The case for a Universal Basic Income (UBI) has rapidly become part of mainstream political debate. The Labour Party is actively considering the policy, in the US it was revealed Hillary Clinton almost included it as a manifesto pledge. Trials have recently begun across the world, including close to home in Scotland.
1，全民基本收入（UBI）的案例迅速成为主流政治辩论的一部分。 工党正在积极考虑这项政策，在美国，Hillary Clinton几乎将其列为宣言承诺。 最近世界各地开始进行试验，包括靠近家乡的苏格兰。
The policy is again in the news as the Finnish government chose not to fund an extension to their two-year basic income trial. This led to much speculation as to what this means for the policy, leading many to argue that a basic income had fallen flat. In reality, the government simply chose not to fund an extension to what was always intended as a time limited policy experiment. But this provides a useful chance for reflection on the idea of Universal Basic Income, its aims and the debate that surrounds it.
2，该政策再次出现在新闻中时，芬兰政府选择不资助延长他们的两年基本收入试验。 这引发了很多猜测，认为这对政策意味着什么，导致很多人认为基本收入已经失败。 事实上，政府只是选择不资助一个已经被设计为有时间限制的试验。 但是，这为思考普遍基本收入这一想法，它的目标以及围绕它展开的辩论提供了一个有用的机会。
The idea of Universal Basic Income, or Citizens Income, is superficially quite simple. A monthly payment made to every adult and/or child in the population, of equal value and with no conditions attached. No need to search for or be in work, no means testing, just a condition of citizenship.
3，全民基本收入或公民收入这个想法在表面上很简单。 每位成年人和/或儿童每月得到一笔钱，价值相等，没有附加条件。 不需要正在找工作或在工作，也不需要测试，只是公民权利的一部分。
For its proponents, UBI has several benefits. It would remove bureaucracy, and therefore cost, from the system through eliminating means testing, and protects workers in an increasingly insecure labour market. This latter point is particularly important in an age where many are concerned about the impact that automation and AI might have on our working lives, and the resultant power balances between capital and labour.
4，对于其支持者来说，UBI有几个优点。 它将通过测试消除手段来消除系统中的官僚作风，从而消除系统成本，并且在日益不安全的劳动力市场中保护工人。 后一点在许多人担心自动化和AI可能对我们的工作生活产生的影响以及由此产生的资本与劳动力之间的权力平衡的时代显得特别重要。
These benefits, and a perceived coalition of support from both left and right, have led many to view UBI as a potentially revolutionary policy which could bring about positive change to a welfare state battered by years of austerity and ideologically driven reforms.
5，这些好处，以及来自左翼和右翼两方的联合支持已经使许多人认为UBI是一项潜在的革命性政策，可以为受到多年紧缩和意识形态驱动的改革的打击的福利国家带来积极变化。
However, the superficial simplicity of a Universal Basic Income belies a multiplicity of versions, and raises several questions. At what level should a UBI be paid? How does it factor in children? How will it support those with disabilities or who are out of work? Will it sit alongside or replace existing social security arrangements? And most importantly, what are the economic arrangements which govern how a UBI would be paid for?
6，然而，全民基本收入的表面简单特性掩盖了多种版本，并提出了几个问题。 UBI应该在怎样的级别上支付？ 它如何影响儿童？ 它将如何支持那些残疾人或失业的人？ 它会单独存在还是替代现有的社会保障安排？ 最重要的是，关于如何支付UBI的经济安排是什么？
In reality, those who advocate Universal Basic Income have varied motivations for doing so, and there are also multiple versions of what a UBI could look like in practice. For instance, there is a drastic rift between those for whom UBI is about transforming the economy and those for whom it is about papering over its cracks. This acknowledgement is often lacking from the UBI debate, but should be of primary interest.
7，事实上，那些主张全民基本收入的人有不同的动机，而且在实践中也有多种版本的UBI。 例如，在认为UBI是转变经济的那些人中间与在认为UBI是那些为了抹平社会裂缝的人之间存在着巨大的裂痕。 在关于UBI的辩论中通常缺乏这种认知，但这应该是主要的议题。
Those who seek a radical departure from capitalism see UBI as part of a radical platform to move away from a world in which work is central to our lives, identities and economies. In their book Inventing the Future, Alex Williams and Nick Srnicek argue that UBI is a fundamental part of delivering a new economy in which citizens have much greater freedom over when and if they work.
8，那些试图彻底抛弃资本主义的人将UBI视为一个激进平台的一部分，用以摆脱一个以工作在我们的生活，身份和经济中占中心地位的世界。 在他们的书“发明未来”中，Alex Williams和Nick Srnicek认为UBI是提供新经济的基础部分，在那里公民们在工作时间和是否工作方面拥有更大的自由。
To do this, Williams and Srnicek acknowledge that UBI “must provide a sufficient amount of income to live on” so that people can refuse employment, thereby freeing them to engage in more meaningful labour, whether paid or unpaid. This is often picked on to claim that a UBI would simply be unaffordable. There is truth in this. While Williams and Srnickek have not proposed a specific payment level, modelling conducted by IPPR shows that were a UBI paid at a high enough level to meet the Minimum Income Standard (a measure of what the public think people need for an acceptable minimum standard of living), it would cost around £1.7 trillion a year – equivalent to almost all of the UK’s GDP in 2016.
9，为了做到这些，Williams和Srnicek认为UBI“必须提供足够的收入来维持生活”，以便人们可以拒绝就业，从而把他们解放出来，使他们能够从事更有意义的劳动，无论是带薪还是无偿。 这常常导致有人声称UBI简直无法承受。 这是有道理的。 虽然Williams和Srnickek没有提出具体的支付水平，IPPR进行的模拟表明，当UBI的支付水平足以满足最低收入标准（衡量公众认为人们需要达到可接受的最低生活标准的程度 ）时，每年需要1.7万亿英镑左右的费用 – 几乎等同于2016年英国所有的GDP。
What this shows is that for UBI to be a viable proposition at these levels, there would need to be a fundamental transformation in the ownership of the economy. Williams and Srnicek acknowledge this, arguing that UBI will only work in combination with large scale and collectively owned automation, a reduction in the working week and a shift in social attitudes around the value of the ‘work ethic’.
10，这表明，对于UBI而言，在这些层面上可行的主张将需要对经济所有权进行根本性转变。 Williams和Srnicek承认这一点，认为UBI只能与大规模和集体所有的自动化相结合，工作周的减少，以及围绕“职业道德”价值观的社会态度的转变。
It is this level of transformation which sets the ‘post-workists’ against many other proponents of the policy. Those who argue for a basic income from a post-work platform have little in common with the tech entrepreneurs of Silicon Valley who are funding trials of UBI in the US. For this group, the appeal of a basic income lies in its ability to offset the impacts of automation and AI, whilst their creators still accrue the benefits. Here, rather than using technology to facilitate a radical platform, UBI is a capitulation to the rise of inequality in the age of the robot and AI.
11，正是这种转变级别使得“后工作主义者”反对许多其他这一政策的支持者。 那些主张从工作后平台获得基本收入的人与在美国资助UBI试验的硅谷科技企业家几乎没有共同之处。 对于这个群体来说，基本收入的吸引力在于它能够抵消自动化和人工智能的影响，同时他们的创造者仍然获得收益。 在这里，UBI不是利用技术来建立一个激进的平台，而是对在机器人和人工智能时代上升的不平等的投降。
This critique has been central to the argument forwarded by left wing opponents to UBI who argue that it is an individualistic policy that accepts a status quo in which capital exploits labour. These criticisms recognise that as an indiscriminate policy UBI is blind to structural inequalities in a way the labour market isn’t. As Anna Cootes notes, UBI fails “to tackle the underlying causes of poverty, unemployment and inequality”.
12，这种批判是左翼反对者向UBI提出的论点的核心，他们认为这是一种接受资本剥削劳工的现状的个人主义政策。 这些批评认识到作为一项不进行任何区分的政策，UBI对于结构性不平等是盲目的，并不像劳动力市场那样。 正如Anna Cootes指出的，UBI未能“解决贫困，失业和不平等的根本原因”。
That there are radically different visions for Universal Basic Income is somewhat lost in a policy debate, which often presents UBI as a catch all policy which can offer both cost-effective efficiency and radical emancipation for those on low incomes. Worryingly this tension, and the myth of a coalition of support between left and right which underpins it, might see policymakers sleep walking into a position that suits very few.
13，对于全民基本收入存在着极端不同的看法在政策辩论中有所丢失，这种辩论常常将UBI视为所有能够为低收入者提供具有成本效益的效率和激进解放的政策的一项措施。 令人担忧的是，这种紧张局势和支撑它的左翼和右翼的联合支持的神话可能会让政策制定者们走入一个适合很少人的位置。
In Scotland for example, the Green Party has proposed a model of UBI which could get close to being fiscally neutral. This would see much of the existing welfare system replaced by a payment of £5,200 per year for adults and £2,600 for children, alongside significant reform the tax system. In this scenario, personal allowances would be removed and combined tax and NI rates increased for all.
14，例如，在苏格兰，绿党提出了一个UBI模型，该模型可能接近于财务中性。这将看到许多现有的福利制度被替换成向成年人支付5,200英镑，向儿童支付2,600英镑，同时还有重大的税制改革。 在这种情况下，个人津贴将被撤销，复合税率和国民税率都会增加。
Citing security in the labour market as a key reason for the policy proposal, this model has been welcomed by proponents of UBI. However, at £400 a month for adults while also removing almost all the welfare state, it is unlikely to buy much economic freedom for those on low incomes or insecure and exploitative employment contracts. In reality some would see their incomes drop. For instance, in Scotland lone parents would see their monthly earnings fall by around £300 a month.
15，确保劳动力市场的安全性是作为政策提案的一个关键理由，这种模式受到了UBI的支持者的欢迎。 然而，对于成年人而言每月400英镑同时也移除了几乎所有福利国家，但对于低收入者或签订了不安全和剥削的就业合同的人来说，购买很多经济自由的可能性不大。 事实上有些人会看到他们的收入下降了。 例如，在苏格兰，单身父母每月的收入会下降300英镑左右。
What’s more, a model of UBI paid at this level would also have notable impacts on rates of relative poverty. Were this model introduced in the UK as a whole, it would also raise relative child poverty by 17%, placing a further 750,000 children into households who earn below 60% of the median income. This is because while it would raise the incomes of those earning the least, it would also raise incomes for all but the highest income decile, lifting the poverty line higher.
16，更重要的是，这种在这一水平上的UBI支付模式也会对相对贫困率产生显著影响。 如果这个模型在整个英国引入，它还会使儿童的相对贫困率增加17％，并将75万名儿童增加到收入水平低于中等收入的60％的家庭中。这是因为虽然这会提高收入最低的人的收入，但除了最高收入等级之外，它还会提高其他所有人的收入，从而抬高了贫困线。
Research commissioned by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation has similarly found that UBI schemes increase relative poverty for working age adults, children and pensioners. The introduction of a UBI, according to their modelling, could see the number of children in poverty rise by up to 60%.
17，Joseph Rowntree基金会委托进行的研究同样发现UBI计划增加了在工作年龄的成年人，儿童和养老金领取者的相对贫困程度。 根据他们的模型，UBI的引入会造成贫困儿童的人数上升60％。
Increasing the incomes of those at the bottom of the distribution is imperative. This is demonstrated clearly by the rise of food banks deprivation and income crisis in the UK since 2010, which is a direct result of government policy choices. However, using a UBI to achieve this, at the expense of say increases or reforms to Universal Credit and a more generous and less conditional unemployment benefit, comes at the cost of addressing, and in fact exacerbating, relative poverty.
18，增加分配底层人员的收入势在必行。 自2010年以来，英国食品银行的匮乏和收入危机的抬头就清楚地表明了这一点，这是政府政策选择造成的直接结果。 然而，使用UBI来实现这一目标，其代价是增加或改革普遍债务，以及更慷慨和更少条件限制的失业福利，这是以造成相对贫困为代价的，并且事实上加剧了相对贫困。
Action on relative poverty is important, and inequality is not cost free. As Kate Pickett and Richard Wilkinson show in their book ‘The Spirit Level’, countries with higher rates of inequality perform worse against a range of social outcomes – physical health, mental health, drug abuse, education, imprisonment, obesity, social mobility, trust and community life.
19，对相对贫困进行行动很重要，不平等不是免费的。 正如Kate Pickett和Richard Wilkinson在他们的书“精神等级”中所表明的那样，不平等程度较高的国家对一系列社会结果表现更差 – 身体健康，心理健康，药物滥用，教育，监禁，肥胖，社会流动，信任和社区生活。
The pursuit of a fiscally neutral UBI has led to a series of proposals which, if implemented, would do little to raise the material circumstance of those in poverty nor provide sufficient additional power in the labour market. In light of this, can it be really said that such proposals meaningfully fit with a progressive, radical vision for the welfare state?
20，追求财政中立的UBI已经产生了一系列提案，如果得到落实，这些提案几乎无助于提高贫困人口的物质状况，也不会为劳动力市场提供足够的额外动力。鉴于此，这样的建议是否真的可以说符合福利国家渐进式的激进愿景？
The need to act in delivering a better vision for the welfare state is clear. In 2016, 22% per cent of adults and 30% of children were living in poverty. By 2019/20 the number of children in poverty could increase by 500,000. This is driven by political choices, the consequence of welfare reform and austerity. As such, it is welcome that as a society we are discussing more ambitious plans for the collectivisation of income and wealth and how it can be best deployed to support the needs of all in society.
21，明确表达出为福利国家提供更好愿景的必要性是很清晰的。在2016年，22％的成年人和30％的儿童生活在贫困中。 到2019/20年，贫困儿童人数可能增加到50万。 这是由政治选择推动的，福利改革和紧缩造成的后果。因此，值得欢迎的是，作为一个社会，我们正在讨论更加雄心勃勃的关于集体化收入和财富的计划，以及如何最好地分配以支持社会上的所有人的需求。
However, unless we are to engage in a radical economic transformation which drastically increases common ownership of economy, it is unlikely that Universal Basic Income on its own will do more than lock us into our current predicament. In the meantime, we need to look for equally radical policies which make a much more material difference to the lives of those on low incomes and who suffer from structural inequalities. Proponents of UBI need to go big or go home.
22，然而，除非我们要进行一场彻底的经济转型，这会大大增加集体的经济所有权，否则基本收入本身不可能做除了把我们锁在目前的困境中的之外的事。与此同时，我们需要寻求同样激进的政策，这些政策对低收入者和遭受结构性不平等问题的人的生活产生更大的物质影响。 UBI的支持者们需要做大，或回家。