背后是有大金主的,很明显出的起巨款的只有那些政客们和财团老板们),他们就会把气撒到更弱势的移民和非白人以及穆斯林身上,从而陷入内斗中,而政客们和老板们则稳坐钓鱼台。

最后,知道占领华尔街运动中一个写了反大银行标语的抗争者面临什么吗?面临13年监禁,并且其律师被法庭禁止使用宪法第一修正案进行辩护:California man faces 13 years in jail for scribbling anti-bank messages in chalkOccupy Wall Street protester could face up to 13 years in jail, $13,000 fine for writing anti-bank messages in chalk

美国的民主制度已经被金钱严重腐蚀了,这是资本主义下必然会出现的状况,同时也是新自由主义泛滥四十年的恶果,而川普不过是新自由主义泛滥造成的恶果之一而已。

 

 

 

自由市场通往奴役之路

(写在前面:我发现很多人虽然认可社会主义的一些主张,但同时也不觉得右派主张的自由市场有什么问题,故此写一篇文章进行具体说明。同时,这也是我经历过的思考过程。)

看到这题目,很多人都会感到很奇怪吧?“自由市场通往奴役之路?怎么会呢?不是自由市场吗,怎么会和奴役扯上关系呢?”

请诸位先思考一个问题:在墙外,左派是那些反对自由市场,主张政府干预,支持福利国家,支持平权(女权和LGBTQ平权)的人,而右派则是那些支持自由市场,反对政府干预,反对福利国家,反对平权的人(部分进步右派支持平权,但很多右派都是反对平权的)。那么是不是发现了一个很奇怪的地方:支持自由市场和反对福利国家,是同一个逻辑,但为什么支持自由市场和反对平权也是经常搭配出现的?

如果是普通人,那么在没有深入思考的情况下,有些地方出现自相矛盾也不奇怪,但那些著名的学者政客们,例如为法西斯主义洗地的米塞斯,为种族隔离和右翼独裁者们洗地的哈耶克,邓坦克国师弗里得曼无视六四屠杀吹捧中国“自由”“繁荣”,撒切尔反对平权敌视同性恋者,新自由主义者普京大肆迫害俄国LGBTQ,美国政府支持的右翼独裁塞西政权比穆斯林兄弟会更残忍的抓捕同性恋者,以及众多极右垃圾纳粹喉舌一边鼓吹自由市场一边反对平权敌视民主,他们如此表现可没法用“没有深入思考”去解释啊。要知道社会主义者们都是支持平权的(毛派的本质是极右纳粹垃圾,他们不是社会主义者。)

再思考一个问题:芝加哥学派声称只有自由市场才能捍卫自由,否则就会开启通往奴役之路,但我已经在前面说了,芝加哥学派的代表人物全都为右翼独裁政权洗地,并公开敌视民主敌视独立工会(哈耶克直接在《通往奴役之路》中说民主不一定能保护自由,并认为独立工会会威胁自由),那么为什么他们又不认为独裁是奴役之路了?为什么为种族隔离洗地?为什么敌视民主,敌视反企业霸权的独立工会?

诸位,看到这里,我想很多人应该都能发现关键问题了:自由市场的定义到底是什么?自由市场中的自由是谁的自由?

自由市场的鼓吹者其实都漏掉(或者说故意漏掉)了一个关键前提:那就是,只有在资本主义之下,才存在自由市场,无论这个自由的含义是什么。而在社会主义之下,无论是进行计划经济(这里我要说明的是,今天的社会主义者大部分也不认可中央计划经济了,而是主张一种分散式的民主的计划经济。别误会,这可不是因为中央计划经济会导致极权独裁,而是因为中央计划经济本身不可行,实际操作必然会变成一锅粥。),还是进行民主政府控制下的基于经济民主的市场经济,都不可能是自由市场。

接下来我们来看看自由市场中的自由到底是谁的自由吧。首先,让我们来看看资本主义三要素:市场,雇佣劳动,对生产资料和资本的私人独裁占有。其中,二是三的结果。请注意,资本主义是一种经济制度而不是政治制度,所以雇佣劳动这一要素是不适用于政府人员的,也就是说,不能简单的把政府人员(官僚,普通公务员,警察,军队)看成和老板雇佣的员工一样的人民的雇员。

我具体解释一下:老板雇佣员工,是为了压榨员工创造出的剩余价值,老板从员工的劳动中获取利润(这里说的是总体情况,现代资本主义对消费者也进行了大量剥削,其中科技公司的利润主要来自剥削消费者(用户),所以科技公司的员工在自身被剥削的同时也参与了对用户的剥削,所以他们的工资才很高,不过大部分公司还是主要通过剥削员工来获取利润的;此外,金融资本通过投机赌博和欺诈进行二次剥削。);而人民选举议员,市长,总统,“雇佣”公务员,警察,军队,是为了提供捍卫基本人权这一公共服务以及执行人民意志的,政府人员只是人民意志的代行者而已,他们不能有自己的意志,否则就会滥用权力反噬人民(例如警察滥权,公务员腐败,官僚和商人勾结,最典型和最极端的情况就是极权独裁,人民完全对政府失控)。而公共服务的特点是,无法获取利润,或者说,一旦被拿来当成获取利润的工具,那么就必然会制造大灾难,例如共匪市场化教育医疗住房就制造出了无数看不起病上不起学住不起房的悲剧。所以,人民“雇佣”政府人员,是为了捍卫社会上所有人的人权,而不是为了压榨剩余价值获取利润,所以人民不是老板,政府人员也不是员工,政府人员只是也应该只是人民意志的代行者而已。

然后再来看看自由市场。既然自由市场是基于资本主义的,那么就必然拥有资本主义三要素。其中最关键的“生产资料和资本的私人独裁占有”,很显然不是自由的,也正因为这点,资本主义下的公司必然是极权独裁的,这更谈不上自由了。而雇佣劳动的本质是独裁老板压榨员工的剩余价值,也根本就谈不上自由。

哦,等一下。自由市场的鼓吹者根本就不承认老板的利润来自于压榨出的剩余价值,但就算是不承认这点,也是没用的,因为老板们在公司里极权独裁这一事实,是无法否认的。当然新自由主义鹦鹉们和芝加哥哈巴狗们发明了一系列洗地言论,我在博客上的其他文章中已经批驳了很多次了,这里就不再重复了,有兴趣者请自行翻看“批判新自由主义专题”下的文章。哦,不要告诉我员工可以换公司,换公司也没用的,不过是被另一个老板独裁而已。如果不想被独裁,那么就只能:失业喝西北风,当被大资本家压迫的个人小摊主,成为老板压迫别人。也就是说,你要么独裁别人,要么被别人独裁,这根本就不是选择,更谈不上自由。

那么自由市场到底是什么?自由市场的鼓吹者说:自由市场是自由竞争的市场。好吧,那么我们就先抛开老板们极权独裁压榨剩余价值的事实,抛开资本主义制造失业大军以压低工资和控制工人的事实,让我们看看公司之间的“自由竞争”是否存在吧。

自由市场的鼓吹者同时还说,公司之间是公平竞争。哈哈哈哈哈,公平竞争?一家刚创立的什么都没有的公司,和一家跨国企业,相互之间有可能是公平竞争的吗?当然没可能。所以,自由竞争也根本不存在:要么不停的靠资本攻击(具体手段会很肮脏,各种阴谋,勾结,陷害,欺诈,恶性竞争手段不断,反正公司是个黑箱,独裁的老板们能做的小动作太多了)干掉其他企业,要么就被其他企业以相同手段干掉,这算哪门子自由选择?(有个笑话:屠夫问猪:你想被红烧还是被清蒸?说吧,我尊重你的自由选择。猪:我不想被吃,可以吗?屠夫:你看看,你这就超过规则限制了吗。)

那么自由市场中就没有一点自由吗?答案是:有的,但人是没有自由的,只有资本有。资本可以在自由市场中自由的流动,自由的增殖自己,自由的扩张领地,但是处在其中的人,无论是老板还是员工还是个人小摊主还是失业大军,都是毫无自由可言的。

而反对平权和资本主义文化霸权有关。资本主义一直以来都是靠谎言,暴力和收买维护自身的,就和其他所有压迫性的制度一样,而压迫者们最害怕的就是被压迫者之间的联合,所以政客们和老板们为了分裂人民,挑动人民内斗,就必然会鼓吹仇恨,例如种族歧视,民族仇恨,宗教仇恨(例如反穆),“反恐”战争,压迫性少数群体,用压迫性的文化洗脑人民,使得人民为了虚假的文化和宗教因素而放弃切身利益,而政党制度则能够方便的做到这一点,例如把支持宗教价值观和削减福利绑定,就会导致教徒为了支持宗教价值观而同意削减自身福利。(我认为政党制度并不是必要的,而是财团老板们为了维持统治而故意选择的一个最方便他们游说控制的制度,因为游说各个独立候选人的难度比游说一个独裁政党的难度要大多了。

而压迫女性则是因为老板们为了利润最大化,拒绝为劳动力再生产支付任何费用,把生育和抚养成本丢给家庭,同时也因为女性需要为生育和抚养付出时间精力(把抚养责任扔给女性同时也是私有制家庭下男权压迫的表现,包括把家务劳动扔给女性,也是男人对女人的压迫。),碍着老板们最大程度压榨剩余价值了,因此老板们总是排斥压制女性。

当人民的愤怒已经无法被阻挡时,政客们和老板们为了利益会选择彻底毁灭民主,建立法西斯极权专制制度。这就是为什么芝加哥学派会给右翼独裁者们洗地,因为他们为了维护老板们的利益是不顾一切的,只要民主威胁到了老板们的口袋,那么他们就会毫不犹豫的抛弃民主。

同时,自由市场的鼓吹者否定剥削的存在,合理化富人的巨额财富,那么反过来穷人穷困就是因为穷人自己不努力了。我们可以看到,这就是丛林哲学!

至于自由市场的鼓吹者主张政府不得干预市场,呵呵,我想我们已经看到了,自由市场的本质是资本的自由而不是人的自由,而资本自由必然会导致一系列灾难的出现,例如假货满地,例如污染遍天,例如垄断压迫,例如官商勾结侵蚀民主,例如企业残害员工迫害维权消费者,例如投机赌博制造经济危机,如果想要通过政府干预,这是自打脸,同时从外部干预需要的成本很高,一个满足干预需求的政府绝对不可能是自由市场鼓吹者所鼓吹的“小政府”(事实上所有的现代政府都比古代皇权政府要大得多,所以“小政府”从一开始就是个伪概念);如果不干预,呵呵,那么只能是血腥地狱了!

顺便说一句:资本主义总是指责社会主义反人性,但资本主义才是反人性的。资本主义鼓吹“自由竞争”,把所有人都抛入了一个不稳定状态:不知道哪天会被解雇,不知道自己的努力能否转变为工资,不知道公司能否在其他公司的资本攻击下活下来,不知道自己会不会因为公司的目标转变而被公司逼迫更换工作,为了一口饭在老板面前卑躬屈膝,不想加班却被迫加班,被新自由主义的狗屁“个人奋斗”“同事是竞争者”的垃圾逻辑洗脑成孤独的个体,不想透支健康却被迫透支健康,被消费主义洗脑被迫跟风购买自己不需要的商品,为了房子被迫背负巨大债务…….任何人在这样的社会中都不会有任何安全感,而人类是需要安全感的生命,人类是需要相互照顾,相互安慰,相互扶持的,人类通过合作抵抗了恶劣的自然环境,却被资本主义重新拆分为孤独的个体,在资本主义下,普通人被压迫被孤立被焦虑,痛苦而无助,而超级富豪们也被贪欲所吞噬。

最后说一下私有产权:资本主义哈巴狗们所说的私有产权是从来不包括个人财产的,穷人的个人财产资本主义从来都没有保护过,所谓的私有产权不过是为了维持对生产资料和资本的垄断而编造的洗地借口罢了。

总结一下:自由市场中的自由是资本的自由,而不是人的自由,而资本的自由会破坏人的自由,把所有人都变成资本的奴隶,而资本主义为了维持统治,会借助于反平权挑动人民内斗,必要时也会选择彻底毁灭民主,所以自由市场总是和反平权反民主搭配,因为自由市场从一开始就没有任何关于人的自由。